Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

311. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the White House¹

Secto 15066.

Rabat, December 10, 1983, 2201Z

For S/S. Subject: Visit of Secretary Shultz to Rabat—My Meeting in Tunisia, December 10, 1983.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. I spent six working hours in Tunisia December 10 and met with President Bourguiba,² Prime Minister Mzali³ and Foreign Minister Essebsi.⁴

3. They had prepared two basic messages—linked by the perception of the threat which all agreed Qadhafi represents—which every interlocutor addressed. One of these dealt with Tunisia’s economic difficulties and related requirements for softer U.S. assistance—particularly military assistance terms. The other concerned Arab perceptions of the imbalanced reinforcement of our relations with Israel after the Shamir visit.⁵ This struck them as dangerous to their interests as well as ours.

4. Prime Minister Mzali carried the ball on the terms-of-aid issue. He pointed to the exponential curve of Tunisia’s indebtedness to the U.S. as a result of the commercial interest rates under which we allocate FMS credits and pled for concessional terms. He reviewed the rationale for Tunisia’s arms purchases “imposed upon us by Qadhafi’s Gafsa raid” and was at pains to highlight the Tunisian budget’s primary emphasis on education, health and development, to illustrate the modesty of this country’s unavoidable but essential military outlays. President Bourguiba put it in a nutshell when he said Tunisia needed help half in credits, half in grants. I told the Tunisians we were aware of the problem and would be seeking approval for more concessional and grant aid from the Congress, and I was hopeful we would be in a position to present more favorable terms next year.

5. Foreign Minister Essebsi spoke to me at length about our “enhanced” relations with Israel. Taking the decision announced after the Shamir visit⁶ as his point of departure Essebsi found them comprehensible only as evidence of Washington’s sense that a strong Israel was the best and only barrier to Soviet expansionism in the Middle East. Tunisia and other moderate Arabs could not share this American view. To the contrary, they believed that Israeli nationalism, competing with Palestinian nationalism for the same soil, had found expression in the rejection of the promising Reagan plan (“we thought that a solution was finally in sight”); had led to the invasion of Lebanon exacerbating the turmoil there; had turned Syria “which came to Fez and Washington believing at the time that Moscow could do nothing” back towards the Soviets for support. Tunisia, in short, saw an aggressive Israel as the agency through which the Soviets were enabled to exploit new opportunities in the region. Essebsi urged not an abandonment of Israel “whose right to exist is not challenged,” but more balanced American relations with the countries of the region. Such balance would best protect American interests, he said, as well as those of our Arab friends. Bourguiba echoed this theme and so did Mrs. Bourguiba, in a state of high emotion on the subject of Arafat’s tribulations, which the news of Israeli raids on Lebanon kept on everyone’s mind.

6. I said that the U.S. has had, has and will have strong links to Israel. I told all of my Tunisian friends of the important “Arab side” to our policy which, in fact, has the balance they desire. I stressed we had explained to Shamir in Washington that Israel’s willingness to withdraw from Lebanon and to negotiate the status of Gaza and the West Bank would, ultimately, make or break any negotiation which might yet come to pass. I spoke repeatedly about our awareness of the centrality of legitimate Palestinian interests and our intention to seek an improvement of the quality of Palestinian life.

7. I believe I was heard. However, we clearly confront a strongly skeptical Arab reaction to recent events in the Levant and shall need to show by what we do and say that our policy towards Arabs and Israelis is indeed balanced and responsive to need.

Shultz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. A record of the Shultz-Bourguiba conversation is in telegram Secto 15070 from Rabat, December 11. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830730–0088)
3. A record of the Shultz-Mzali conversation is in telegram 9290 from Tunis, December 12. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830731–0434)
4. A record of the Shultz-Essebsi conversation is in telegram 9291 from Tunis, December 12. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830731–0397)
5. Shamir visited the United States November 27–30. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.
6. In remarks after his November 29 meeting with Shamir, Reagan announced that the two nations “have agreed on the need to increase our cooperation in areas where our interests coincide, particularly in the political and military area.” (Department of State Bulletin, February 1984, pp. 30–31)