Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

343. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

7228.

Tunis, July 22, 1986, 1401Z

SUBJECT

• Conversation With MinInt Zin el Abidine Ben Ali.

Refs:

• A. Tunis 7126,²
• B. Tunis 7144.³

1. S—Entire text.
1A. This is an action cable, see para 7.

2. Summary and introduction: I had unprecedented 90 minute one-on-one conversation with BG Zin el Abidine Ben Ali, MinInt of GOT, at latter’s invitation, July 21. We met in his Tunis office. His putative purpose was to elicit my (read: the U.S.) assessment of Tunisia’s internal situation. The tenor of his questions was singularly impolitic and one of the issues flowing from the conversation is Ben Ali’s true motivation: why was it held? My answers to the questions were framed in an acute awareness that they might be recorded or misused to Ben Ali’s possible private purposes. Be that as it may, my tentative assessment—which may evolve—is that Ben Ali’s charge—internal security—has led him into the heart of Tunisia’s domestic political conundrum and that he felt acute need to explore American perception of dramatic transformation of country’s political geography. (FYI: He’s not alone; everyone is asking what we think about “the changes”.) While I responded as carefully as possible, I also decided not/not to sidestep issues Ben Ali raised, as his position, potential and current standing in GOT warrant an effort to dialog and perhaps ever to develop a closer (but correct) relationship with him. Indeed, Ben Ali said after our talk that he had found the exchange valuable and hoped for more soon.

3. A number of operational issues emerged during our talk, particularly with respect to [less than 1 line not declassified] the Libyan opposition and the Palestinian presence here. They will be reported in septels or other channels.⁴ Agraniants did not arise. This message gists the essence of the conversation. A full memcon will be pouched to NEA/AFN.⁵ End summary and introduction.

4. Ben Ali began by saying he wanted this talk to be “private” viz., between us as political men and not between the Tunisian MinInt and the U.S. Ambassador. He then asked me about my assessment of the Tunisian internal security situation. I responded with an honest but generalized description, focussed on the long term socio-economic trends, the exacerbation of stress built into the current economic situation and the impulse which would be given all manner of “Oriental” options were the Western-oriented socio-economic model to fail. Ben Ali agreed but, to my surprise, then asked what the solutions might be. I responded it would need to be a mix of measures decided by Tunisian political authority to foster consensus, confidence and participation across the political spectrum. This suggested need to free up market place of ideas so that PSD could defend its choices and benefit from critiques in a political dialog conducted along generally recognized norms of legitimacy. “At present most safety valves appear to be tied down.” Ben Ali agreed: “I tell them we are sitting on lid of a volcano, if pressure keeps building it will blow.”

5. Ben Ali then asked blandly whether I thought new PriMin Sfar could do the job? I responded by listing his many widely agreed positive qualities, and observed it seemed clear President intended continue hold on to central decision making power. This suggested Bourguiba looking to new PriMin first of all for help with economic crisis. His leadership role thus might well be complementary to President’s. Limits of PriMin’s capacity could be judged only if and when, ultimate authority came to be vested in him. PriMin’s most important task now, I thought, was to generate that public confidence which was necessary to successful economic recovery.

6. Ben Ali then turned to the succession: What did I think about a possible constitutional amendment? I said we had heard talk about a proposed amendment, still in gestation, creating a Tunisian Vice Presidency designed to fit Habib Bourguiba, Jr. Its utility seemed open question since much clearly depended upon degree to which confidence and responsibility would be shared between incumbent and his successor and/or PriMin in current or any future constitutional context. Ben Ali, I assumed, was well aware of widespread speculation about Bourguiba’s ultimate intent with respect to current PriMin. Did President contemplate further changes around upcoming November parliamentary elections? For present seemed clear that President Bourguiba had vested confidence in new PriMin Sfar whom constitution made ipso-facto his successor. Both thus now at center of Tunisian political reality and changes to succession, if enacted, would clearly involve new political relationships as well.

7. Ben Ali then turned to PLO. What did I think of its presence here, which he ascribed to Wassila Bourguiba: “She invited PLO to come here.” I thought outside world saw “Tunisia’s invitation” to PLO as GOT effort to demonstrate Arabism and sympathy to Palestinian cause during Israel’s Lebanese adventure. Since PLO’s arrival, events had changed context and weakened organization. ALCON had had to adjust. PLO’s presence in Tunisia had been reduced. Absent direct threats against Americans here, question became complex, regional and political. I went over our position on eventual dialog with PLO. PLO remains a problem for us as long as its leadership, weakness and related internal contradictions inhibit peace process. Ben Ali then said he had tightened down on PLO gradually for years. Fighters had left. GOT had received Oued Zarga camp. PLO efforts create autonomous capabilities in Tunisia (e.g. police) had been nipped-in-bud. PLO notables comings and goings remain under close scrutiny. Total Palestinian presence in Tunisia, including families, now less than 500. While presence of PLO political headquarters/Wafa as such not a problem for GOT now, Ben Ali said he inclined tighten down further. He asked for my reaction, explaining that he was uninstructed and raising issue on his own. I said I would secure “authoritative” response. He asked I do so “discreetly.” I noted that PLO HQ in friendly Tunisia had, I thought, conceivably some advantages for us to PLO in, say Aden, but I would get back to him. Action requested: Please instruct on reply I am to make, bearing in mind Ben Ali purports to speak for himself alone.

8. Ben Ali asked me to speak to the Tuniso-Libyan relationship. What were our views? I said we were aware that PriMin Mzali’s departure had fuelled expectations that there might now be opportunity for normalization of relations (ref A). We had even heard Libyan delegation expected “today” in Monastir. Ben Ali said 74 Libyan sportsmen had asked for visas “in Arab League context.” Bourguiba had turned them down flat, reiterating GOT position: No relations; no access; no visas; no visitors—until Qadhafi goes. No/no change in GOT position therefore in offing.

9. I reminded Ben Ali of what our posture had been: we had recognized Tunisia’s need to deal with disagreeable, dangerous neighbor as best it could. We had never urged course of action on Tunisia, believing that GOT knew best what protection its vital interests required. We had understood and sympathized with GOT’s decision to sever its ties with Tripoli in 1985. There had been ample cause. On other hand, we were aware of impact on southern Tunisia of resulting absence of Libyan trade and tourism. We had finally offered assurances GOT would not face Libyan invasion alone. Our views on Qadhafi regime were known. They remained unchanged. If GOT came to feel some adjustment in its posture towards Libya were to become necessary, we would, I felt sure, welcome opportunity to consult before final decisions were made.

Sebastian

1. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, NEA/CIA/INR Meetings 86. Secret; Immediate; [handling restriction not declassified].
2. In telegram 7126 from Tunis, July 18, the Embassy reported it was “picking up indications that departure of ex PriMin Mohamed Mzali has led perhaps significant stratum of Tunisian public opinion to anticipate evolution of GOT’s relations with Libya and Algeria” given that Mzali had taken a “very strong anti-Libyan posture. In so doing he shifted markedly from the traditional Tunisian attitude of flexibility he espoused until last year’s Libyan worker expulsion and letter bomb campaigns.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860554–0679) In telegram 6701 from Tunis, July 8, the Embassy reported Bourguiba had “dismissed” Mzali and replaced him with Sfar. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860527–0861)
3. In telegram 7144 from Tunis, July 18, the Embassy provided an analysis of Ben Ali’s “rapid rise to the center of political power” in Tunisia. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860554–0983)
4. Not found.
5. Not found.