Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

450. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Belgium and France¹

139837.

Washington, May 18, 1987, 2328Z

The following State 139837 8 May 87 sent action Rabat Algiers info Nouakchott Tunis Riyadh being repeated for your info.

Quote: 139837. Subject: Washington Readouts on 5/4 Maghreb Summit.

1. C—Entire text.

2. Summary: NEA/DAS Ussery invited resident Ambassadors from Algeria and Morocco for separate conversations aimed at their initial impressions of 5/4 Maghreb Summit² and what that might portend for developments in Western Sahara. Sahnoun of Algeria (stating he had talked to Belkheir) gave essentially downbeat assessment, although he stressed that this was not a failure since “psychologically” it had defused tense situation. Bargach of Morocco took opportunity to make impassioned appeal for unequivocal USG support for GOM’s position on Western Sahara. End summary.

3. During 5/6 conversation, Algerian Ambassador Sahnoun said that GOA had been disappointed with summit. Through King Fahd, Algerians had anticipated that Hassan would bring “something new” to discuss on Western Sahara, drawing on last bilateral summit (2/83) and subsequent GOA “plan” presented in early 1985. Instead, Hassan had avoided almost all discussion of Western Sahara, sticking to previous positions. GOA more convinced than ever that Moroccans are intent on military solution to conflict.

4. Even though brief summit was “politically sterile”, it was not a total failure in GOA assessment. “Psychologically” it helped defuse building tensions. Fact that this was first time these two leaders had agreed on joint communiqué—albeit bland—was significant. Sahnoun also pointed out that Hassan and Bendjedid had been stiff at outset, just shaking hands; at conclusion, two embraced. Although there is no precise format or timing, Sahnoun anticipates that GOA and GOM FonMins will have follow-on discussions at an early date.

5. Sahnoun expressed view that Fahd’s principal purpose in meeting with Maghreb leaders was to press for Arab League summit. Sahnoun believes that lack of progress on Western Sahara does not necessarily forestall that meeting. In replying to inquiry about Bendjedid’s recent visit to Mauritania, Sahnoun replied that this had been to reassure GIRM of GOA support—especially economic.

6. On 5/7, Moroccan Ambassador Bargach said that he had no direct feedback yet on summit. He observed that resolution of a major problem is not possible in one and one half hours’ of meetings in two segments. Most significant item is that summit took place at all. Hassan has always wanted dialogue with Algeria on Western Sahara issue, believing that this is fundamentally an issue to be solved politically between Algeria and Morocco. Bargach also noted that issuance of joint communiqué pointing to further contacts is positive.

7. Concerning Mauritania, Bargach on several occasions referred to GOM’s strong support for its territorial integrity and pointed to Moroccan restraint in not exercising its “right” to hot pursuit of Polisario forces which attack through, then seek refuge in Mauritania. He said that Mauritanians were irritated by GOA offer of support which GIRM felt it did not need. What Mauritanians want is GOA action to prevent Polisario forces in Algeria from crossing the Mauritanian frontier.

8. Amb. Bargach then launched into lengthy, impassioned review of history of Western Sahara problem, point of which was to press hard for unequivocal USG support for Moroccan positions. Following were points stressed:

— Settlement can only come from agreement between Morocco and Algeria.

— American neutrality in the conflict actually supports Algeria’s position.

— Polisario is creation of GOA, and Algerian claims of not being able to negotiate for Polisario are a pretext.

— Conversely, SDAR statement at time of summit (that GOA could not speak for it) is evidence that Polisario now is a challenge, destabilizing factor in internal Algerian politics.

— GOM has long supported a referendum and will respect results thereof. But Moroccans will “never” agree to independent state in Western Sahara or relinquish Moroccan claims thereto.

— Algeria which had originally proposed referendum now opposes it.

— Continuation of the war opens avenues for the Soviets, Iranians and Libyans to exercise greater influence.

— If Western Sahara were to become independent, Soviets would have ports/bases there within two months.

— Only “legitimate” governments in Africa are Morocco, Ivory Coast, Senegal. All others came into being through irregular processes.

— Lack of U.S. support on the Western Sahara and continued low levels of military and economic assistance are raising questions among Moroccans about value of our bilateral relationship.

— Economic benefits of a negotiated settlement for all Maghreb countries.

9. Throughout, Bargach appeared frustrated by lack of success at efforts for a political settlement and what he saw as U.S. neutrality in a dispute involving an old and close friend.

Whitehead

Unquote

Shultz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870356–0048. Confidential. Sent for information to Brussels and Paris. Drafted by Fisher; approved by Zweifel. A repeat of telegram 139837 to Rabat and Algiers, May 8.
2. For more on the Maghreb Summit between Bendjedid and Hassan, which took place on May 4, see footnote 4, Document 78.