Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

21. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

2305.

Algiers, June 2, 1983, 1010Z

SUBJECT

• Libyan and Mauritanian Actions Reportedly Behind Hassan’s Failure to Attend Maghreb Summit.

1. S—Entire text.

2. Summary. According to Tunisian Ambassador (protect) who took part in all of Bourguiba’s meetings in Algiers, King Hassan originally proposed that he join Bendjedid and Bourguiba in Algiers in a symbolic show of Maghreb unity. Algerians accepted with alacrity and asked if Haidalla and Qadhafi could also be invited. Hassan agreed but just before scheduled meeting informed Algerian and Tunisians that he had discovered existence of arms shipments from Libya and Mauritania which made it impossible for him to meet with these two Chiefs of State.² End summary.

3. Tunisian Ambassador states that initial proposal for Bendjedid-Bourguiba-Hassan summit came from King Hassan. Idea was for King to join other two Chiefs of State at guest villa where Bouguiba was staying in order to symbolize Maghreb reconciliation. Both Algeria and Tunisia warmly welcomed Hassan’s suggestion.

4. Algeria next asked if there were any objection to invitations being extended to Haidalla and Qadhafi. King Hassan reportedly replied that there was no problem with Haidalla. He was less enthusiastic about Qadhafi [but?] eventually agreed he could also be included.

5. Shortly before the scheduled Grand Maghreb summit, Hassan informed the Algerian and the Tunisians that shipments of arms via Libya and Mauritania had been discovered in Morocco and that, under the circumstances, he could not meet with Qadhafi and Haidalla. Reportedly, the King stated that the Libyan shipment was to Casablanca in a British ship. Apparently, the shipment via Mauritania was a separate operation.

6. Tunisian Ambassador considers Qadhafi is behind efforts to sabotage Maghreb reconciliation. He says Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco all share same analysis of Qadhafi problem.

7. Tunisian confirmed impression Algerian-Tunisian relations continued to improve. Bourguiba and Bendjedid had established close personal relationship and policy of improved relations was very popular in both countries.

8. Polisario seating issue at OAU summit was not a factor in King’s non-appearance. Tunisians expect that Algeria and Morocco will maintain their respective positions in Addis but that Algeria will not mount a major campaign on behalf of the Polisario. Ambassador Baccouche remarked that the U.S. position on the OAU Summit was “wise”.³

9. Comment: This is a curious development at a curious time. We would appreciate any confirmation from any source that arms shipments did in fact take place. While we would not put it past Qadhafi to engage in such antics, we are surprised that a British ship was supposedly involved. We are also surprised that Mauritania is allegedly involved in shipping arms to dissidents in Morocco.

Newlin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830313–0902. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Addis Ababa, Bamako, Nouakchott, Paris, Rabat, and Tunis.
2. In telegram 2302 from Algiers, May 31, the Embassy reported: “Algerian attempts to arrange a grand Maghreb summit collapsed late May 30 when King Hassan and Qadhafi failed to join Bendjedid, Bourguiba and Haidalla in Algiers. Algerian officials are taking the line that they did their duty in extending invitations to other Maghreb Chiefs of State to join the Presidents of Algeria and Tunisia at their long-planned summit to promote regional cooperation and that it is a shame only Mauritania’s Haidalla seized the opportunity. We assume Moroccan concern over the Western Sahara caused the non-appearance of King Hassan. The invitation to Qadhafi was probably more of a gesture than an expectation he might accept.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830308–0213)
3. In telegram 140422 to the OAU collective, May 20, a repeat of telegram 18758 from Paris, May 18, the Department stated: “The US asserts that it: ‘continues to believe that the admission of the SADR to the OAU would be a grave mistake.’”(Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830288–0096)