Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

169. Memorandum From the Vice President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gregg) to Vice President Bush¹

Washington, August 4, 1987

Subject:

• Memorandum of Conversation with Algerian Ambassador Sahnoun

The Ambassador had just returned from several weeks in Africa, including a trip to the OAU meeting in Ethiopia. He had flown back from that meeting to Algieria with President Bendjedid and they had long talks on the aircraft. The following key points emerged:

— Algerian policy toward Qadhafi. Qadhafi has recently received heavy setbacks. Sahnoun said that the American attack had weakened him and had shown that, despite spending billions on weapons, Libya was still vulnerable to America. The recent defeats in Chad have also weakened Qadhafi. In this state, he sought a meeting with President Chadli and suggested that Algeria and Libya unite politically as Libya had previously joined with Morocco.² Bendjedid, who in Sahnoun’s words, “would like to get rid of Qadhafi,” rebuffed this suggestion. He did tell Qadhafi that if he fully repaired his relations with Tunisia, that Algeria would consider including him in the Treaty of Friendship which currently exists among Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania. Qadhafi is moving toward better relations with Tunisia and has agreed to pay reparations for those Tunisian workers forced out of Libya. If this continues, there will be a meeting in Tunisia under Bourguiba’s leadership, where Libya’s reentry into the concept of Mahgreb unity will be considered.

— Why Be Nice to Qadhafi? Sahnoun said that the Algerian diplomatic and military figures are receiving many pleas from Libyan officials urging that Libya not be completely isolated. They fear that Qadhafi, if he feels isolated, may do something utterly foolish which could damage Libya long term. Sahnoun cited the fact that Major Jallud had recently visited Moscow and had proposed to Gorbachev a Treaty of Friendship identical to that which the Soviet Union currently has with Syria. Gorbachev reportedly stated that such treaties take time to negotiate. Jallud said that Libya would like to sign immediately and said that the treaty he had brought was identical to the one existing between Moscow and Damascus. Gorbachev rebuffed the offer, saying “but Libya is not Syria.” Sahnoun stressed that Bendjedid does not like or trust Qadhafi and that if he returns to a more radical stance, they will adopt a harder line. He assured me that they remain deeply suspicious of Qadhafi and are not about to be taken in by him.

— I asked about Abu Nidal. Sahnoun seemed a little uncomfortable with this subject, but answered quite forthrightly. He said he had been told by the Chief of Algerian Intelligence that they do have periodic contact with the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO). Algeria does this in order to keep tabs on what the ANO is doing, to be able to put pressure on the ANO in case of an outbreak of terrorism, and to seek to moderate its stance. He insisted that no support was being given to the ANO, that there are only meetings with ANO representatives when they come to Algeria. Sahnoun said he had been told that ANO representatives had been received at high levels in France and Germany, and that the ANO appeared to be trying to change its image, if not its tactics. (He was a little vague on this.) He assured me that this had been reported by Algerian Intelligence to CIA through established liaison channels.

— Algeria, Morocco and the Sahara. Sahnoun was somewhat upset on the Sahara problem, saying that King Hassan had said some helpful things after the recent meeting of Bendjedid, King Fahd and Hassan.³ They were particularly struck by Hassan saying that the Polisario issue is not a problem between Algeria and Morocco and that he (Hassan) knew that only a political solution was logical. Sahnoun said he was aware of the Vice President’s interest in this problem and said that if a breakthrough became virtually assured, except for one or two final matters, Algeria might ask for the Vice President’s help.

— The Persian Gulf. Sahnoun knows the Iranians rather well and says that the situation in Iran and the Gulf is very dangerous. He says that there are people in Iran who oppose Khomeni, but that it is terribly difficult for them to show their opposition due to the war with Iraq. Sahnoun did not think that Iran would make a blatant or open attack on American ships in the Gulf or the reflagged Kuwaiti tankers. He did feel that mines would continue to be used extensively. He acknowledged that the U.S. might be forced to retaliate against Iran if more mine attacks were successful, but was concerned that Khomeni would use such attacks to incite the Iranians to further actions of fanaticism. Sahnoun said that the deaths in Mecca were a deeply serious matter and that the next several months in the Gulf area would be very touchy indeed.⁴

— Bendjedid’s Views. Sahnoun said that Bendjedid hopes very much that you will be elected in 1988. He asked Sahnoun if there was anything he (Bendjedid) could do to help your campaign. Sahnoun smilingly told the President that he “had best keep quiet” so as not to interfere in U.S. politics. Sahnoun stressed how highly Bendjedid regards you. I said that you had been concerned about reports of Algeria’s apparent warming toward Qadhafi and that it was very helpful to learn of President Bendjedid’s long-term motivations.

Comment: Sahnoun was friendly and forthcoming and I consider this a very useful relationship.

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Vice Presidential Records, Office of National Security Affairs, Donald P. Gregg Files, Country Files, OA/ID 19778, Folder 19778–003, Algeria—1987. Confidential. At the top of the memorandum Bush wrote: “Don Fine report interesting Thanx GB 8–4.”
2. See footnote 2, Document 168.
3. Reference is to the May 4 Maghreb Summit during which Saudi King Fahd tried to broker an agreement between Bendjedid and Hassan on the Western Sahara. See Document 450.
4. Reference is to the July 31 riots caused by Iranian pilgrims to Mecca which killed over 400 people. (Charles P. Wallace, “402 Die in Clashes of Saudis, Iranians: Killings at Shrine in Mecca Trigger Attacks on Four Embassies in Tehran,” Los Angeles Times, August 2, 1987, p. A1)