Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

5. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in France, Italy, and Tunisia¹

Washington, April 2, 1977, 2237Z

73662. Subject: Tunisian-Libyan Shelf Dispute: Atherton-Hedda Meeting on April 1. CINCUSNAVEUR, EUCOM pass POLADs. USDOCOSOUTH pass CINCSOUTH for POLAD. Ref: State 71629.²

1. Summary: After reviewing background on Libyan-Tunisian shelf dispute, Tunisian Ambassador Hedda and Assistant Secretary Atherton discussed ways in which U.S. might help Tunisians in their effort to resolve dispute by peaceful means. Atherton drew on points in guidance sent septel³ and added that we would discuss issue with France and Italy. End summary.

2. Hedda’s report on situation paralleled full reports from Embassy Tunis, including Qadhafi’s threat to Tunisian FonMin Chatty in Tripoli last week. Hedda added that Chatty had spent this week travelling to capitals to see Fahmi and Fahd and Iraqi Representative, probably Hammadi, returning to Tunis on March 31. Tunisians had repeatedly asked Italians to comply with their earlier promises about withdrawal of drilling rig, and had sought French support as well. Hedda suggested that U.S. might also intercede with France and Italy.

3. Atherton reassured Hedda that we would help in Security Council, if necessary, and suggested that Tunisian UN Mission talk to SYG Waldheim. Hedda took occasion to ask for increased U.S. military assistance, including Redeye. Atherton replied that no assurances on increased military assistance were possible at the moment. In any event, Tunisia appeared more in need of diplomatic support from friends. In this regard, he said we would exchange views with France and Italy.

4. Hedda said this would be helpful particularly in Rome, where Tunis by itself could scarcely compete with Libya, given important Libyan-Italian economic links. Speaking without instructions, he asked the U.S. to give consideration to what further steps could be taken in the event that Qadhafi should continue to push Tunisians toward the wall. He specifically recalled U.S. political/military support in August 1976 (extended Sixth Fleet ship visit, birthday message from President Ford, exchange of intelligence, etc.), and linked support from U.S. and others to Qadhafi’s agreement only a few weeks later to submit issue to ICJ.

5. Comment: Neither Hedda nor Atherton was aware at time of meeting of information in report being repeated septel that Italian rig Scarabeo has apparently moved to east out of disputed area. Although this will help to defuse situation, we do not yet know whether Tunisians will wish to continue to press for SC consideration of issue. Mere removal of rig does not resolve Qadhafi’s backtracking on August 1976 agreement to submit matter to Hague, nor his threatening demand that operations in Isis field to the north be suspended.

6. For Rome and Paris: We will forward instructions and talking points septel for discussions with FonMins on shelf issue.⁴

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770116–0033. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers, Baghdad, Jidda, London, Oslo, Rabat, Tripoli, USUN, the Secretary of Defense, CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, EUCOM, and USDOCOSOUTH. Drafted by Wilkinson; cleared in draft in EUR and IO; approved by Atherton.
2. See footnote 5, Document 4.
3. See footnote 6, Document 4.
4. In telegram 80407 to Rome, Paris, and London, April 10, the Department transmitted the following instructions: “You should inform FonOff that U.S. is concerned about possible threat to the peace as a result of recent Libyan statements re disputed shelf area between Libya and Tunisia. You should state that we are following standard policy of not taking a position on legal merits of a dispute to which we are not parties and advising American drillers to stay out of disputed waters, but we are willing to associate ourselves with Tunisia’s efforts to prevent the matter from being settled by force. You should note that Tunisians have been eager to drill an exploratory well in disputed zone for over a year, but are continuing to exercise restraint and avoid provoking Libyans. Libyans, in contrast, have exercised no such restraint.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770124–1218)