Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

2. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

737.

Tunis, January 29, 1981, 1232Z

SUBJECT

• (U) Libyan Foreign Secretary’s Visit.

Ref:

• Tunis 685.²

1. (C—Entire text)

2. A Tunisian cabinet minister directly involved in the visit of Libyan Foreign Secretary Turayki has highlighted for the Ambassador the main results. Source said that the meeting between Turayki and Prime Minister Mzali included several acrimonious exchanges and was dominated by each side’s interpretations of the reasons for sour relations in the past. An element which strongly contributed to the tense atmosphere throughout Turayki’s visit was the refusal of President Bourguiba to receive the Libyan emissary. According to source, it was Bourguiba who had invited Turayki to Tunis, and the latter for his part clearly did not believe the medical excuse proffered as the reason for President’s failure to receive him.

3. In a foretaste of the next step in Libyan diplomacy toward Tunisia, Turayki pushed hard for a follow-up visit to Tripoli by a Tunisian Minister. This would probably be Mzali’s close associate Mezri Chekir. The latter is not enthusiastic, especially since he would have to discuss the prospect for a visit by the Prime Minister himself. President Bourguiba, for his part, is inclined to delay any further diplomatic moves, primarily to gauge the evolving international situation following upon the Libyan invasion of Chad. On the other hand, there is a strong school of thought within the GOT that Tunisia can expect help from no one if Libya turns against it. Tunisia must, therefore, establish whatever relationship with Libya is necessary to protect its security.

4. Regarding Tunisia’s specific disputes with Libya, Turayki seemed to have an answer of sorts for each one. With respect to the dispute over the continental shelf,³ he simply noted that Libya had made in 1972 the same proposal for joint exploration which Prime Minister Mzali has now put forward. In 1972 it was the GOT, led by then Prime Minister Nouira, who rejected such an arrangement. He agreed to take another look at the proposal in the light of current conditions. Answering Tunisian charges that Libya maintains camps to train Tunisian dissidents, Turayki denied that the camps have any evil intentions. They have been established, he claimed, to process the papers of Tunisians who have crossed the border into Libya looking for work.

5. Turayki’s line on Libyan involvement in Chad was that Libya had responded both to an appeal for help from the Chadian Government and to protect Libya’s own security. He said that the help being extended to FROLINAT by Egypt, Israel, and others, was posing a clear danger to Libya’s southern border areas. Far from having an interest in staying in Chad if it were not wanted, Libya had proposed to Nigeria that the latter replace Libyan forces in Chad with Nigerian troops. The Lagos government refused. Libya was still prepared to withdraw its troops whenever President Goukouni asks it to do so. As for the references to unity in the recent agreement between Goukouni and Qadhafi, this was nothing more than a standard rhetorical formula common to many exchanges between African brothers.

6. Subsequent conversations with two separate Foreign Ministry officials yields line that Libya would have to engage in confidence-building measures in order to encourage further detente. Prior to a Mzali visit to Tripoli, there would have to be visible evidence of Libya’s good intentions.

Bosworth

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810048–0591. Confidential. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, Dakar, Khartoum, Lagos, Niamey, Paris, Rabat, COMSIXTHFLT, CINCUSNAVEUR, USDOCOSOUTH, CINCUSAFE Ramstein, USCINCEUR.
2. In telegram 685 from Tunis, January 27, the Embassy reported that, according to the press, “Turayki’s meetings centered on expansion of bilateral economic and commercial cooperation, as well as on desire to increase tourism by opening border. Tunisians describe visit as being ‘psychological.’ Libyan follow-through will be seen as test of Qadhafi’s declared intent to improve relations, especially with respect to Tunisian proposal for joint exploitation of petroleum resources in contested continental shelf.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810043–0663)
3. For more on the Libyan-Tunisian dispute over the continental shelf, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, Part 3, North Africa, Documents 4 and 5.