Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

375. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Haig in Amman¹

Tosec 20154/87810.

Washington, April 7, 1981, 1929Z

For Draper and General Walters. Following CIA 040048Z Apr 81, sent action DIRNSA Dept of State DIA Treasury Dept White House NSC CIA Office of Current Operations, being repeated for your info. Subject: Indications of Moroccan Readiness to Pursue Polisario Forces Into Mauritania.

[less than 1 line not declassified]

1. [3 lines not declassified]

2. In early April, [1 line not declassified] Moroccan King Hassan II has decided that Moroccan forces will be permitted to pursue Polisario units into Mauritanian territory if the Polisario again launches a major attack from Mauritania against Moroccan positions in the Western Sahara. [less than 1 line not declassified] the King had made this decision after receiving “solid evidence” that Polisario forces had come from positions inside Mauritania prior to launching their late March attack against the Moroccan garrison at Guelta Zemmur. The King added that Morocco was prepared to take this action despite the probability that relations between Algeria and Morocco would worsen as a result.² [less than 1 line not declassified] comment: [less than 1 line not declassified] did not specifically state what form the Moroccan pursuit would take, but implied that the Moroccan forces would launch air attacks against retreating Polisario units if they are found in Mauritanian territory.) [less than 1 line not declassified] comment: [1½ lines not declassified] the King has decided to permit Moroccan forces to attack the Polisario inside Mauritanian territory if the Polisario again uses Mauritania as a staging area for attacks against Moroccan positions. [less than 1 line not declassified] the initial Moroccan response would be air attacks against Polisario units found in northern Mauritania, but if such strikes “did not solve the problem,” ground troops would be committed across the border.)

3. [2 lines not declassified]

4. There continues to be a heavy, urgent build-up of Moroccan armed forces in the combat zone of Smara and Guelta Zemmur in preparation for “a special mission.” In late March–early April elements of the 6th Mechanized Infantry Regiment (RIM) located in the Boucraa and Smara zone were reinforced with the following equipment: 42 assorted trucks to transport munitions, supplies and water; ten LandRovers/Jeeps; twelve 130mm cannons. The 4th Royal Artillery Group (GAR) in the Smara zone also received the following additional equipment: 47 assorted trucks, 23 LandRovers/Jeeps, three 105mm cannons, three 89 mm Lance rocket launchers, twelve 14.5mm machine guns, twenty 12.7mm machine guns, and 13 unspecified anti-aircraft machine guns. Accompanying both of these reinforcements of vehicles and arms was an assortment of support equipment, such as radio transmitters and receivers, fuel and food. ([less than 1 line not declassified]) comment: Moroccan forces in the combat area have been placed in a high state of readiness in preparation to conduct a special mission to block off Polisario forces in the area between Smara and Guelta Zemmur. The 4th GAR, and 6th RIM will conduct sweep operations in coordination with a special task force currently located at Guelta Zemmur. These Moroccan units will be ready to pursue Polisario forces if they retreat into Mauritanian territory.) [3 lines not declassified]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810165–0136. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Thor Kuniholm (NEA/AFN); cleared by William Imbrie (NEA) and Sylvia Blumenthal (INR/INC/IC); approved by Coon. Haig was visiting Amman and Riyadh to discuss the Middle East peace process.
2. In telegram 2174 from Rabat, March 26, the Embassy reported: “Rabat Core Country Team assessment is that a Polisario attack did take place on Guelta Zemmour on or about March 23–24, that Polisario forces very likely did at least cross Mauritanian territory, but that the attacking force was considerably smaller than the Moroccans have publicly claimed.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810143–0813)