Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

321. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 63–84

Washington, December 1984

PROSPECTS FOR TUNISIA

[Omitted here is a table of contents.]

SCOPE NOTE

This Estimate examines Tunisia’s political, economic, and societal problems, the likelihood of further unrest, and the prospects for President Bourguiba’s regime over the next two years. Given Bourguiba’s stature in Tunisia, questions regarding stability had tended to focus on the post-Bourguiba era. The January 1984 bread riots, however, illuminated a more pressing question—will the state survive Bourguiba’s continued reign? The youthful populace and the disadvantaged do not perceive the regime or the ruling Destourian Socialist Party as responsive to their needs and aspirations. Libyan-supported subversion and the Islamic resurgence add to the regime’s challenges. This Estimate addresses the implications for the United States in the event of domestic upheavals which produce a new government, and examines alternative scenarios.

KEY JUDGMENTS

Prospects for more political instability in Tunisia are high:

— President Bourguiba has shown no inclination to address fundamental economic, social, and political grievances that trouble many Tunisians. Bourguiba’s mental and physical capabilities are declining—he recently entered a hospital suffering from heart spasms—but the 81-year-old President shows no sign of stepping down voluntarily. His continued rule will stifle desperately needed change and increase the likelihood of violent change.

— Although many Tunisian leaders recognize the need for reforms, they are unwilling to confront Bourguiba directly. Instead, many officials are content to adopt measures that appear responsive to the public, but fail to meet growing public demands for real change.

Given Bourguiba’s inflexibility, the subservience of his officials and the decline in political institutions, Tunisia’s future is likely to be increasingly turbulent, although we do not think the regime will be toppled as long as Bourguiba remains alive and in control. Nevertheless, the boiling point for dissension may have been substantially and permanently reduced; future unrest may be touched off by a far less momentous event.

Opposition forces, while growing in strength, are not well organized. The legal, secular opposition seeks only an expanded role in the decisionmaking process and a broadening of the political process. The illegal opposition—particularly the Islamic fundamentalists—is growing, but remains poorly organized, factionalized, and publicly committed to nonviolent change.

The likelihood of serious instability and chances for an abrupt change in regime will increase greatly once Bourguiba dies, however. His constitutionally designated successor, Prime Minister Mzali, has little popular support. Many of Tunisia’s elite—clan patriarchs, government officials, and party leaders—fear that the unpopular Mzali’s accession would trigger widespread unrest and ultimately threaten their wealth and positions in Tunisia. Thus, Bourguiba’s heart spasms precipitated vigorous efforts to encourage the President to alter the constitutional succession procedure or to replace Mzali as Prime Minister.

The President has long hoped that his son, Habib, Jr., would replace him; however, the latter has previously opted out of the contention. The cause of Minister of Public Works and Housing Sayah is also being pressed. Such a substitution might smooth the way for succession in the post-Bourguiba era; however, it offers little hope of reform to the disadvantaged and alienated, who will view the power struggle as the elite’s attempts at protecting itself. As long as Bourguiba retains his grip on power, substantial change cannot be expected, and this will increase the pressure for violent change. For his part, Prime Minister Mzali will intensify efforts to garner support.

Bourguiba’s death in office and the uncertainty surrounding the succession process would give Islamic fundamentalists and secular radicals opportunities to extend their influence and perhaps take over the government. Younger Tunisians—about 70 percent of the population is under 26—and the growing number of unemployed are increasingly turning to the fundamentalists and would probably be willing to support them in a succession crisis. Bourguiba’s secular policies and the Westernization of the privileged classes have given Islamic fundamentalism credibility among the disadvantaged and alienated. Although the strength of the Islamic Tendency Movement—the most prominent fundamentalist group—is difficult to measure, its appeal to the youth is evident and is likely to increase. The Movement’s more radical members are well placed to exploit discontent.

Moreover, the turmoil likely to surround the succession process would offer external actors—particularly Libya—chances to interfere in Tunisian politics. Libya’s Qadhafi remains intent on developing a Tunisian dissident organization capable of fostering armed revolt. While he has had little success to date, if he does develop such an organization, it could provide him with the pretext for invasion.

The Tunisian military, traditionally apolitical and under tight civilian control, may become a significant factor in the succession process. Although uneasy with riot-control duties, the military has obeyed civilian direction, and we believe it will continue to do so while Bourguiba is in power. The military could potentially become the dominant element in choosing Tunisia’s next leader.

The military’s role in the succession process will depend on how that process unfolds. If the succession process proceeds smoothly and according to law, we doubt that the Army will intervene. In the face of prolonged instability or unrest generated by squabbling over the succession, however, the military could feel compelled to intervene—provided it does not fragment—and take power. Moreover, the possibility of a coup by radical younger officers cannot be ruled out. [1½ lines not declassified]

Within the near term, Prime Minister Mzali is the strongest candidate as Bourguiba’s replacement, provided the constitutional process operates. Barring a serious miscalculation, Mzali is likely to retain Bourguiba’s confidence. Should Mzali lose his office, possible alternatives—other than Public Works and Housing Minister Sayah—include Destourian Socialist Party (PSD) Director Baccouche and Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi.

Tunisia’s relations with France and the United States would not change substantially under Mzali or any other PSD successor. Political reality will force the successor to rely upon and maintain relations with Tunisia’s traditional friends. Tunisia will have to adhere closely to the broad Arab consensus on regional issues; however, under Mzali or another PSD figure, Tunisia would be likely to remain a voice of moderation in Arab and nonaligned fora.

From the US perspective, the most favorable scenario would be a peaceful transition to a constitutional successor government dedicated to widening the political process and correcting inequities. A broad-based government of national unity would be an acceptable alternative, but such a regime would have great difficulty operating effectively over the longer term. A military-controlled government might prove the only one capable of ensuring stability; however, it would be no more desirable than a civilian regime and no more adept at solving Tunisia’s problems.

The accession of an Islamic fundamentalist government would reduce Western influence; however, an eventual modus vivendi with the United States and the West could be possible. Such a regime would probably prove less harmful to US interests than a radical leftist regime.

Finally, the seizure of power by a patently anti-Western regime would adversely affect US interests in the Maghreb and beyond. Such a development would be widely perceived as a severe blow to US prestige and policies. Should such a regime perceive itself weak and threatened by the United States and the West, it might turn to the USSR with ominous implications for vital US and Western security interests.

Tunisia’s economic woes, partly the product of the international recession, will remain a problem throughout the decade. Oil revenues probably will decline slowly, and the growth in worker remittances from abroad will be slight. The prospect of worker migration to Europe and the wealthier Arab states, a traditional relief valve for excess labor, is declining. At the same time, economic growth in Tunisia cannot accommodate the 3.8-percent annual increase in the manpower pool. Tunisia increasingly will be unable to afford the large foreign exchange expenditures for food imports. Thus, increased agricultural productivity will be crucial to future balance-of-payments stability.

Petroleum production, a mainstay of the economy, probably has peaked at 120,000 barrels per day. Although production from fields still under development should allow overall oil production to approximate current levels over the near term, the rapid growth of domestic requirements will cut into net oil export volume. Tunisia will probably become a net oil importer by the end of the 1980s, further worsening the financial pressures. The troubled financial picture, coupled with the elite’s unwillingness to share its wealth or broaden access to economic opportunities, will increase the difficulty of reallocating resources to neglected economic sectors.

The USSR’s principal interest in Tunisia is to neutralize its pro-Western orientation and to maintain and expand access to port facilities—part of an overall objective of expanding regional access. Moscow must view the Bourguiba succession issue and other domestic problems as opportunities to advance Soviet political and military interests. Although there is no evidence of overt Soviet destabilization efforts, Moscow would clearly benefit from the damage to Western interests that might proceed from a radical change of regime in Tunisia. Libyan subversive activities against Tunisia also serve Moscow’s longer term interests.

Unable to keep pace with Libyan and Algerian military modernization and expansion, Tunisia’s military goal has been to develop only a force capable of delaying an invading army until foreign assistance arrives. The Bourguiba regime has forged tacit security relationships with France and the United States and, more recently, improved ties with Algeria to counter the Libyan threat. Algiers would respond to a Tunisian request for assistance. Likewise, France would employ its armed forces to repulse any encroachment of Tunisian sovereignty. An unequivocal French and US commitment to Tunisia’s security remains the best guarantee against direct Libyan aggression.

[Omitted here is the body of the Estimate.]

1. Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Tunisia, Reference File 1984. Secret; [handling restrictions not declassified]. Approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board based on information received as of November 27.