371. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Morocco and Nigeria1

38353.

SUBJECT

  • Western Sahara and the OAU Ministerial.

Refs:

  • (A) Rabat 980;2
  • (B) Lagos 1806.3
1.
(C) Entire text.
2.
Department is concerned that if issue of Western Sahara is raised at Addis OAU Ministerial4 and attempts made to admit SDAR, debates will be highly divisive and deflect from current OAU efforts to seek removal of Libyan forces from Chad. In addition, debates on this issue would impede progress towards settlement of the Saharan dispute within the OAU framework, and would in particular hinder our own efforts to bring the Moroccans to the negotiating table.
3.
For Lagos: In light of current Nigerian efforts to seek resolution of Chad problem, we suggest following points be made to Nigerians at level and in manner you consider most appropriate:
As you know, the USG strongly supports OAU and Nigerian efforts to secure withdrawal of Libyan forces from Chad.5
We realize the importance of African unity on this issue and recognize the leadership role which your government is playing in maintaining that unity.
Efforts to raise the issue of SDAR membership at the upcoming OAU Ministerial could have divisive effect on African unity and detract from the efforts you and other African governments are making to secure the withdrawal of Libyan forces from Chad.
We think we have made some progress with Morocco on the Western Sahara issue. This administration wants to explore subject further with the GOM in order to see how it can best help lay the groundwork for a solution within the OAU framework.
Meanwhile it would be helpful if the OAU Wisemen could use the period between now and July summit to attempt to engage the Moroccans in steps following up in the Moroccan GA statement last fall.6
For all these reasons, it would be helpful if the issue of SDAR membership were not debated at the Addis summit, both to avoid dividing OAU at critical juncture, and in order not to limit our and the OAU’s options for achieving a negotiated settlement.
4.
For Rabat: You should inform Tazi or other GOM official of foregoing. At your discretion, you may also pass on the suggestion that Morocco send a special representative to Lagos (para 8 ref B).
5.
For info addressees: We expect to authorize at least some of you to weigh in along comparable lines but prefer to await initial feedback from Lagos and Rabat before giving green light. Meanwhile you may if you wish send Department your in-house reactions to foregoing. We would also appreciate your comments on Lagos’ suggestion that a Moroccan delegation be sent to shore up support among other African moderates.
Haig
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810070–0610. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Coon; cleared in draft by James Roach (S/P), R. Grant Smith (IO/UNP), and Borg; cleared by Princeton Lyman (AF/I); approved by Draper. Sent for information Priority to OAU Collective.
  2. In telegram 980 from Rabat, February 9, the Embassy reported on February 6 that Tazi “asked for US diplomatic support in capitals for GOM efforts now in course to block Algerian moves designed enhance status of Polisario ‘government’ (SDAR) in OAU. He said Moroccans would fight efforts of Algerians and others in NAM to introduce Saharan issue into proceedings.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810065–0417) In telegram 657 from Algiers, February 15, the Embassy reported: “In a joint FLN-Polisario communiqué published in Algiers February 11, the FLN ‘reaffirmed the total and unconditional commitment of the Algerian revolution to the struggle carried on by the Sahrawi people under the leadership of its sole and legitimate representative, the Polisario Front, for national liberation, for the achievement of its national independence, and for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its state. The FLN considers that the SDAR constitutes a factor of equilibrium and stability and that respect for the SDAR is a condition for peace, cooperation and concord in the region.’” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810073–1181)
  3. In telegram 1806 from Lagos, February 12, the Embassy agreed “that every effort should be made to forestall moves to secure SDAR admission to OAU at the Addis meeting.” The Embassy also commented: “There appears little appreciation in the GOM of the strength of Nigerian opposition to the present situation in the Western Sahara.” The Embassy continued: “On the other hand the Nigerians do not want to see an open split in the OAU and will go to some length to avoid a confrontation over the issue.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810067–0804)
  4. The OAU Ministerial meeting was held in Addis Ababa February 23–25.
  5. References are to, respectively, the OAU’s call for Libyan withdrawal from and the holding of free elections in Chad made at the November 1980 OAU meeting in Lagos and Nigeria’s attempts to secure Libya’s withdrawal from Chad.
  6. In telegram 5035 from USUN, November 12, 1980, the Mission reported that the Moroccan representative “insisted on its right and duty to defend its territorial integrity, and declared the UN resolution on the Sahara null and void.” Reference is to the Albanian resolution which called for a popular referendum in Western Sahara. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D800544–1044)