Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

377. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

139368.

Washington, May 29, 1981, 0111Z

SUBJECT

• Moroccan Foreign Minister’s Meetings With Vice President Bush and Under Secretary Stoessel.

Ref:

• Rabat 3491.²

1. S—Entire text.

2. Moroccan Foreign Minister Boucetta held discussions with Vice President Bush and Under Secretary Stoessel on May 12. The meeting with Vice President Bush was a brief but useful visit attended by Secretary Haig, Assistant Secretary Veliotes, and Admiral Murphy (the Vice President’s Chief of Staff), Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Richard V. Allen and NSC Senior Staff Member James M. Rentschler. Boucetta delivered King Hassan’s message to the Vice President.³ In his exchange with the Vice President Boucetta stressed the danger of Qadhafi’s subversive activities in North Africa.

3. Sahara Background. With Under Secretary Stoessel, Boucetta reviewed the evolution of the Sahara issue in the OAU, confirming Morocco’s acceptance of both a ceasefire and a UN-supervised referendum. Boucetta said last year 16 or 17 OAU members would have joined Morocco in walking out if SDAR had been admitted, including Senegal, Guinea, Ivory Coast and Sudan. He said there were 26 members who recognized the SDAR. He said there are about 60,000 people left in the settled areas of the Sahara.

4. Sahara Consultation. While Boucetta pointed out that modalities for the popular consultation still needed to be worked out, he envisaged a procedure similar to the one used in West Irian.⁴ In conducting a consultation the 1974 Spanish census could provide a useful tool, he said.⁵ In response to a question by Stoessel on the nature of the consultation, Boucetta replied that it would give the population a choice between independence or the status quo. In response to a follow-up question, Boucetta confirmed that the official Moroccan position was to accept some form of consultation under UN or OAU supervision in which Saharans would be given an option of independence or joining Morocco. He said Morocco will consider any formula for the consultation and supervision. He left clear impression, however, that Morocco does not have proposal of its own, but is awaiting proposal from the OAU.

5. Algeria. Boucetta said that the Algerians were reluctant to get involved in negotiations for fear of being confronted with questions about the justice of territorial adjustments made by France during the colonial era in which Morocco lost some of its patrimony to Algeria. Boucetta acknowledged that Moroccan-Algerian discussions had taken place in France, Switzerland and Taif. Algeria, like Morocco, agrees to support the OAU’s call for a ceasefire and referendum. Boucetta said it is in the interest of Algeria and Morocco to work together.

6. OAU Summit. Regarding the possibility of SDAR membership in the upcoming OAU summit in Nairobi, Boucetta said this would destroy current efforts to implement the OAU Wisemen recommendations; Morocco seeks an honorable solution. He said the issue of SDAR admittance to the OAU must await the completion of the procedure on the Wisemen recommendations. He hoped that the U.S. could support Morocco particularly in the Anglophone countries of Africa.

7. Mauritania. Boucetta stressed that Morocco had no territorial design on Mauritania wishing only that it remain neutral in the conflict.

8. UN. In discussing Morocco’s acceptance of a UN supervised referendum in the Western Sahara, Ambassador Bengelloun noted that SecGen Waldheim was proceeding very cautiously in this regard because of the forthcoming UN Secretary General election. (Bengelloun said that Morocco preferred OAS SecGen Orfila over Tanzania’s UN representative, Salim, whom he described as a Marxist). Boucetta said that the UN had not approached Morocco about holding a referendum. In response to Veliotes question he said the Algerians continue to prevent the UNHCR from conducting a census of the refugee camps in Tindouf.

9. Military Situation. In reply to a question about Polisario military activity, Boucetta told Stoessel that the Polisario have sophisticated weapons but they lack manpower and were trying to recruit in Mauritania. Boucetta said that Libya is the main arms supplier to the Polisario and the chief financial, political, and diplomatic supporter as well. (He said that the Moroccans had captured some equipment still bearing Libyan stencils.) He claimed that the Polisario are being trained in Libyan camps assisted by Soviet advisors.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Western Sahara.]

Haig

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810251–1030. Secret; Immediate; Exdis; Noforn. Drafted by Kuniholm; cleared by Flaten, Seitz, Rentschler, Nance, and Dennis Sandberg (S/S–O), and in substance by Richard Baker (P); approved by Veliotes. Sent for information Priority to Algiers. Sent for information to Dakar, Libreville, Kinshasa, Lagos, Freetown, Khartoum, Nairobi, Abidjan, Conakry, Cairo, Bamako, Dar es Salaam, Paris, and Lomé.
2. In telegram 3491 from Rabat, May 16, Sebastian said Boucetta had called him in “to say how much he had appreciated courtesies shown him during his recent sojourn in Washington” as well as the “extensive substantive exchanges afforded him” by Haig, Stoessel, “and their collaborators concerned with Morocco’s part of the world.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810232–0671)
3. No record of Hassan’s message to Bush has been found.
4. Reference is to the so-called 1969 “Act of Free Choice,” whereby inhabitants of Papua and West Papua (West Irian or Western Guinea) were allowed to vote in a referendum on whether or not they wished to become independent from Indonesia.
5. Spain controlled Western Sahara until it gave joint control of the region to Morocco and Mauritania in 1975.