Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

26. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State and the White House¹

93.

Algiers, September 14, 1983, 0135Z

For: NSC/Judge Clark Office of the Vice President. From: Vice President’s Traveling Party. Subject: September 12 Meeting Between King Hassan II and Vice President Bush.

1. The Vice President and King Hassan met on 12 September in the Royal Palace in Rabat. Ambassador Walters was the only other person present. Since this was a very private meeting, distribution should be held to minimum.

2. Lebanon. After the amenities, the Vice President said we had received very alarming news yesterday from Lebanon. The King interrupted to say he had just heard that Prince Bandar had obtained a cease-fire from the Syrians, Druzes, and Shiites, and was currently in Larnaca (Cyprus) talking to President Gemayel of Lebanon. He did not think that Bandar would have made his proposal in the first place if he did not have Lebanese agreement.

3. The Vice President asked whether such a cease-fire in place would hold. King Hassan replied that it would “for a while.”

4. The Vice President then asked what the King thought we should do and the latter replied that we should above all not put our tail between our legs and “bug out.” The Vice President then asked whether the King thought a government of national unity could be formed in Lebanon. The King said it could and when it was formed then the countries having forces in Beirut could withdraw honorably. However, to bug out would cause tremendous U.S. loss of face. Long term the King was not optimistic about the durability of the government of national unity and he added reluctantly, “In the end it may result in a partition of Lebanon between Syria and Israel.” The King was most concerned about the activities of the Shiite Moslem Iranian volunteers. The Syrians were egging them on. Arming and supplying them.

5. King Hassan said that he had advised the Saudis to cut off the Syrians’ money to force the Syrians to cooperate with Bandar. They had done so and six hours later Assad had indicated willingness to resume talks with Bandar. The Vice President said that this jibed with our information.

6. Iran-Iraq war. The Vice President then asked the King what he thought of the Iraq-Iran war. The King replied that the Vice President would recall that when he was in Washington that had been the subject about which he had talked the most as it could easily degenerate into a much more serious conflagration. The Saudis were most concerned. There were more than 100,000 Iranian pilgrims in Saudi Arabia. They were demonstrating and causing trouble, but they could not be kept out because they were Moslems visiting the holy places. However, when the demonstration began, Prince Abdallah, the head of the National Guard, had been most concerned and had curtailed his month-long vacation in Morocco and rushed home. In addition, said the King, there were a lot more Iranians who had entered Saudi Arabia through Bahrain and other places and it was difficult for the Saudis to keep track of all of them.

7. Libya. The King then spoke of Qadhafi’s recent visit to Morocco.² The Libyan leader had sent him a message saying he would like to come to Morocco. King Hassan had asked what he wanted to talk about and Qadhafi had replied about a number of things. So the King had agreed that he could come for a day and a half. He had, in fact, stayed for four days.

8. He had promised King Hassan that he would cease all support to the Polisario. King Hassan said that he had kept that promise up to now but he was very skeptical for the future.

9. “Qadhafi is a schizophrenic” the King added. “All of us are to some degree. But in most cases our schizophrenia amounts to ripples. In his case, it is tidal waves.” The King had introduced Qadhafi to the parents of most of the Polisario leaders. These people are Moroccans living in Morocco.

10. King Hassan said that Qadhafi was still determined to hold on to large pieces of Chad and would not give up those territories he had acquired by force.

11. Qadhafi had been so taken with the uniforms of the Moroccan parachutists that the King had to have a number made overnight for the Libyan leader’s female party who were not, contrary to popular belief, bodyguards but students ranging from 19 to 25 that Qadhafi took with him on his travels on a rotating basis so that “they could see the world.”

12. The King said to Qadhafi at the outset of the visit that he would talk very bluntly with him since he would not ask the Libyans for money or cheap gas. He concluded that Qadhafi was schizophrenic and a dangerous man, unpredictable and irrational. His relations with Algeria were deteriorating because of border problems along the 1,000 kilometers of common frontier.

13. Western Sahara. The Vice President then asked about the Sahara. The King went through the history of the area and the grounds of the Moroccan claim. He said he had promised a referendum before the end of the year and he would go through with it. It would be supervised by the UN and the OAU. The Algerians had indicated to him that they were not keen for a referendum because they knew that Morocco would win.

14. The King said he had offered the Algerians a free port and fishing rights on the Atlantic coast. He had told them that they had things Morocco needed such as energy and petroleum technology and Morocco had food and other resources Algeria needed. Why should they not join together to build the great Maghreb. He believed President Bendjedid would have to go along with all of this and build a natural gas pipeline to Europe via Morocco and Spain that would unquestionably be viewed favorably and perhaps helped by the U.S. which would be delighted to see Europe less dependent on Siberian gas. The difficulty was that the Algerians were still searching for their national identity and it was difficult to get a consensus of those who governed Algeria.

15. The Vice President asked what he could do to help while in Algiers. The King replied, “emphasize all of the foregoing.”

16. The King then gave the Vice President a copy of his letter to OAU Chairman Mengistu indicating that he would hold the referendum in the Western Sahara but would not go to Addis Ababa.³

17. The King said that all parties in Morocco supported his position on the Sahara and he was quite sure that Morocco would win the referendum. The July and September 3 and 9 attacks on Morocco were Algerian-supported.⁴ Earlier on one occasion the Polisario had fired 3,000 rounds of Katyusha (122 mm) rockets in one day. That represented an expenditure of some 20 million dollars and the Polisario simply did not have that kind of money. It had to come from Algeria.

18. The King said that the form in which the question was posed for the referendum was important. The Algerians would demand the withdrawal of the Moroccan administration and armed forces. He would reply that the referendum which gave independence to Algeria had been posed simply as “do you want to be part of France or Algeria?” and in the Sahara it should be phrased: “do you want to be part of Morocco or of an independent state?” he also pointed out that the referendum had been held in Algeria with the French administration and armed forces in place.

19. If a majority decided for an independent state in the Sahara. He would hold free elections and turn the country over. Not to the Polisario, but to whoever won, just as the U. S. felt that the Palestinians had a right to a homeland but was not in favor of turning them over to the PLO.

20. Invitation to King Hassan. The Vice President said that President Reagan was looking forward to a working lunch in the United States with the King. King Hassan then said that he would probably go to the United States on September 23. He would speak the day after the President.⁵ He knew that the President had 37 leaders who wanted to see him, and he was delighted that the President had accepted this meeting with him.

21. The Crown Prince. The Vice President and the King then spoke about the Crown Prince and how the King was more and more putting him into public life and possibilities in a non-deferred future of his spending some time in the United States.

22. Conclusion. The Vice President and the King agreed to exchange information on Lebanon later in the day when they met for dinner. At the end the Vice President handed the King the letter from President Reagan.⁶

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Vice Presidential Daily Files, OA/ID 20652. Secret; Niact Immediate; Via Privacy Channel. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Bush visited North Africa September 11–16, Yugoslavia September 16–18, Romania September 18–19, Hungary September 19–20, and Austria September 20–21.
2. See footnote 2, Document 22.
3. Telegram 7313 from Rabat, September 12, contains the text of Hassan’s letter to Mengistu. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number])
4. For information concerning the July incident, see footnote 2, Document 411. No record of attacks in September has been identified.
5. Reference is to Reagan’s September 26 address to the UN General Assembly.
6. No record of Reagan’s letter to Hassan has been found.