Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

161. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

263994.

Washington, August 21, 1986, 2218Z

SUBJECT

• Vice President’s Conversations With Belkheir.

1. Secret—Entire text

2. Summary: Gen. Larbi Belkheir, Algerian Presidency Cabinet Director (regarded as GOA’s second most important figure) requested appointment with the Vice President to deliver a message from Pres. Bendjedid. Belkheir met twice with Vice President on 8/14; meetings also held with DCI Casey, VAdm Poindexter, and Deputy Secretary Whitehead (with Under Secretary Armacost attending). In first meeting with Vice President, Belkheir expressed satisfaction with bilateral relationship, citing success of first Joint Economic Commission (2/86) and cooperation in areas such as agriculture.² Belkheir noted rumors of possible Algeria-Libya union, but asserted it was out of the question; GOA would not lightly conclude such an arrangement without considerable groundwork and preparation. Belkheir touched quickly on other regional issues, principally Tunisian situation and Western Sahara.

3. In second meeting, Belkheir introduced topic which had prompted request for appointment with Vice President:
GOA concern over Israeli/Moroccan military cooperation growing out of Hassan/Peres meeting.³ Belkheir criticized Hassan’s talks as unhelpful to other peace efforts, such as those of U.S. and King Hussein. He asserted that principal product of Hassan initiative is GOM decision to press for a military solution to Western Sahara conflict, using Israeli military assistance. Belkheir cited information from “several sources” that Israeli/Moroccan military cooperation is increasing and that there are Israeli military advisers in Morocco. Vice President expressed surprise, noting we have no information on such an arrangement and that it seems highly unlikely. GOM would be aware of extreme sensitivities raised by such cooperation, risking adverse reactions in the Arab world; such cooperation would cause Israel major problems with the Congress and the administration because this “is not what Israel’s defense is about.”

4. Vice President expanded Western Sahara discussion to inquire about possibilities for negotiated solution, taking note of UN/OAU efforts. Belkheir voiced GOA support of any constructive initiatives, but doubted GOM seriousness; Bendjedid open to direct contact with Hassan only in “well-prepared” meeting which would demonstrate genuine Moroccan commitment to go beyond buying time. Meeting ended with brief exchange on terrorism and agreement that cooperation held productive possibilities for mutual benefits. End summary.

5. Vice President granted two sessions, on 8/14, to visiting Algerian Presidency Cabinet Director General Larbi Belkheir, who had requested appointment to deliver message from President Bendjedid. Belkheir transmitted thanks from Bendjedid for Vice President’s get well message following Bendjedid’s back surgery. Belkheir noted Bendjedid’s positive memories of his April 1985 trip to the U.S. and his satisfaction with the course of growing bilateral cooperation.⁴

6. Belkheir continued with synopsis of GOA concerns regarding North Africa, beginning with mention of rumors of a GOA union with Libya. Belkheir stated that such a union is “out of the question for the time being” and that Algeria would not conclude any union quickly and without considerable preparation and groundwork. The Vice President interjected that Qadhafi is “crazy about unions” and even raised the possibility of a union with the PRC in discussions with the Chinese. Belkheir continued that GOA had been concerned by the potential for simultaneous problems on two fronts (Morocco and Libya), thus prompting the dialogue with Qadhafi to neutralize one front. Bendjedid also felt that he should use direct contact to advise Qadhafi to moderate his behavior.

7. Belkheir also touched briefly on the worrisome situation in Tunisia and the “poisoning” influence of the Western Sahara conflict. Responding to the Vice President’s question, he elaborated that the GOA is concerned that the uncertainties of the succession after Bourguiba, coupled with severe economic problems, could lead to serious instability.

8. Lacking time for further discussion, the Vice President arranged for a second meeting with Belkheir, noting, as the first talk ended, interest in discussing U.S. concerns about Libya and the possibilities for a Hassan/Bendjedid meeting.

9. In the second meeting, Belkheir began his comments by expressing interest in the Vice President’s Middle East trip,⁵ stating that the effort was very encouraging to the extent that it might lead to solving the problem of the Palestinian people. Belkheir continued, however, that the Hassan/Peres meetings represent an obstacle both to what the U.S. has been doing in the region and to King Hussein’s efforts. Further, he asserted that the GOA has information that the central topic of discussion at Ifrane was the Western Sahara question and, specifically, that military cooperation between Israel and Morocco is being established. The presence of Israeli military advisers in Morocco leads the GOA to assume that Hassan has decided to seek a military, rather than a negotiated, solution to the conflict. (Note: In later meeting with VAdm Poindexter, Belkheir left implication that Israeli assistance would be financial as well as military; this subject was not discussed with other interlocutors.)

10. Belkheir said that Bendjedid is highly concerned and hopes that “our American friends” will use their influence to avoid such a development in the region. The GOA is in favor of stability in the Maghreb; Algeria as always been open to dialogue and there are in fact no bilateral problems between Algeria and Morocco, except for the “Moroccan-Sahraoui problem”. Belkeir noted GOA interest in a united Maghreb, implied appreciation for U.S. views on such unity, but worried that there are “other powers in the world” not in favor of a united Maghreb; the GOA does not want to see their intervention in the region.

11. The Vice President responded that we have had extensive discussions with Peres, Shamir, Hussein and Mubarak; “not a single time” was there a mention of Peres’ visit to Morocco having any connection with the Western Sahara problem. The Vice President said that the GOA assertion came as a “tremendous surprise,” particularly as there was never any suggestion of such a development during his Middle East trip. The U.S. understands that the central focus of the Hassan/Peres talks was the ten points presented by Peres. He continued that it would be surprising if Morocco would even consider Israeli assistance because of the sensitivities in Morocco itself, in Algeria, and the rest of the Arab world. Further, military cooperation of this nature would cause Israel major problems with the Congress and with the administration, despite Israel’s special relationship with the U.S.—“this is not what Israel’s defense is about.” The Vice President said that he believes the Algerian intelligence is wrong, but that we are interested and would appreciate any further available information.

12. Belkheir reiterated President Bendjedid’s determination to settle the Saharan problem and stabilize the region. Thus, when this intelligence was received from “several sources”, Bendjedid felt it necessary to send Belkheir to discuss it. Belkheir expressed the hope that the information is not correct.

13. The Vice President asked Belkheir to assure Bendjedid that we understand his concern about a problem which would create great difficulties in the region and put the U.S. in a bad position. He emphasized that Belkheir should tell Bendjedid that we have had “no hint, no evidence, nothing about this”, but that we will investigate it.

14. The Vice President shifted the thrust of the conversation to the chances for negotiations leading to a Sahara referendum. Asking Belkheir to assume that the information on Israeli/Moroccan military cooperation is incorrect, he wondered how the GOA feels about chances for negotiations and a referendum, citing our feeling that chances for a solution might be better than in the past.

15. Belkheir said that there were hopes surrounding the UN/OAU initiative, but that these demarches had no results. In 1983, Bendjedid proposed a solution to the problem within the framework of a united Mahgreb state.⁶ In 1984, he suggested another solution, a link between the King and “the Sahraoui entity”.⁷ These two initiatives failed. Belkheir asked rhetorically how a referendum could occur with the Moroccan Army and administration still in the territory.

16. Regarding a Bendjedid/Hassan meeting, Belkheir said Bendjedid is open to the possibility, but has told Hassan that it must be well prepared to avoid an unsuccessful meeting such as that of 1983. Belkheir expressed the hope that the UN SYG would continue his initiative, especially if it is supported by the U.S.

17. Belkheir said that there was another issue which he wanted to raise, i.e., terrorism. Algeria consistently has condemned terrorist acts and has advised “countries and liberation movements” against carrying out such activities, especially outside their area of interest. He maintained that the GOA has so counseled Palestinians of different factions, the Lebanese, and other movements; further, Bendjedid has taken this line with Qadafi each time they have met, although Qadhafi always denies backing terrorists.

18. Belkheir suggested that, now that cooperation has been established between GOA and USG intelligence services, there should be more frequent exchanges of information to better combat the terrorist threat.

19. The Vice President agreed, adding that “it should be a two way street” and we hope to be helpful to the GOA when we see a problem arising in or around Algeria. “We must present a common front against terrorism”. By the same token, the Vice President asked that the GOA inform us of any threats against U.S. interests which become known to it. He also voiced awareness of the GOA’s deeply emotional commitment to the Palestinians—“we know and respect this”, but hope that no Palestinian group will take advantage of Algerian hospitality, claiming they are training for one purpose when in fact they are training for terrorist acts.

20. The Vice President ended by noting his conviction that a major goal of U.S. foreign policy should be to continue to improve our relations with Algeria: “We have certain differences with you on international issues” but the bilateral relationship is going well. He asked Belkheir to tell Bendjedid how strongly both he and the President feel about our bilateral relations and that we must keep talking; he expressed pleasure that the GOA felt this problem was important enough to make a special effort to discuss it—“it is exactly in this way that we will improve our relations.”

Whitehead

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N860008–0210. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Richard Fisher (NEA/AFN); cleared by Ussery, Pearson (NSC), Jay Bruns (D), Richard Mueller (S/S), Douglas Smith (S/S–O), and Menarchik; approved by Murphy. Sent for information Immediate to Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tunis, and Nouakchott.
2. See footnote 3, Document 157.
3. Peres visited Morocco on July 21 and met with King Hassan to discuss the Middle East peace process. In telegram 228781 to all Near Eastern and South Asian diplomatic posts, July 22, the Department described the meeting as “a positive development of great historical significance.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860559–0574)
4. See Documents 147 and 148.
5. Reference is to Bush’s trip to Egypt, Israel, and Jordan earlier in the month to discuss the Middle East peace process. Documentation on the visit is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.
6. See Document 21.
7. In telegram 844 from Algiers, February 16, 1984, the Embassy reported that Bendjedid told Hassan they should subsume “the problem within the Grand Maghreb, i.e. some form of confederation between Morocco and Mauritania with autonomy for the Sahrawis. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840003–0387)