Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

213653.

Washington, July 11, 1987, 1252Z

SUBJECT

• Algerian Ambassador’s Read-Out on North African Deveopments.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Algerian Ambassdor Sahnoun returned to Washington 7/9 from UN meetings in New Delhi. He leaves again 7/10 for Algiers; all Algerian Ambassadors have been summoned back, presumably to be briefed on Algerian-Libyan dialogue and implications thereof.

3. During his recent stay in Algiers, Sahnoun met with President Bendjedid among other GOA leaders. Bendjedid allegedly commented to Sahnoun about likely unease in Washington about the Qadhafi visit to Algiers.² He directed Sahnoun to present the Algerian position and to try to assuage USG concerns.

4. Libya:

— As have other Algerians, Sahnoun insisted that GOA is responding to Libyan initiatives, remains suspicious of Qadhafi’s ultimate motives and willingness to follow through on commitments, and will proceed in very measured fashion.

— Sahnoun contends that Qadhafi has always been personally cool towards Algeria, unenthusiastic about entering into relationship in which Libya would be weaker partner. He posited that pressure for closer relations ironically comes more from Libyan military officers than that of Qadhafi himself.

— In recent past, a number of these military leaders have come to Algiers or otherwise contacted Algerian counterparts to appeal for GOA support in lessening Libyan isolation. As portrayed by Sahnoun, the basic message is that such support will constrain Qadhafi by strengthening positions of more rationale Libyan leaders.

— In discussing Algerian attitudes towards quickening pace of Libyan-Algerian relations, Sahnoun several times noted that there are those “especially among the military” who oppose any rapprochement with Libya.

— A document on future Algerian-Libyan relations was drawn up during Jalloud visit (which preceded that of Qadhafi by about one week). Bendjedid has directed FLN Central Committee to study this and make whatever recommendations it pleases. (However, this was not done at just-concluded session of Central Committee.) Any proposals agreed to by Central Committee eventually will have to be submitted to a party congress, thence to a popular plebiscite; this drawn-out process is deliberate GOA maneuver to frustrate faster pace sought by Libyans.

— As to GOA motivation for continuing dialogue, Sahnoun mused about Algeria’s present economic difficulties and speculated that it might be possible to redirect Libyan revenues away from military procurement and nefarious activities towards assistance for Algeria. This is especially important since next year’s repayments to Soviets for previous GOA military purchases will be particularly onerous, and thus far Soviets are insisting on hard currency repayments. When pressed for any evidence that Libyans might come through with funding, Sahnoun admitted that this is more a hope than a real prospect; GOA recognizes that such assistance is not likely to materialize in any significant degree.

— In conversation with Sahnoun, Bendjedid consistently spoke of “coordination”, “cooperation”, and “Maghreb unity” (rather than Algerian-Libyan union). He reportedly told Sahnoun that his ultimate purpose is to be involved in such fashion in Libya so as to “neutralize” Qadhafi. Sahnoun explicitly understands this term in the sense that might be employed by Al Capone.

— As portrayed in public statements and private conversations, GOA line is that any further progress should take form of Libyan adherence to Tripartite Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Tunisia, Mauritania and Algeria. When reminded that the GOA earlier had ruled out Libyan membership as incompatible with treaty’s call for non-interference in affairs of others and recognition of international boundaries, Sahnoun quickly claimed that this is precisely the GOA’s point: to include Libya in this Maghrebian group would imply very significant concessions by Qadhafi on both counts. He said that while in Algiers, Qadhafi committed himself “in writing” henceforth to abide by these principles.

— When in Algiers, Qadhafi pressed to address the FLN Central Committee. Bendjedid refused, saying that Central Committee deliberations are strictly Algerian matter. Bendjedid likewise allegedly rejected Qadhafi’s suggestion that Syria should be affiliated in some sort of union with Libya and Algeria; GOA is not interested in crossing Maghreb issues with those of Levant.

— Qadhafi, at GOA insistance, met with Libyan dissidents in Algeria. (Sahnoun claimed not to know who these might be.)

5. Chad:

— Both during Jallud and Qadhafi visits, there were Libyan contacts with Gokouni Ouedi. Qadhafi also met in Algiers with an unnamed Habre emissary.

— On Aouzo Strip, Qadhafi’s position remains that unratified early 20th century boundary demarcation should prevail over 1935 accord which ceded the strip to Chad.³

— GOA is willing to accept referral of this issue to ICJ, but is confident that Libyan position would not prevail.

6. Tunisia:

— Sahnoun surmised that purpose of Bendjedid’s subsequent visit to Tunis was to press Tunisians to support Libyan adherence to tripartite accord. He noted long standing Tunisian resistance to this.

— GOA obviously also is pleased to have played a role in fostering at least partial Libyan compensation for Tunisian commercial claims.

Shultz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870701–0129, D870547–0407. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Zweifel; cleared by Robyn Bishop (S/S–O), John Dobrin (AF/C), and Thomas Benesch (AF/W); approved by Ussery. Sent for information to Tunis, Paris, Rabat, Nouakchott, and Ndjamena.
2. Qadhafi visited Algiers June 28–July 1. In telegram 3983 from Algiers, July 2, the Embassy reported that “senior GOA officials have spent last 24 hours trying to telegraph to diplomatic corps that the Libyan leader’s visit was an unwelcome imposition. An Arab Ambassador with excellent GOA sources told us that the Algerians were forced to accept a Qadhafi visit after his repeated insistence on coming.” The Embassy further reported: “Algerians say that since GOA is seeking to bring Qadhafi under control through a broad range of low level engagements it was necessary to keep that process on track by letting him visit Algiers. GOA knew that he would use the occasion to thump for a full unity agreement, but was confident that it could handle whatever theatrics Qadhafi used to push his case.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870522–0743)
3. Reference to the unratified Mussolini-Laval Treaty between Italy and France that confirmed Italy’s possession of the strip.