Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

36. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

5882.

Rabat, July 5, 1984, 1120Z

SUBJECT

• King Hassan on State of Relations With Libya and Algeria.

1. (Secret—Entire text.)

2. Summary: Following July 3 meeting with Air Force Chief of Staff, General Charles Gabriel,² King Hassan took Ambassador aside for one-hour private audience. The exchange, which covered multiple topics (septels)³ included review of present Moroccan relations with both Libya and Algeria. While aware of limited Libyan resupply of Polisario, Hassan remains most concerned by Algerian intentions. Dialogue with President Bendjedid, he said, has reached highly sensitive phase even including exploratory discussion of Maghreb “confederation”. End summary.

3. At the conclusion of audience on military issues with General Charles Gabriel, King Hassan continued discussion for one hour with Ambassador Reed. While conversation covered many subjects, Hassan clearly wished to provide highly sensitive, close-hold up date on state of play with Libya and Algeria. The King began by indicating his awareness of resumed, but still limited, Libyan resupply of Polisario guerrillas. Hassan stated that, following the recent attempted coup in Libya, Colonel Qadhafi was convinced of Moroccan complicity and recalled his Ambassador in Rabat. Hassan subsequently sent an emissary to Qadhafi to make clear that, effective July 16, 1983, he had ceased all training for Libyan opposition elements. He further requested and received Qadhafi’s agreement for reassignment of the Libyan Ambassador who is well regarded locally. The King continued that he is aware that Libya has since dispatched several plane loads of supplies to the Polisario, but the assistance, he said, is limited and he is not yet concerned. War in the Sahara, he summarized, had ended in a military sense with expulsion of the Polisario from the territory.

4. Turning to Algeria, Hassan said that Libyan resupply could not take place without Algerian approval. Recalling his meeting with President Bendjedid in February 1983, he reiterated that Morocco’s interest in the Sahara remains only the symbolism of the Moroccan flag and postage stamps. He said that Morocco is already a large country and difficult to manage, implying that a successor to the throne would be best served by an autonomous Sahara within a confederated Morocco. Speaking in strict repeat strict confidence, he reported that the dialogue begun over a year ago with Bendjedid is now entering a delicate stage. The Algerian President had sent Foreign Minister Ibrahimi to Morocco with tentative proposals for a confederation of Algeria and Morocco as part of a larger Maghreb. Hassan had received the proposal and immediately ordered separate studies on the viability of (1) an Algerian-Moroccan confederation, and (2) a confederation of the two countries with Tunisia and possibly other Maghreb states. Before replying to Bendjedid, he also requested Algeria’s more detailed thinking on the two prospects. The next step, Hassan noted, asking that the Ambassador not take notes, will be a further exploratory meeting in Paris July 6 between Royal Counselor Reda Guedira and Foreign Minister Ibrahimi.

5. Asked by Ambassador Reed what confederation with Algeria would mean in practical terms, Hassan replied that Bendjedid is conscious of growing human restraints in the present authoritarian political system adapted from the Soviet model. Confederation could thus imply a shifting away from such a system with political adjustments and flexibility expected from Morocco as well. Algeria, the King said, appears to favor a confederation with Morocco as the first step toward Maghreb unity, since the two countries are the major regional powers.

6. As a parenthesis to the above, the King brushed aside the June 15 border incident with Algeria as inadvertent and entirely Morocco’s fault. He implied that it resulted strictly from poor judgment by an individual, local commander.

7. Comment: We suspect Rabat and Algiers remain a long way from confederation, but are encouraged that secret dialogue is continuing at the Guedira-Ibrahimi level. Hassan, who prides himself on being a geopolitical and abstract thinker, frequently takes the long-term view and in this conversation was clearly thinking ahead to a future in which an untried successor will be faced by domestic and regional pressures working against continuation of the traditional and autocratic Moroccan system of government. Confederation, as a symbolic rather than practical concept, probably thus appeals to him in the abstract as a will-o’-the-wisp to achieve sovereignty in the Sahara while making peace with Algeria.

Reed

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840008–0401. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. A record of the Gabriel-Hassan conversation is in telegram 6009 from Rabat, July 11. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840441–1090)
3. No other record of the Reed-Hassan meeting has been found.