Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

22. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Chad¹

195758.

Washington, July 14, 1983, 0208Z

Following Rabat repeated for your action dtd Jul 6: Action SecSte info Algiers Cairo Lisbon London Madrid Nouakchott Paris Tel Aviv Tunis.

Qte: Rabat 5283. Subject: Qadhafi Visit to Morocco—King Hassan’s Views. Ref: Rabat 5211.²

1. (S—Entire text)

2. Summary. King Hassan asked Ambassador Reed to spend the evening with him after the ceremonial breaking of the Ramadan fast on July 5. The King believes that while Colonel Qadhafi is mentally unstable, he is intelligent and, for the time being, Morocco and the Arab world will have to get along with the Libyan. Some diplomatic activity is envisaged.

— The King and Qadhafi reached no agreements either on providing assistance to Morocco (as had been rumored) or on the Western Saharan and Chad matters.

— The King said his sources in Israel have told him the Begin government is planning a de facto occupation of southern Lebanon and is putting the infrastructure in place to accomplish this.

— The King sent his warm personal greetings to President Reagan. End summary.

3. King Hassan asked Ambassador Reed to join him for an evening at home after the “harirar” or breaking of the fast at the end of the day on July 5. The Ambassador was accompanied to the meeting by Foreign Minister Boucetta and Chamberlain Frej. Neither man stayed for the conversation which took place from 8:20 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. in the King’s private apartment in the palace compound in Rabat.

4. The King said he wanted to be sure the U.S. and President Reagan had an early and authoritative read-out on Qadhafi’s visit.

5. It was Qadhafi, according to Hassan, who insisted on coming to Morocco. He originally came for a two-day visit and stayed for four. The King found Qadhafi’s behavior erratic and bizarre, sometimes rude. (The flaunting of female bodyguards who apparently glowered at guests over their weapons at formal dinners seemed particularly to have irritated the King.)
“Schizophrenic” was a word used by the King several times to describe Qadhafi. The Libyan “tunes out” at regular intervals and makes curious and inappropriate noises and sounds at other times, according to Hassan.

6. However, said Hassan, Qadhafi may be “unstable” but he is not stupid and he, Hassan, has decided (we understand from other sources the Saudis share this view) that Qadhafi will be around for a while and the Arabs will have to learn to live with him.

7. As a start, Hassan has decided to send a special envoy to Libya to explore the possibility of setting up diplomatic relations with the Tripoli government. This special envoy may be the brother of Education Minister Laraki. Hassan said he and Qadhafi also agreed it would be a good idea to have a meeting of Maghreb leaders. Hassan proposed Algiers as a site. Qadhafi was taken aback at this and said he wasn’t “getting along with the Algerians.” These were the only “concrete” results of the visit. On Chad and Western Sahara, both sides spent a lot of time sparring and seem to have ended up hinting to each other that Morocco would stay out of the Chad situation if the Libyans stopped interfering in the Western Sahara.

— Qadhafi told Hassan there are no Libyan troops currently in Chad.

— As an aside to a description of the talks on Western Sahara/Chad, King Hassan said Qadhafi would giggle and ask him when the referendum would be held. Hassan said he finally asked when the Libyans would be holding a referendum in Chad and that this had caused one of Qadhafi’s tune-outs.

8. The King said he did not ask for Libyan financial assistance and refused to discuss a Libyan idea to refuse Moroccan military facilities to imperialists. (“What cheek* do you Americans know what the Russians have in Libya?”)

9. Hassan sent Qadhafi to meet the father of the current Polisario chief, Mohammed Abdelaziz, who lives in Rabat. According to the King, the father gave Qadhafi an “earful on the abuses of the Polisario and their mistaken goals.”

10. In sum, the King said, he had spent rather too much time on Qadhafi but perhaps it would be useful to have a dialogue. The difficulty of such a dialogue was illustrated, Hassan said, by the departure scene. Qadhafi has said he was going on to Mauritania. However, his aircraft took off due east**

11. On another subject: King Hassan continues to be gloomy about the Middle East. He claims to have highly placed sources in Israel who say the Begin government is preparing the de facto annexation of southern Lebanon and is installing the infrastructure (roads, schools, etc.) to accomplish this*

12. The Ambassador discussed weather modification, VOA enhancement and security matters which will be handled in septels.³

13. The King looked well and seemed relaxed and at ease. There is no sign of any tension or unusual security on the palace grounds.

14. The redoubtable Moulay Hafid, however, is showing signs of age. He has developed a slight tremor and in dealing with senior Embassy officer has been uncharacteristically forgetful and sloppy about details.

15. The King thanked the Ambassador for delaying his departure to meet at the palace and provided a private aircraft to fly the Ambassador to London.

Curran

Unqte

Shultz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830399–0442. Secret; Exdis. Repeat of telegram 5283 from Rabat, July 6, which has not been found. Drafted by Terrell Otis (NEA/AFN); cleared by Sebastian, Bishop, and William Garland (S/S–O); approved by Schneider. All asterisks are in the original.
2. Telegram 196717 to Ndjamena, July 14, repeated the text of telegram 5211 from Rabat, July 5, in which the Embassy reported: “Qadhafi’s unexpected visit to Rabat ended on Sunday, July 3. To the end, the visit was played as being at the ‘working level’, but the lavishness and breadth of the reception given Qadhafi left many with the impression that it was a full State visit. Efforts were made, our sources tell us, to keep the frenetic (one high Moroccan called him ‘schizophrenic’) Libyan from getting out of hand, and most with whom we have spoken thus far express their skepticism about the sincerity of Qadhafi’s new-found moderation and friendliness. It would appear that all expected issues were in fact covered.” The Embassy continued: “We fear that the U.S. position in North Africa may have been a Moroccan bargaining chip.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830402–0613)
3. No other record of the July 5 Reed-Hassan meeting has been found.