358. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Embassy in Tunisia1

1324.

SUBJECT

  • Ambassador Walters’ Meeting With President Ben Ali on March 5.
1.
Confidential—Entire text.
2.
Summary: In his March 5 meeting with President Ben Ali, Ambassador Walters reviewed the current U.S. initiative in the Middle East2 and elucidated U.S. policies on the Maghreb and in the UN. Ben Ali expressed pessimism about resolution of the Western Sahara conflict; affirmed that he had taken a tough stance toward Qadhafi; and noted that former President Bourguiba was being well cared for. End summary.
3.
March 5 President Ben Ali received Ambassador Walters, accompanied by Ambassador Pelletreau, for a one-hour exchange of views on regional and UN Security Council issues. Ambassador Walters also presented a Presidential letter to Ben Ali.3 Tunisia Desk Officer-designate Kunstadter attended as notetaker.
4.
Western Sahara: Ambassador Walters reiterated U.S. support for the SYG/OAU initiative.4 Ben Ali said Tunisia was trying to get both [Page 741] sides to make goodwill gestures, but there was a stalemate. He believed Morocco and Algeria would have to normalize relations before it would be possible to resolve the issue.
5.
Libya: Ben Ali stated that in a recent lengthy meeting with Qadhafi he had bluntly told the Libyan leader to shape up. However, he was under no illusions that Qadhafi would soon become more reasonable. Because of Qadhafi’s instability, Ben Ali doubted whether Libya would push for entry into the Tripartite Pact. Ben Ali acknowledged Ambassador Walters’ point that a regional treaty excluding Morocco would not make sense.
6.
Chad: Ben Ali said he had reproached Qadhafi for using mercenaries. Qadhafi was now trying to get rid of them since they were evidently causing problems for him with his own troops. The OAU Ad Hoc Committee was ineffective and the matter of the Aouzou Strip would have to be referred to the ICJ. However, it was not certain the ICJ would decide in Chad’s favor, since the French had apparently told Qadhafi that the Aouzou belonged to Libya. Ambassador Walters responded by pointing out that France had never ratified the Franco-Italian colonial agreement transferring the Aouzou to Italian Libya.
7.
Middle East: Ben Ali was supportive of U.S determination to continue its current initiative, but was skeptical that Israel would move forward to a definitive peaceful settlement.
8.
Iran/Iraq: Ben Ali did not seem entirely convinced that either the French or Soviets had supplied the guidance system for the missiles Iraq was currently using. He queried Ambassador Walters about Khomeini’s health and wondered whether someone other than Khomeini was now making the key decisions about waging the war. He expressed interest at Ambassador Walters’ offer to send information on the current military situation for a briefing by Ambassador Pelletreau.
9.
Tunisia: Anticipating a question about Bourguiba, Ben Ali said the former President was very comfortably installed and well cared for. Owing to unemployment, drought and the resulting poor harvest in 1987, it would not be easy to carry out the November 7 program. Nevertheless, the GOT was determined to move ahead.
10.
This cable was cleared by Ambassador Walters.
Johnstone
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880199–0519. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to the Department of State, Cairo, Ndjamena, Rabat, and USUN.
  2. Reference is to the Shultz’s proposal for a three-year transitional phase of limited self-rule for Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Documentation on the proposal is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.
  3. See Document 357.
  4. See Document 455.