Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

315. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

221.

Tunis, January 11, 1984, 1421Z

Please pass White House for Vice President and Department for S/AL from Walters. Subject: Ambassador-at-Large Vernon A. Walters’ Meeting With Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba.

1. (S—Entire text.)

2. On January 11, accompanied by Chargé Anderson, I called at the President’s palace at Carthage. We were initially received by Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi and I told him in broad terms, without mentioning figures, what the purpose of my mission was. I mentioned the President’s letter² and his and the Secretary’s concern for the security, independence and territorial integrity of Tunisia. He seemed pleased and indicated that the Tunisians had just been through a most traumatic experience. We were then received by President Bourguiba at 0900 in the presence of Prime Minister Mzali, Foreign Minister Essebsi and Habib Bourguiba, Jr.

3. I then expressed my gratitude for being received so promptly after my arrival by the President and his ministers, and our satisfaction that much of the tension surrounding recent events seemed to have dissipated (though armed soldiers and armored personnel carriers were in evidence near the residence and the palace). I went on to say that we understood the dilemma in which they found themselves in trying to end the costly subsidies while achieving steady economic development. We were aware of the fact that they faced difficult challenges both internally and from potentially unfriendly neighbors. President Reagan had therefore directed me to come to Tunis to deliver a letter to President Bourguiba and I was pleased to do so. I then handed over the letter together with a French translation done by the Embassy. Bourguiba started to read it but had difficulty and the Foreign Minister read it to him.

4. After President Bourguiba had read the letter, I expressed the United States’ concern for the stability, security, independence, and territorial integrity of Tunisia. Bourguiba interrupted to say that these were defended by arms. I replied that I would come to the matter of defense equipment at once. What I would give them was a preliminary report on what we would do in the light of the situation that had developed over the past few days in Tunisia. The Department and DOD had agreed that 15 M60A3 tanks would be delivered in March instead of in October. (in consultation with Chargé and Country Team we had decided that the tanks would be the most reassuring option for the Tunisians since the APCs are scheduled to be delivered in March anyway.) I said that I understood that the agreement for the MTT and the TAT had already been signed by them and they confirmed this. I pointed out that the radios might not be available at the time of the delivery of the tanks but that they could be installed later. I confirmed that for FY–84 there would be a $87 million credit and $18 million in MAP grants and that these funds would now be available for drawdown at once.

5. Prime Minister Mzali said that the advance date of delivery of the tanks was the only new element in the program, with which they were familiar. Their real problem was the immense amount of money they had to spend to service their debts and which prevented them from carrying out the economic programs that would lessen unemployment and give the young the sense of a future in which they could participate. Credits were helpful but what they really needed was some oxygen in the form of grant aid that would not further increase their indebtedness. President Bourguiba strongly supported this statement and said that their problems would not be solved by going further into debt. He reiterated his request for 50 percent grants in security assistance. The measures he had announced would give them three months’ breathing space, but then they would have to find solutions. He emphasized the permanent threat from Libya which they had to face. He said Tunisia was a showcase of a moderate Arab state. They were under attack because they were the friends of the United States.

6. I then said that in the field of agriculture, I was pleased to be able to tell them that in the blended credits of 132.8 million the proportion of interest-free credits had been raised from 14 to 19 percent. This would enable Tunisia to buy wheat with a much larger interest-free portion of the credit. We could not go to the 20 percent they had requested for a variety of reasons. I asked them to hold the fact of the 19 percent interest-free credit in great confidence. A number of other countries had asked us for similar treatment and we had been obliged to refuse. They promised to keep this matter to themselves.

7. Bourguiba then asked if I was aware of the blowing up of the pipeline in southern Tunisia³ and I assured him that I had talked to Col. Landy Nelson, our military attaché, who had visited the site the previous day and he had given me a full account with color photography of what had happened. Bourguiba was convinced that the Libyans or Tunisian dissidents trained and equipped by the Libyans had done this. All in all my impression was that they emphasized any Libyan participation in the recent rioting less than I had expected in the light of their previous claims.

8. I then proceeded to give them a briefing on the situation in western Libya for which they were grateful. I indicated that we had no indications of abnormal military moves in Libya and we would continue to remain watchful for any such moves and would promptly advise them. Bourguiba noted that while we could perceive any substantial military moves we could not pick up individual commando-type raids.

9. Mzali then made an impassioned plea for more grant aid, both military and agricultural. I said that we were preparing to do something in respect to PL–480 but I did not have precise figures but hoped for something on the order of slightly less than a million dollars but would try to see what could be done beyond that. I explained that we had many legislative constraints that limited the ability of the executive to do certain things. Habib Bourguiba, Jr. then pointed out that in the case of Israel the aid proportion to grants was about 50 percent and wondered why small friendly country in danger could not do as well. Then he answered his own question by saying that they simply did not have a sufficiently large Tunisian lobby in the United States.

10. Mzali then said that much of the recent troubles was due to the large unemployment figure in excess of 20 percent, especially involving young people coming out of school and with no hope of a future. The service of Tunisia’s debts to us, to the French and to others was so large a burden that it prevents them from developing programs that would aid development and provide new jobs to stimulate the economy. He said that he had made these points recently to Vice President Bush⁴ and to the Secretary⁵ when he was here. Prime Minister Mzali commented that they were currently talking to the Kuwaitis about more assistance from Tunisia. He asked, seconded at once by Foreign Minister Essebsi, that we urge the Kuwaitis and the Saudis to be more helpful to them. The Prime Minister commented with satisfaction that Ambassador Cutler was a friend and understood Tunisia’s situation well.

11. President Bourguiba then invited me to lunch with him superseding the planned luncheon by the Foreign Minister and I accepted.

12. During a session with Prime Minister Mzali, Foreign Minister Essebsi and Habib Bourguiba, Jr., the Prime Minister raised the possibility of our lending them some military equipment on an emergency basis. I said that l would transmit this expression of his interest but was not in a position to make any commitment.

13. Comment. The Tunisians were grateful that I had been sent but basically they felt I was not bringing too much that was new, that their danger was great, that they should be a showcase to show how successful a moderate Arab state could be and most of all they pleaded for a much greater percentage of grant aid. I said that I would certainly transmit their views to the appropriate U.S. authorities, but they must understand that the demands on us were very great. They asked if I would make a short statement to the press, which I did on leaving the palace.⁶ The President said that it was most friendly of President Reagan to have sent me at this difficult time. I will have further discussions at lunch and will see Defense Minister Baly this afternoon. On the basis of my previous visits to President Bourguiba, whom I have known for 30 years, I found him in relatively good shape. He was not unduly emotional. He was less visibly disturbed by the recent events than I might have expected and the trembling of his hands was no greater than the last time I saw him about six months ago. He obviously had difficulty in reading the translation of President Reagan’s letter but other than that it seemed to be one of his better days. He was obviously pleased and grateful that I had been sent to him with a friendly personal letter from President Reagan. End comment.

Anderson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840019–0378. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Algiers, Paris, Rabat, and the White House. Sent for information to USCINCEUR.
2. See Document 313.
3. In telegram 184 from Tunis, January 10, the Embassy reported that “after briefing the U.S. Chargé, the French Ambassador, and various press representatives, the Tunisian Government went public with the sabotage of the Algerian-Tunisian oil pipeline at a point just inside the Libyan border” perpetrated by, the Tunisian Government contended, “four armed men wearing sandals, and that they returned to Libyan territory after carrying out the operation. A note had been sent in this regard to Libyan authorities.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840016–0381)
4. See Document 27.
5. See Document 311.
6. No record of Walters’ public statement was found.