Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

369. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

555.

Rabat, January 24, 1981, 0830Z

SUBJECT

• Comments on Hassan’s Hard Line on the Sahara.

Ref:

• Rabat 477.²

1. C—Entire text.

2. The Embassy offers the following comments regarding King Hassan’s purposes and objectives in taking a hard line on the Sahara conflict in his recent “Der Spiegel” interview (reftel). They coincide with those of two very high level government officials who, while not direct participants in the King’s current Sahara planning, possess the position and background to offer particularly well-informed judgments. In the interview Hassan spoke of winning the war militarily by the end of the month, continued to rule out talks with the Polisario as such and highlighted the danger to all posed by Qadhafi’s rogue regime. He also said that negotiations are not now in train with Algeria (which country he avoided criticizing.)

3. Our contacts believe, as do we, that the interview had major tactical aspects and that the possibility of a meeting with Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid at Ta’if was an important determinant of its content; clearly, a Moroccan projection of strength is to be expected as contingency planning before any possible meeting with Chadli. We have learned that it was decided at time of interview (Jan 8) that it would be embargoed until Jan 21, and it is clear that date of its release was picked with King’s imminent departure for Ta’if summit,³ in mind—where efforts have been underway to bring him together with Chadli and where, additionally, Gulf state donors are due a reading on the results of their heavy donations to Morocco’s defense budget. The accession of the new American administration was also undoubtedly relevant to interview’s timing, as was French PriMin’s visit beginning Jan 22.⁴

4. Part of the interview was directed at Europe. As noted above, it was given Jan 8 immediately following King’s conversation with Lord Carrington (1/6)⁵ and FRG Chancellor Schmidt (1/7).⁶ As we know, King struck certain themes during these talks which reappear here, viz., Morocco’s military progress in Sahara; need for greater European support for Morocco’s efforts there and for its future economic viability (e.g, on question of Morocco’s exports to EC); need for equitable MidEast solution which would take account of Palestinian rights, given that US will not abandon Camp David and that (as Hassan believes) MidEast peace not achievable without some form of Soviet participation; the desirability for active European role in MidEast to strengthen hands of moderate (read: Morocco) to achieve all this.

5. The interview also quite naturally reflects the evolution of situation on ground, viz., expansion of Moroccan system of fortifications in Western Sahara which Polisario has been able to slow but not prevent; increasing control of Moroccans over key Saharan population centers and an improved sense of security there; growing concern in Africa and beyond over Libyan activities in Chad and over Afghanistan; approaching presidential election in France; Saudi effort at Ta’if to heal rifts dividing Moslem world and collapse of Begin government in Israel. Finally, the interview provides an assessment of the results of five years of fighting clearly meant to influence political parties and reassure the local population, which has tended increasingly to perceive Moroccan economic and financial problems as war-related. In sum, the King’s interview was addressed to several audiences: Moroccan, American, Algerian, European and that of the Ta’if summit participants. Hassan, at this juncture, has persuasive reasons for wanting to look like a winner to all of these: Bendjedid whom he could face across a negotiating table; the Saudis and other supporters; the new American administration (Morocco which has soldiered on without much American help is a winner, worthy of support and with much to offer in African and MidEast arenas); Moroccans concerned about their daily bread; and Europeans to whom he presents himself as the Arab spokesman.

6. Treatment of negotiation issue seems worthy of particular note. The King does not say that there have been no contacts with Algeria—and, indeed, statements to the contrary have been bandied about for months—nor does he assert that there will be none, only that there are no negotiations being held with Algeria now. Polisario, he adds is not fit interlocutor because it is not Moroccan. Obviously, the long-standing Moroccan thesis that peace requires a prior understanding with Algeria would have been fatally weakened had the King left open the possibility of Polisario negotiations while the Algerians continue to decline to participate publicly in talks. Significantly, he asserts that he will see once he has won who his interlocutors will be. Any feint in that (Polisario) direction would not only have produced domestic discord and dismay but would also have tended to validate the Algerian thesis that Morocco’s quarrel is with the Polisario, not Algeria. Any indication that contacts with the Algerians were continuing would have offended the Algerians, who have maintained publicly that there aren’t any; raised suspicions among Moroccan politicians that a deal—which they would be asked to endorse—was being concocted behind their backs by Hassan and Chadli; and, finally, raised to unrealistically high levels public anticipation of a “miracle” meeting at Ta’if between the two heads of state, which if not held or unsuccessful risked the danger of dealing with disillusionment. In sum, we think Hassan clearly still wants to meet with Chadli and that his denial of current contacts with Algeria seems to have been designed precisely to keep open the possibility of a productive meeting with his Algerian counterpart.

7. Unsurprisingly, in view of the above, the King was as tough as he has ever been on the question of negotiating with the Polisario. One new element was Hassan’s redefinition of the Polisario: its Saharan component is authentically Moroccan—though only one of ten “authentic” Saharan groups. As Moroccans, its members can be pardoned but never accepted as negotiators.

8. The OAU referendum element of problem is notable by its absence in King’s presentation. It is not at all clear whether Hassan judges that Libya’s activities in Chad have so alarmed key OAU states such as Nigeria that the pressure for implementing the “Wisemen”⁷ recommendations has eased—or whether, on the other hand, Hassan for his own reasons wants to preserve the concept of a popular consultation staged among increasingly more secure Sahara population. Our contacts believe the King’s eventual decision on “consultation” will be an ad hoc one, subject to the full range of relevant factors as they emerge this spring.

Duke

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810038–0350. Confidential. Sent for information to Addis Ababa, Algiers, Bonn, Dakar, Jidda, Madrid, Nouakchott, Paris, Tunis, and USUN.
2. In telegram 477 from Rabat, January 21, the Embassy reported: “In a recent interview, Hassan argued that Morocco will have resolved the Sahara conflict militarily by the end of the month, after which there might be negotiations—but not with the Polisario. The King saw an evolution in Algerian policy and expressed the belief that Morocco now has less reason to be concerned about OAU condemnation. He said there were no negotiations with Algeria now.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810034–1004)
3. In telegram 370 from Algiers, January 24, the Embassy reported: “Such summits always stimulate speculation” that Hassan and Bendjedid “will meet and perhaps settle the Western Sahara issue. The Algerian precondition for such a meeting so far has been that there must be an agreed agenda, meaning that Algeria would agree to such a meeting only if it were a prelude to Morocco-Polisario negotiations.” The Embassy concluded: “Even if the two chiefs of state do meet bilaterally we doubt that they will address the Western Sahara problem directly.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810037–0950)
4. French Prime Minister Raymond Barré visited Morocco January 21–24.
5. British Foreign Minister Lord Carrington visited Morocco January 5–6.
6. Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Helmut Schmidt visited Morocco January 6–7.
7. In telegram 6384 from Rabat, September 12, 1980, the Embassy reported that an ad hoc, six-member “Wisemen” meeting on Western Sahara in Freetown proposed a “six-point recommendation for a peaceful resolution of the Western Sahara conflict,” which included “a ‘just and general’ referendum” organized by the OAU “with UN assistance,” as well as a ceasefire monitored by the UN. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D800435–0765)