4. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State1
2107. CINCUSNAVEUR, EUCOM pass POLADs. USDOCOSOUTH pass CINCSOUTH for POLAD. Subject: Prime Minister Views Tunisian-Libyan Confrontation. Ref: Tunis 2049 and Tunis 2050.2
1. Summary: Prime Minister Nouira reviewed with me at length today Tunisian version of its dispute with Libya over delimitation of continental shelf. He charged Italians with bad faith and recounted complete impasse encountered by Foreign Minister Chatti in talk last week with Colonel Qadhafi. He sought U.S. opinion as to wisdom of referral of present dispute to Security Council. End summary.
2. Prime Minister Hedi Nouira took most of one hundred minute meeting afternoon March 28 to review history of Tunisian-Libyan confrontation over continental shelf and exposition of Tunisian policy thereon. He explained that GOT has been trying since 1968 to obtain delimitation of continental shelf precisely in order to avoid potential armed clash now likely to arise due to Qadhafi’s intransigence.
3. GOT’s basic position, Nouira explained, has never changed. It seeks pro forma delimitation of continental shelf according to accepted principles of international law. Once defined GOT’s original and standing offer to exploit oil resources on the continental shelf jointly with Libya still stands. Tunisia today takes the position that dispute should be referred to ICJ which should state principles upon which demarcation should be based. Once delimited, disputed area should be exploited by Tunisia in common with Libya. This only just and equitable, Prime Minister insists. Libyan position has constantly shifted to point where Libya now even refused to apply the universally accepted principles of Geneva Convention with regard to “median lines” [Page 8] between shore points.3 GOT cannot wait until Law of Sea conference obtains general agreement on principles.
4. Prime Minister reviewed history of current confrontation arising from drilling by Scarabeo IV as outlined in note submitted March 19 to Italians (Tunis 2049 and 2050) and emphasized Italians’ bad faith in this incident. At this juncture I told Prime Minister of brief talk I had had with Italian Ambassador Giuffrida March 25 who insisted that Italian Foreign Ministry had been unaware of intentions of SAIPEM (AGIP–ENI subsidiary) to drill on disputed site. Prime Minister replied “that may or may not be true”. Involvement of Italians in this incident, he said, was especially sad since Tunisia had “maintained only friendliest of relations with Italy since last Punic War”.
5. Foreign Minister Chatty had visited Tripoli last week carrying moderately worded note for Qadhafi, protesting GOT’s desire to settle current dispute in peaceful, non-violent manner, suggesting that matter could be referred for arbitration to group of mutually agreed Arab League members if Libya disliked going to ICJ. He told me Chatty had had two hours alone with Qadhafi and used every possible fraternal and moderate means to persuade Qadhafi to negotiate the dispute peacefully. When Qadhafi remained adamant that he would not negotiate away a single meter of Libyan territory, Chatty stated that Tunisia only wished to have Libya agree to execute the accord reached last year to submit dispute to ICJ.4 Qadhafi replied that Libya would apply that accord when Tunisia agreed to apply the Djerba Accord of 1974 (merging the two countries). Chatty then made it clear that Libya leaves Tunisia no alternative but to defend its rights by all means at its disposal. Qadhafi stated strongly (with Nouira then reading from Chatty’s cable) that if Tunisia resorts to military methods it would find Libya “stronger than you”. Qadhafi also said that Scarabeo IV would soon resume drilling and he hoped GOT would not be foolish enough to try to prevent it. He repeated that “the military balance is not in favor of Tunisia”. Chatty replied with regret that Tunisia could only rely upon Qadhafi’s goodwill or resort to means of self-defense to protect its territory, since Libya refused all offers of arbitration. Qadhafi reiterated his refusal to accept any arbitration. Interview was terminated on this unhappy note.
6. Prime Minister said he had taken pains to ensure that Tunisia’s friends were aware of each new development in this unhappy story. He has appreciated understanding attitude U.S. has displayed and [Page 9] generous contribution of time and expertise given by officers of Department to Tunisian representatives who have visited Washington recently. He thought it was now important to note that if Scarabeo IV resumes drilling GOT may well be obliged to resort to force to prevent it. He said he had begun to wonder whether the UN Security Council could be invoked with a view to settling a possible clash. I told him that, while I was far from expert in Security Council procedures, the UN Charter created the Security Council to have jurisdiction in threats to international peace and security and it seemed to me that this would encompass potential threats as well as actual clashes. He asked me if I would obtain the Department’s opinion regarding the likelihood of Security Council acceptance of a Tunisian appeal to it for mediation of this dispute. I promised to do so.
7. Nouira stated that Qadhafi’s current attitude completely denies GOT the resources of an appeal to the ICJ and obliges it to appeal to international opinion possibly through Security Council. He stated that if Tunisia is proved wrong on subject of boundary it will accept this fact. Tunisia would give up its claims; however, it feels that it should have the right as a peaceful state to have its rights examined peacefully.
8. Prime Minister soliloquized at considerable length over plight peaceful, hard-working Tunisia finds itself in today at [garble] troublesome neighbor, Libya. Tunisia has devoted all its efforts to raising the standard of living of its people and promoting their social development. No Arab nation is more Westernized nor more pro-West than Tunisia. If Qadhafi chose to roll across the border with his hundred [garble] Soviet tanks and scores of MiGs, Tunisia would be defenseless, having nothing but Korean War vintage military equipment and a small army to defend itself. Currently, the Prime Minister said, his government is deeply concerned with the inexplicable Libyan prohibition of movements into and out of Libya by all Arabs. “Why is he doing this?” asked Nouira. I told him I had only seen a report of this move in past few hours and was unable to offer any valid explanation. I could only express the hope that reason would prevail and that Tunisia’s persistence in seeking a peaceful solution would prove successful.
9. Comment: While Nouira from time to time referred to a map showing Tunisia’s boundary claim and of oil concessions within it, he volunteered no reference to Tunisian intention to commence drilling at site due north of present position of Scarabeo IV. When I asked whether Tunisia planned any early drilling operations in vicinity of Scarabeo IV (not citing my March 25 talk with Defense Minister Farhat) he indicated that the Chatty-Qadhafi conversation had changed nature [Page 10] of entire confrontation, leaving me with impression such drilling would not soon take place.5
10. Action requested: I would appreciate a statement of Department’s views on wisdom of GOT’s request for Security Council meeting on current dispute suitable for passing to Prime Minister at an early date.6
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770107–0094. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Rome, Tripoli, and USUN. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, London, Oslo, Paris, Rabat, the Secretary of Defense, CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, EUCOM, and USDOCOSOUTH Naples.↩
- In telegram 2049 from Tunis, March 25, Mulcahy wrote: “I learned today that Tunisia plans to have Norwegian drilling contractor operate at site just north of disputed drilling location on Tunisian-Libyan continental shelf. It was made clear to me by Minister of Defense that Tunisian Navy will guard drilling operations and be prepared to fire upon any parties interfering with it.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770103–0317) In telegram 2050 from Tunis, March 25, the Embassy provided an unofficial translation of the Tunisian note presented to the Italian Embassy on March 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770103–0321)↩
- The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf defined the limits of territorial waters and continental shelf boundaries.↩
- In August 1976, Tunisia and Libya agreed to submit the matter of the continental shelf boundary dispute to the International Court of Justice.↩
- In telegram 71629 to Tunis, April 1, Atherton wrote: “Qadhafi’s refusal to negotiate and his veiled threat to resort to military force against Tunisia clearly places the onus of fault for deterioration of the situation on Libya, regardless of the merits of the respective boundary lines. I believe Qadhafi’s threat should be taken seriously and I want you to know that we are focusing on the problem with a view to determining how the U.S. might be most helpful to Tunisia.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770111–0557)↩
- In telegram 72492 to Tunis, April 2, the Department wrote: “Since Qadhafi has for the moment rejected ICJ adjudication and has threatened to use force, we believe Tunisians have a legitimate basis to seek Security Council action. U.S. policy is to support right of any UN member to bring to attention of SC any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction or endanger the maintenance of international peace, as provided for in Chapter VI of UN Charter. In this case, our initial judgment is that SC debate would help Tunisia by broadening international support for what appears to be a reasonable and restrained attitude and perhaps bring international pressure on Qadhafi to adopt a more conciliatory posture.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770114–0385)↩