317. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
TUNISIA: MOVING TOWARD CRISIS [portion marking not declassified]
The prospects for stability in Tunisia are poor. President Habib Bourguiba shows no inclination to address the grievances of disaffected youth and the unemployed, the urban and rural poor, and those wanting to revitalize the Arab-Muslim character of Tunisia. Disorders similar to the economic riots last January could occur with little provocation and accelerate the erosion of government authority. [portion marking not declassified]
Senior officers, struggling to maintain the apolitical character of the armed forces, and moderate leaders of the country’s growing Islamic fundamentalist movement continue to be forces for stability. Their strength is eroding, however, under popular pressures for reform. Bourguiba’s paternalistic rule has created a sycophantic political elite that has acquired privileges resented by the poor. The aged President’s failure to build a constituency beyond this group is encouraging the trend toward radicalization and thus invites foreign, particularly Libyan, meddling. [portion marking not declassified]
Prospects for stability appear even worse should Bourguiba die in office. Bourguiba’s constitutionally designated successor, Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali, has shown little ability to build a broad base of support. His blatant efforts to weaken his rivals have damaged his political standing even in official circles, setting the stage for a prolonged and bitter struggle after Bourguiba’s death. Such a crisis may prompt the armed forces to step in to secure an orderly transfer of power or to ensure that their own favorite assumes the presidency. [portion marking not declassified]
Opposition to US policies among newly radicalized Tunisians is growing and may soon prompt the government to give additional emphasis to the Arab and nonaligned aspects of its foreign policy. Although ties to the United States and Western Europe probably will remain important for defense support and economic investment, Tunisia’s need to demonstrate its nonaligned credentials may push it closer to the Soviet Union [Page 659] in the post-Bourguiba era. This—in the worst case—could jeopardize the unrestricted passage of US naval vessels through the 140-kilometer strait between Tunisia and Sicily. NATO would then have to devote more assets to keeping this vital sea lane open during a confrontation with the Soviet Union. [portion marking not declassified]
[Omitted here is a map of Tunisia and the body of the assessment.]
- Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Tunisia, Reference File 1984. Secret; [handling restrictions not declassified]. Prepared in the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and coordinated with the Directorate of Operations based on information received as of July 16.↩