Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

135. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

78924.

Washington, March 17, 1984, 0139Z

SUBJECT

• Meetings Between Algerian Emissary Abdelaziz Khellef and the President and the Vice President.

1. S—Entire text.

2. Summary: Algerian Special Emmissary, Commerce Minister Adbelaziz Khellef presented on March 13 a brief and general oral message from Algerian President Bendjedid to the President at a short meeting in the Oval Office followed by a longer meeting with the Vice President. Bendjedid’s message spoke of his desire for friendship, cooperation and dialogue and of his sending Khellef in a quest for further development of a bilateral cooperative relationship in which both bilateral and regional affairs could be discussed. Khellef elaborated on this in his meeting with the Vice President, discussing the Western Sahara at length. He explained that Algeria seeks peace and stability in the Maghreb and the continuation of Hassan’s reign. The Algerians see Hassan’s extension of the berm, his new understanding with Libya, and his failure to avail himself of opportunities following the 1983 Bendjedid-Hassan summit² as indications that Hassan may be seeking a military solution to the dispute. Algeria wanted to share its views to see if the U.S. might be able to moderate Hassan’s position. The Vice President replied that he did not believe Hassan seeks a military solution to the Western Sahara dispute. There is difficulty about direct talks, however. The U.S. supports a referendum and believes that there is much Algeria can do the bring about a negotiated solution. We believe that Hassan has his eyes open about Libya; the U.S. would be troubled if Hassan’s understanding with Qadhafi harmed Algerian intrests or the U.S.-Algerian relationship. As time ran out, Khellef called for self-determination for Palestinians as the ultimate solution for the Lebanon problem and expressed concern about Iranian intransigence and movement away from negotiations to end the Iran-Iraq war. End summary.

3. The President very briefly met in the Oval Office with Algerian Commerce Minister Abdelaziz Khellef at 3:00 p.m. on March 13.³ Thereafter Khellef met for a longer discussion with the Vice President in his West Wing offices. Also present at the meetings with the President and the Vice President were, on the Algerian side, Algerian Ambassador Yaker and Ambassador Abdelkrim Chitour, Director for Western Europe and North America, MFA; and, on the U.S. side, the Vice President, Donald Gregg Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, Charles Tyson, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Howard Teicher of the NSC Staff, and David Schneider State/NEA.

4. The President opened the conversation warmly welcoming Minister Khellef, a greeting which Khellef reciprocated with great thanks for the President’s making available time for the meeting. Khellef conveyed the greetings of the Algerian President, saying that Bendjedid wished to convey a message of friendship, cooperation, and desire for dialogue. He recalled his coming to know the President at Cancun with pleasure. Khellef also noted his satisfaction with his discussions with the Vice President during the latter’s visit to Algeria. Khellef said that he had been asked to visit Washington in order further to develop a cooperative bilateral relationship in which both bilateral and regional issues could be discussed. This, said Khellef, briefly, was his message from Bendjedid. The President again expressed his appreciation for the Algerian visit and the message Khellef had conveyed. The group thereupon left the President and the Oval Office; the Vice President escorted the Minister to his office where a more detailed discussion ensued.

5. The Vice President opened the discussion asking Khellef to tell President Bendjedid how much the extra courtesy which Bendjedid had shown the Vice President had meant to him and Mrs. Bush. Equally important was what Bendjedid had said about the relationship he desired with the U.S. The Vice President had returned to Washington and immediately informed President Reagan about this. Khellef replied that Bendjedid had also asked him to speak of his pleasant recollections of the Vice President’s visit. He had instructed the Minister to continue the dialogue which the Vice President had initiated. Khellef reported on various visits which had been exchanged between the two countries and the achievements which were being made: setting up a joint economic commission, developing a commercial relationship, signing an agricultural agreement, etc. In his only reference to the natural gas issue, Khellef noted that the only drawback in our commercial relationship was the conflict between Trunk-line and Sonatrach, to which he wished to find a solution so that our commercial cooperation could improve.

6. Khellef then turned to the Western Sahara issue, which clearly was the most important matter he wished to discuss. He explained that the Algerian approach was to find out how Algeria could help King Hassan find a solution. The Bendjedid-Hassan meeting in 1983 was a beginning. Then the Addis OAU resolution “made a solution possible.”⁴ This was confirmed in the UNGA, which made an appeal for direct Moroccan discussions with the Polisario. Unfortunately, Khellef said, the direct talks did not take place. Hassan had stepped back. The Algerians fear that he may think that a military solution to the Western Sahara dispute is possible. They disagree. Algeria wishes to see the Mahgreb a region of peace and stability where all resources could be devoted to development. They want Hassan to remain on the Moroccan throne. His policy of “non-negotiation” did not help movement toward these objectives.

7. The Vice President interrupted to explain that he had talked personally to Hassan.⁵ We do not feel that he wants a military solution. There is a difficulty regarding direct talks, however. As for the U.S., we wish there would be a negotiated solution. We believe Algeria can do much to bring about this result. We support a referendum. We are quite close to Morocco and don’t believe that it has shifted to military means.

8. In response to a question from the Vice President regarding the basis for Algerian concerns, Khellef replied that Hassan did not seize the opportunities offered in the aftermath of the Bendjedid-Hassan meeting in 1983. Further, Morocco has now extended the berm in the Western Sahara in a way which involves Mauritania. Then, Khellef said, there is the arrangement Morocco has reached with Libya, under which Hassan supports Qadhafi on Chad and Qadhafi supports Hassan on Western Sahara. Khellef added that Qadhafi has many reasons to be unhappy with Algeria. The Vice President intervened to say that he seriously doubted that King Hassan was putting any great trust in anything Qadhafi said. We think Hassan has his eyes open about Libya. Khellef concluded that these were the reasons why Algeria believed there had been a shift in Moroccan policy. Algeria wanted to share these views to see if the U.S. might moderate Hassan’s position regarding a negotiated settlement.

9. The Vice President asked how Algerian interests were affected by Hassan’s understanding with Qadhafi. Khellef replied that Algeria had no objection in principle to any rapprochement in the Mahgreb but it wanted to see a clear foundation for such rapprochement. There should be no alliance which threatens the region. Algeria has improved its ties with Tunisia and wishes to do the same with Morocco and, ultimately, Libya.

10. The Vice President then expressed U.S. pleasure with the direction in which our bilateral relationship with Algeria was proceeding. Ambassador Yaker was helping. We want relations further to improve. We are tremendously impressed by Chadli Bendjedid. Mentioning the natural gas problem, the Vice President said that nothing should interfere. In regard to regional affairs, he said that we would be very troubled if we thought any understanding between Hassan and Qadhafi would harm the interests of Algeria. We would be willing to take this matter up. We see nothing redeeming about Qadhafi; he is behind much of the terror in the world. We understand Libya’s neighbors’ concerns. If the President concluded that Qadhafi was undermining Algerian interests or our bilateral relations, we would want something done about the matter. Qadhafi is stirring up trouble in Chad and even in this country. Algeria has an extraordinarily important role to play in the Mahgreb, including in the quest for a negotiated solution to the Western Sahara dispute.

11. As time began to run out, Khellef briefly mentioned Lebanon, expressing the hope that factional dialogue, taking into account the interests of Syria, would improve the situation there. He maintained that the Palestinian issue was the basic cause of Lebanon’s difficulties and urged recognition of the right of Palestinian self-determination as important to the solution. The Vice President countered by explaining that the President’s September 1 proposals were still an effective approach to a solution of the Palestinian problem. As the meeting broke up, the Vice President said he wished there had been time to discuss the Iran-Iraq situation. There had been great loss of life and threats to our interests. We were very worried about the situation there. Khellef said the Algerians had been surprised by Iranian intransigence. Most recently the Iranians had again “slipped back” from any receptivity to negotiations.

Shultz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840177–0244. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by David Schneider; cleared by Teicher, Covey, and Gregg; approved by Schneider. Sent for information to Rabat, Tunis, Nouakchott, and Paris.
2. See Document 19.
3. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Reagan, Bush, Khellef, and Yaker met on March 13 from 3–3:06 p.m. in the Oval Office. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary)
4. Reference is to a June 11, 1983, OAU Resolution which called for “direct negotiations” between Morocco and the Polisario. See footnote 3, Document 408.
5. Not found.