Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

370. Memorandum From the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Kramer) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

Washington, January 24, 1981

SUBJECT

• Moroccan Port Visit

(S) As you are aware, Secretary Haig would like to offer to Morocco a visit in the first week of February by elements of the Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) to a Moroccan port south of Tangier.² The main objective of the visit would be to signal the Soviets who, since January 16,³ have been keeping a destroyer, frigate and oiler off Western Sahara waters apparently in response to the Moroccan seizure of 3 Soviet trawlers, 1 factory ship, and 1 Cuban ship which were fishing inside Moroccan-claimed waters.⁴ We do not know if the Moroccans have asked for such a visit or whether it is Secretary Haig’s idea to offer to them.

(C) The United States has long had an excellent port relationship with Morocco. Visits generally occur every two to three months. The last visit was by three ships into Tangier, September 29–October 3. The next scheduled visit is by two ships of the Mediterranean ARG, the USS EL PASO (LKA–117) and the USS NEWPORT (LST–1179), into Tangier February 7–9. These ships have a combined crew of 579 and 330 embarked Marines.

(S) The seized Soviet and Cuban ships are being held at Dakhla, which is in the territory contested between the Moroccans and the Polisario. A visit to Dakhla would be viewed as a sharp tilt to the Moroccans in this struggle, a stance we have tried to avoid because we are interested in building our relationship with Algeria (which has substantial economic ties with the United States) and because recently there are intelligence reports that Morocco and Algeria are about ready to settle the dispute. It is fair to say that we have, from time to time, tilted toward the Moroccans in the past, most especially through the provision of weapons (F–5s, OV–10s, etc.),⁵ but we have done so largely to avoid a tilt in the military balance in the Western Sahara against the Moroccans. Our calculation has been that, without our military assistance, King Hassan might be unable to cope with either the Polisario or internal pressure and it definitely is in our interest that Hassan retain his throne. At the same time we provided military assistance, we pressed the King to settle the dispute and avoided gestures which indicated we agreed that the Moroccans had sovereignty in the Western Sahara. In the current situation, there is no need to take a position in the Polisario context and strong reasons—avoiding disruption of our Algerian relationship and the possible settlement—not to do so. Accordingly, we recommend against a visit to Dakhla.

(S) There are other ports south of Tangier which the ships could probably be rerouted to, e.g., Casablanca (JCS and Navy are looking at the technical feasibility). None of these are very close to Dakhla. However, because we do not usually visit these ports, the Soviets should notice the change and there is some possibility that they would take it as a signal, although the distances are sufficiently significant (and we have occasionally had port visits to Casablanca—one frigate in last year) so that they likely would miss the point. Assuming (as is likely) the technical feasibility of visiting, for example, Casablanca, there is little reason not to do so if such a visit would be satisfactory to the Moroccans. Normally, port visits are scheduled a month or more in advance, but short-notice procedures do exist and such a visit could be accommodated from their side if they wish. On the other hand, if the point is to impress the Soviets, the Moroccans might well wish the ships to come further south and, as indicated above, such an action would have significant drawbacks. In short, while a visit to Casablanca has few drawbacks, an offer to visit Casablanca might get us into waters we’d rather avoid.

(S) There is an alternative which would make the point to the Soviets, yet avoid the drawbacks of a visit to Dakhla. We could operate either by ourselves or in conjunction with the Moroccans in the vicinity of the Soviet fleet. (The JCS and CINCLANT could be tasked to come up with an appropriate mix of ships.) If the problem persists over time, we could shorten the interval between our regularly scheduled port visits to Morocco (although I would note the Moroccans and Soviets are negotiating over the disposition of the fishing vessels and we have indications that the dispute will be solved reasonably soon, with the Soviets paying a fine and leaving).

(S) In sum, I recommend against altering our currently scheduled port visit. I would instead propose that we explore with the Moroccans the desirability of our operating in the vicinity of the Soviet warships.⁶

Franklin D. Kramer
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Acting)

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–83–0104, 1981 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 13, Morocco (Jan–Jun). Secret.
2. No record of Haig’s offer has been found.
3. The date is in error. In telegram 184 from Rabat, January 10, the Embassy noted a DAO report of “the presence of Soviet naval ships off the Western Sahara coast. On or about January 5, a Soviet minesweeper reportedly crossed the 12-mile limit off Cape Baras (Western Sahara), an area considered by Morocco as territorial waters. The Moroccans may not be aware of this intrusion. A Soviet frigate moved in on Jan. 6 close to the limit near Dakhla, where one Cuban and three Soviet trawlers are being held.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810015–0874)
4. In telegram 9345 from Rabat, December 8, 1980, the Embassy reported: “General Ahmed Dlimi, Moroccan Commander in the Sahara, has confirmed to AFP that the Moroccan Coast Guard has taken in to Dakhla one Cuban and two Soviet fishing vessels. Dlimi mentioned that one Soviet seaman had been wounded when the Moroccans fired warning rounds at the vessel found illegally in Moroccan waters.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D800585–0311)
5. See footnote 2, Document 100.
6. In telegram 21635 to Rabat, January 28, the Department reported: “The Secretary with concurrence of DOD has decided that a well-publicized US naval visit to Agadir would be desirable in order to send a signal to the Soviets in response to their positioning of three naval vessels off Dakhla, Western Sahara following Moroccan seizure and detention of several Soviet fishing vessels in December and January.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810040–1154) Agadir is approximately 285 miles from the Western Sahara-Morocco border.