Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

316. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

117333.

Washington, April 21, 1984, 0009Z

SUBJECT

• Tunisian Ambassador Ben Yahia’s Call on the Vice President.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary: Tunisian Ambassador Habib Ben Yahia called at his request on the Vice President April 16. AFN Director Sebastian also participated. The Ambassador reviewed both U.S.-Tunisian bilateral relations and Tunisia’s regional relationships. On bilateral matters, Ben Yahia emphasized the need for greater U.S. security and economic assistance. On regional affairs, Ben Yahia reviewed recent Libyan activities and concluded that Qadhafi continued to pose a serious and perhaps enhanced threat to Tunisia. End summary.

3. Ambassador Ben Yahia called on Vice President Bush at the former’s request on April 16. AFN Director Sebastian sat in. The Ambassador opened with a statement of appreciation for the Vice President’s visit to Tunis last year,² noting that the Vice President had had a powerful and positive impact and expressing hope he would find it possible to return. The Vice President said he remembered his sojourn in Tunis and the hospitality extended to him with pleasure and would gladly consider another visit should the opportunity present itself.

4. Ambassador Ben Yahia said that much had happened since last September. The January riots had had both internal and external causes, but the country had recovered its perspective under the wise leadership of President Bourguiba, “our George Washington”. The President was fully involved in the political decision-making. The Prime Minister was in charge of the day-to-day administration of the government. Reform measures favoring the disadvantaged classes of Tunisian society and the less favored regions of the country were under way. Clearly, Tunisia’s leaders had under-estimated the pressures in the environment when it discussed the bread price reforms. Adjustments were nonetheless being made, the Ambassador said. Tunisia was grateful for the prompt American response.

5. Reverting to President Bourguiba’s health, Ben Yahia said that Bourguiba is holding up well, despite his 82 years. Bourguiba had just gone through a cataract operation (in Lyon) which had been successful. He would return to Tunisia after a few days of rest in France. The Vice President asked that his best wishes for President Bourguiba’s rapid and complete recovery be conveyed to him.

6. The Ambassador then addressed the external dimension. In response to the Vice President’s question, he said that Qadhafi had unquestionably played a role in the January unrest. Three thousand Tunisians had been expelled from Libya just prior to the riots in Tunisia. While the attempt to double the price of bread had triggered the demonstrations, others had been prepared to make trouble too. Tunisia, however, was not looking for scapegoats.

7. Expanding on the Libyan threat, Ben Yahia said that Qadhafi’s intention remains hostile. He seeks to destabilize Tunisia. The situation in this respect is deteriorating because Qadhafi is becoming more aggressive. He has now disrupted the flow of Libyan tourists to Tunisia and the Tunisian authorities have the distinct impression that he is “cooking something”. The GOT is also disturbed because in Qadhafi’s March 28 speech, he offered facilities to the USSR (“another power”). Ben Yahia pointed out that Qadhafi made this speech as an official statement of policy at a meeting with the Ambassadors of all Mediterranean powers.³ His objective is to alarm the regional powers, the NATO Allies and the U.S. He is using a combination of carrots and sticks, however, as in last week’s announcement, intended to entice the attention of consumers and deter them from action, of a huge new offshore oil find. The GOT judges, Ben Yahia said, that Qadhafi feels under pressure following the bombing of Omdurman and seeks to break out of his isolation in his own way. Tunisia must take seriously the danger he represents. He is unpredictable. The GOT, therefore, requests the U.S. to monitor the area closely. The Vice President undertook to pass this request along. He noted our continuing interest in Tunisia’s security. The Ambassador then amplified on his earlier remarks, saying that the time had come to do more than react to Qadhafi’s transgressions. Ben Yahia said that his government is in close touch with the Sudanese, Egyptians, Algerians and Moroccans. Tunis is, however, concerned over Morocco’s rapprochement with Libya.

8. The Vice President enquired whether Tunisia felt King Hassan was being taken in by Qadhafi. For our part, we do not think so and believe the Moroccan-Libyan rapprochement to be purely tactical. Ben Yahia said the GOT was surprised when King Hassan sought publicly to justify Qadhafi’s presence in Chad. “That is going too far.” The Vice President agreed. He said that we understand Tunisia’s concerns about Libya. Ben Yahia said that his government had discussed with the Moroccans their rapprochement with Algeria in order to sensitize the Moroccans to Tunisia’s security concerns with respect to Libya. Tunis does not want to draw closer to Algeria at the expense of relationships with its other friends. The Vice President replied that we understand completely. Ben Yahia amplified that it is Tunisia’s policy to “contain” Qadhafi. If Tunisia had not been on better terms with Algeria, January’s “events” could have had catastrophic consequences. Tunisia, in short, seeks enhanced stability in the region and hopes that Morocco will join in the effort sooner or later.

9. On the bilateral side, the Ambassador said there had been some hold-ups in the promised early delivery of U.S. military equipment. AFN Director interjected that problems had been worked out and that most of the equipment remaining to be delivered would be turned over shortly to the Tunisians at the point of origin. Ambassador expressed appreciation at this news. He then said that GOT had been surprised at reduced level of FY–85 security assistance requested by the administration for Tunisia. The GOT hoped for upward adjustments of levels and improved terms. The Vice President responded that the administration was faced with the need to spread available resources and stressed that the reduction of requested aid levels for Tunisia in no way reflected any reduction in American interest in Tunisia’s security or well-being. The Vice President added that the administration would remain alert to opportunities to improve this situation in the future. The Ambassador thanked the Vice President and said he hoped for the Vice President’s help with A.I.D. to bring the latter to view Tunisia not repeat not as an A.I.D.-graduate. The Vice President repeated that while the administration had had to go forward with the figures known to the Ambassador, Tunisia’s needs would retain the administration’s full attention.

Dam

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840262–0649. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Sebastian; cleared by Schneider, Richard Kauzlarich (S/S), and Teicher; approved by Gregg. Sent for information Priority to Rabat, Algiers, and Paris.
2. See Document 27.
3. Not further identified.