Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

35. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

5590.

Rabat, June 23, 1984, 0746Z

Military for Polads. Subject: Algerian-Moroccan Relations: Increased Tensions. Ref: (A) Rabat 5382 (Notal),² (B) Rabat 4683,³ (C) Rabat 5063.⁴

1. (S—Entire text.)

2. Summary: although there has been no apparent increase in the level of Moroccan military activity following the June 15 incident along the Moroccan-Algerian border, the incident itself and resulting publicity underscore increased tensions between Rabat and Algiers. The June 15 incident, as well as preceding events over the past two months, has been interpreted by most Moroccans as evidence of a shift in Algerian policy related to Moroccan military successes in the Western Sahara. The present atmosphere could further erode political and economic relations between Rabat and Algiers, increasing the possibility of more serious incidents. End summary

3. Public reaction to the June 15 skirmish between Moroccan and Algerian troops at the border near Anaguir (ref A) has been muted. The GOM has deliberately downplayed the incident in public statements and has not encouraged editorials or speculation by the Moroccan press. Press coverage has been largely limited to reprinting an official communiqué on the incident, and only one paper, the Istiqlal Arabic-language daily “Al Alam”, carried information on reported casualties and prisoners taken by the Algerians. The article, summarizing coverage in the European press, attributes deterioration in Morocco’s relationship with Algeria to military exercises conducted by Algeria in mid-May. “Al Alam” also emphasizes publicity given the incident by the Algerian media and downplays the importance of the actual clash.

4. Privately GOM officials have described the June 15 incident to us as an “ambush.” A senior counselor to the Prime Minister, for example, told EmbOff on July 19 that Moroccan troops, sent to resupply the Moroccan outpost at Hassi Lebraber, have used the same road twice a month for years. The official acknowledged that the road passes through Algerian territory for several kilometers, but said that the Algerians, while aware of the Moroccan resupply efforts, have never objected to Moroccan use of this short-cut in the past. The GOA, he charged, deliberately set a trap for the Moroccan unit using the road on June 15. The same counselor told us June 21 that the Moroccan military is taking a particularly hard line on the incident. He said that he had attended a meeting late into the evening June 20 with Colonel-Major Achabar, Secretary General of the National Defense Administration, to discuss the incident. Achabar, he said, was taking the incident very seriously. Asked whether the GOM is considering exchanging Algerian prisoners captured in 1976 for the 31 Moroccans captured by the Algerians June 15, our interlocutor said that he and the Moroccan military would oppose “handing concessions to the Algerians after such an incident,” but that any decision on such an issue would have to be made at the level of the King and Royal Counselor Guedira.

5. Senior Moroccans tend to view the June 15 incident and recent military activity by the Algerians as a consequence of Morocco’s expansion of the berm and military defeats Morocco has inflicted on the Polisario. Prime Minister Karim-Lamrani told Secretary Weinberger on May 17 that Algeria will no longer be able to put pressure on Morocco through the Polisario and may, therefore, shift the focus of its efforts to the northern sector. In the past, Karim-Lamrani explained, Morocco’s task has been defense of the Sahara; now the GOM may be faced with the need to shift assets to the more vulnerable north. Senior military officers tend to share the Prime Minister’s views on the increased likelihood of incidents along the border, and there is a possibility that several units have already been shifted from the south to Oujda.

6. The June 15 incident did not take place in isolation but climaxed several months of activity and tension along the entire border. In late April, Algeria conducted a series of overflights in Moroccan airspace and over the Western Sahara, coinciding with a large-scale Moroccan effort to further extend the berm. King Hassan told Secretary Weinberger shortly thereafter that Bendjedid had let him know that he had personally ordered the MIG–25 flights. In mid-May, following joint U.S.-Moroccan exercises, the GOA conducted well-publicized exercises which, according to official GOA statements, constituted a “warning to potential enemies.”

7. Comment: Moroccan-Algerian relations, which appeared to offer promise following the resumption of high-level contacts between Rabat and Algiers in early April, have clearly deteriorated. The GOM will probably continue to downplay the June 15 clash and subsequent publicity in large part because Moroccan leaders realize that, in a direct military confrontation with Algeria, the odds would be considerably against them. Nevertheless, while reaction to recent incidents in both Algiers and Rabat suggests that the risk of direct military confrontation remains low, current tensions could well provoke further, more serious incidents. A face-saving exchange of prisoners could defuse tensions, but at present the Moroccan military appears in no mood to pursue this option.

Kirby

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840405–0401. Secret; Priority; Noforn. Sent for information Priority to Algiers. Sent for information to Cairo, Casablanca, London, Madrid, Nouakchott, Paris, Tangier, Tunis, USUN, Dakar, CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE Ramstein, USDOCOSOUTH, and USCINCEUR.
2. In telegram 5382 from Rabat, June 16, the Embassy reported that the Moroccan news agency had issued a communiqué. According to the unofficial Embassy translation, the communiqué stated that on June 15, a Royal Armed Forces unit “mistakenly took a trail located along the border in Algeria. The unit was then intercepted by an Algerian unit thus provoking a minor skirmish.” The Embassy commented: “The Moroccan communiqué seems to accept Moroccan responsibility for the border incident while at the same time minimizing its importance.” The Embassy continued that the reaction by both governments “implies that neither side wants to give the impression that the incident has major military or foreign policy implications.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840390–0713)
3. In telegram 4683 from Rabat, May 24, the Embassy reported that on May 17, Karim-Lamrani, “in a frank exposition of his views,” told Weinberger “while Morocco had made great progress in its fight with the Polisario in the Sahara, it now has to be alert to possible action of some kind by Algeria in the northern sector. The Prime Minister asked the Secretary to give consideration to special, urgent military and economic assistance, with emphasis on grant aid rather than loans. The Secretary indicated that the USG hopes to be helpful in the longer term and to improve the mix of grant and FMS assistance in FY 85.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840339–0122)
4. See also Document 225.