Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

344. Memorandum to Holders of National Intelligence Estimate 63–84¹

Washington, August 1986

PROSPECTS FOR TUNISIA

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SCOPE NOTE

NIE 63–84,² published in December 1984, examined Tunisia’s political, economic, and social problems, the prospects for the regime of President Bourguiba over a two-year period, and the implications for the United States. It predicted an increasingly turbulent future for Tunisia. Developments in Tunisia since the publication of the NIE, including heightened political and economic tensions, recent changes in the cabinet and the prime ministry, and Bourguiba’s increasing infirmity and capricious behavior, pose new questions about the country’s political stability over the near term.³ This Memorandum to Holders focuses primarily on the viability of the Bourguiba regime, especially in light of the President’s recent dismissal of his designated successor, the likely course of Tunisian politics during the next 18 months, how these trends may effect the transition after Bourguiba’s death, and the implications for the United States. The paper also addresses the outlook for Tunisia over the longer term when appropriate. [portion marking not declassified]

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KEY JUDGMENTS

Economic, social, and political problems in Tunisia continue to build dangerously as the ailing and aged President Habib Bourguiba fails to treat them. Action to redress major grievances will not come as long as Bourguiba remains in power, and the longer he remains at the helm, the more intractable these problems become. [portion marking not declassified]

The threat of revolutionary change still remains low, but there are now greater chances for a breakdown in public order that would severely tax the capabilities of the regime of the 83-year-old President. The lack of political unity within the government—reflected in Bourguiba’s sudden change in prime ministers recently—makes a turbulent transition of power more likely and increases the chances of military intervention.

— Regardless of who succeeds Bourguiba, Tunisia’s traditionally close ties to the United States will weaken, and Tunisia—at a minimum—will shift toward a more nonaligned posture. [portion marking not declassified]

[less than 7 lines not declassified] the country’s many problems. These include:

— A deteriorating financial position.

— Indications of discontent within the military and security forces.

— The growing appeal of Islamic fundamentalists.

— Alienation of political, labor, and student groups.

— Continuing threats from Libya. [portion marking not declassified]

Tunisia’s unprecedented economic crisis (largely the result of plummeting oil prices) is adding to political tensions, but government fears that new austerity measures will prompt a repeat of the bloody January 1984 food riots have so far held Tunis back from effectively addressing Tunisia’s economic woes. These same fears will also probably hamper a timely implementation of the government’s proposed IMF program. Tunis will likely temporize as long as possible on potentially explosive reforms (food price hikes, for example) to avoid a popular backlash, but ultimately will be forced to adopt much stricter austerity measures to obtain crucial foreign aid. [portion marking not declassified]

The longer term economic prognosis for Tunisia is grim. Low oil prices, declining reserves of exploitable petroleum, the unlikelihood of new discoveries of oil or other natural resources, and demographic pressures will work against any quick reversal of economic trends, even if the government decides to make comprehensive structural reforms. [portion marking not declassified]

The regime perceives a significant threat to domestic stability and will likely continue its turn toward authoritarian policies to maintain its grip on the country. To deal with negative political and social reactions, the government will probably have to intensify its crackdown on both organized and unorganized opposition. The most likely result will be heightened political tensions before the November election—[less than 1 line not declassified]. Although this will hasten a decline in the govern- ment’s legitimacy in the short term, Bourguiba’s turn to harsh methods probably will prove effective in suppressing the political opposition. Opposition groups do not have the charismatic leaders capable of rallying dissidents and none feel strong enough to challenge the regime in the streets. [portion marking not declassified]

In contrast, the potential for mass-based violence stemming from economic grievances will remain high. The greatest danger is the threat that disorder will provide internal opponents and Libya with fuel to foment regime-threatening violence. We believe the security forces are not strong enough to contain rioting if it became widespread, and the government’s use of combat troops to restore public order would produce further tensions within the armed forces. [portion marking not declassified]

Qadhafi has long provided support for Tunisian dissidents and undoubtedly has agents of influence in place, but he cannot precipitate a revolution. During widespread disorder, however, Qadhafi has significant capability to worsen Tunis’s problem through terrorism, dissident raids, propaganda, and military posturing. He is unlikely to invade Tunisia during the period of this estimate because he fears US, French, or Algerian reaction. [portion marking not declassified]

Bourguiba’s demise during the next 18 months would produce political infighting and could lead to an open power struggle, raising considerably the prospects for military intervention:

— Even though the Tunisian military has been apolitical by Arab standards, officers are increasingly frustrated with the government’s inability to cope with Tunisia’s problems. While the military almost certainly would rally before an open Libyan threat, discipline within the ranks would dangerously weaken if troops were repeatedly called upon to put down internal disturbances sparked by the same economic concerns that worry officers and conscripts.

— A military-controlled government might prove the only one capable of ensuring stability but it would be no more adept at solving Tunisia’s problems. [portion marking not declassified]

Bilateral ties to the United States will remain close as long as Bourguiba is in charge, despite increasing public hostility toward the United States and the President’s own misgivings over what he believes to be shortcomings in US economic and military aid. Bourguiba’s stance, however, poses increased dangers for US interests. His dual strategy of leaning on the United States and the West for financial assistance, while cracking down on dissent at home, will tend to identify the US Government with Bourguiba’s unpopular policies. However, any attempt by Washington to cultivate relations with opposition groups or lobby the government to open up the political system would anger Bourguiba, our closest friend in the country, and possibly signal vacillating US support for the regime to the opposition. [portion marking not declassified]

The President’s demise will almost certainly lead to a government more committed to developing Tunisia’s nonaligned credentials and reducing high-visibility ties to Washington. The current group of civilian contenders for the succession would try to broaden ties to other Arab states and the Soviet Union but they would not want to jeopardize vital economic and security links to the United States and France. While a regime controlled by senior military officers probably would try to maintain good relations with the United States because of its political inexperience and need for foreign support, we doubt that such a government could long afford to rule much differently than a civilian successor. A government led by junior officers would more likely be less sympathetic or even hostile to the United States, but not necessarily more amenable to Soviet interests:

— If in the longer term, a successor regime, or regimes, is unable to consolidate power and rectify the country’s problems, we believe revolutionary change and a more fundamental realignment on international issues is likely. [portion marking not declassified]

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1. Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Tunisia Reference File 1985–1986. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board based on information received as of August 22.
2. See Document 321.
3. In telegram 9100 from Tunis, September 17, the Embassy reported: “There has been dramatic slippage of Bourguiba’s image among the Tunisian populace. This has been brought on by his perceived excesses in public, as well as in his private life. He is increasingly seen as senile and manipulated by a new clan of politically inept maneuverers.” The Embassy continued: “It is unclear whether Bourguiba will produce one of his patented bold strokes to defuse the situation. Indeed, we must question whether he is any longer capable of doing so.” (Department of State, S/S Records, Executive Secretariat, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Tunis)