Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

411. Telegram From the Embassy in Mauritania to the Department of State¹

3624.

Nouakchott, August 3, 1983, 1449Z

SUBJECT

• The Sahara Issue—Mauritanian Views.

Ref:

• A. Rabat 5894,²
• B. Algiers 3188,³
• C. Algiers 3189.⁴

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Summary: As a participant with relatively little input but with a potentially major stake in the outcome, Mauritania is watching events in and around the Sahara with growing concern. In particular, what is seen as Morocco’s hardening stance has dashed Mauritania’s hopes for a near-term OAU-style solution. In this context, Chief of State Haidalla urges the US to reiterate forcefully its support for a settlement along Addis guidelines. End summary.

3. The thoughtful and perceptive analyses of developments in the region contained in reftels arrived shortly after the Ambassador was convoked by Haidalla for a brief meeting, sandwiched with difficulty between other engagements, at which he discussed the same general subject. For the GIRM, the Western Sahara issue has long and understandably been the primary external concern (with very significant internal aspects as well). Until recently, there was a tendency to react with somewhat unrealistic optimism to any indications of progress in the direction of a peaceful resolution. Thus the February 26 meeting between Bendjedid and Hassan,⁵ in which both the Saharan conflict and the resultant Moroccan-Algeria estrangement were viewed as virtually resolved, kindled high hopes in Nouakchott. (A series of high-level Algerian emissaries overcame Mauritania’s initial fears that both it and the Polisario had been abandoned in the process.) The GIRM’s quiet elation, however, faded away as it became clear that nothing really significant had occurred as far as the Sahara was concerned. The process was restarted on the occasion of the OAU summit, which the GIRM initially seemed to believe had removed all obstacles, a euphoria soon replaced by a growing fear that things were waxing worse instead of better. In all of this, Mauritania ceaselessly worries that its own interests might be sacrificed to smooth the way for a settlement.

4. In his meeting with the Ambassador, Haidalla expressed profound disappointment and concern over what he described as Moroccan intransigence. Until quite recently, he said, he had been hopeful that the summit’s consensus resolution,⁶ coming in the wake of the SDAR’s comportment at Addis, and coupled with Algeria’s forthcoming position on bilateral issues, would have been sufficient to convince Hassan that the best interests of his nation and the entire region would be served by accepting the recommendations. The advantages accruing to all the peoples of the area were so compellingly obvious, he added, and the cost of continuing the war so high, that he was taken completely aback by the July 8 [9] statement.

5. Haidalla said that Moroccan inflexibility had already produced the one thing that everyone had hoped to avoid: renewed military activity. No longer convinced that the path of diplomacy offered much hope, the Polisario had felt obliged to remind Hassan that it still has a military option. According to Haidalla, the attacks on M’Seid were not a direct reaction to the July speech,⁷ but to the continuing evidence of a Moroccan decision to ignore the summit resolutions almost from the time of their issuance. The fact that the attacks took place inside Morocco, he added, indicate that they are also a signal from Algeria that the status quo is just as unacceptable as the announced Moroccan position on future developments in the Sahara.

6. The situation is hopeless, Haidalla went on, if even those few countries that are still able to discuss the issue with Hassan are unable to persuade him to abandon a specious claim to territory belonging to a group whose claims are recognized by almost the entire world. He pointed out that the US has been one of the major contributors to Moroccan economic development and military capabilities and has had a close and productive relationship with Hassan since he came to the throne. He urged that we seek to encourage the King to be pragmatic and flexible on the Saharan issue and that we use our access to insure that he is aware that we strongly support the OAU resolutions.

7. The Ambassador reminded Haidalla that the US has continuously and publicly endorsed the position adopted by the OAU on the Western Sahara and had promptly announced its support of the decision reached at Addis. Morocco is in no doubt whatsoever as to our policy on the subject but, as a sovereign nation, makes its own decisions. Haidalla said he only wished to suggest that “Hassan be fully aware that virtually no one supports his position”. The Ambassador replied that although the Sahara question is very important, it is only one aspect of our very broad overall relationship with Morocco.

8. Comment. The GIRM suspects Rabat would be happier with a government in Nouakchott that tilted a little more toward the Moroccan position. Haidalla has on occasion indicated that he fears the Moroccan objective is considerably more than just a similarity of views on various issues. In a French radio interview, published July 26, responding to a question, how he viewed challenges to Mauritanian existence Haidalla said, “as far as I know, the existence of Mauritania has not been disputed except by one of our neighbors”. This appears to be a reference to Morocco and, however paranoid, seems to be a belief shared by many in the leadership, who point to the failed coup of February 81 as a concrete illustration of Rabat’s intentions.⁸

9. Haidalla therefore sees a continuation of the impasse in the Sahara as increasing the threat to his regime as well as the dangers to the region. Nevertheless, he was also very evidently interested in putting his observations on the situation in a positive light. He agreed that if [it] hadn’t been in Algeria at the Maghreb summit, they would have met and talked, and he reminded the Ambassador of the July 10 speech in which he stated that the current lack of diplomatic relations is a temporary aberration in brotherly ties. In short, Haidalla knows he has to do his best to get along with the King, but he sees little to work with either in the bilateral context or, of perhaps far greater significance, in the Saharan context.

10. On the latter issue, he was quite somber, giving the impression that he has little hope that Hassan will change his announced stance. He made only a passing reference to the US arms supply program, and did not voice any criticism of our policy. He appeared to be very interested in being reassured that the USG’s position has not changed, even though he seems to believe that Morocco itself has vitiated the OAU process.

Peck

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830440–0544. Secret; Priority. Sent for information Priority to Algiers, Casablanca, Madrid, Paris, Rabat, and Tunis.
2. In telegram 5894 from Rabat, July 28, the Embassy reported: “During the past three weeks there have been sustained military operations by the Polisario within Morocco. The attacks, centered in the area of M’Seid (inside Morocco proper) appear to signal a change in Polisario military strategy. Moroccan policy to date has been to meet all attacks firmly, but not to counter-attack on the ground or allow the conflict to interfere with the referendum process or long-term rapprochement with Algeria. On the other hand, current Moroccan willingness to view continuing rapprochement and Algerian acquiescence, if not open support, for Polisario operations as separate tracks could be eroded if fighting is prolonged at present levels.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830430–0158)
3. In telegram 3188 from Algiers, July 31, the Embassy reported: “Algeria remains firmly committed to the process of rapprochement with Morocco, although movement has stalled because of lack of progress in resolving the Western Sahara conflict. GOA leaders were especially surprised by King Hassan’s July 8 [9] speech which reinforced the perception—shared by many in the OAU—that the King is basically insincere concerning a genuine referendum of self-determination.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830435–0559)
4. In telegram 3189 from Algiers, July 31, Newlin wrote: “Reflecting on the above messages, I am struck by the fact that there appears to be an articulated desire on the part of both Hassan and Bendjedid to arrive at a compromise settlement on the Western Sahara.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830435–0561)
5. See Document 19
6. See footnote 3, Document 408.
7. In telegram 3267 from Algiers, August 6, the Embassy reported: “According to a reliable Arab journalist who met Aug. 3 with Polisario’s Algiers representative Ould Salek, Polisario is very pessimistic on possibilities for peaceful resolution of the conflict. Salek said King Hassan has shown that he does not accept the most recent OAU Summit Resolution; in such circumstances, the Polisario offensive at M’Sied is to make the point that without negotiations, the war will continue.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830450–0545)
8. See Document 3.