Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, and Mauritania¹

135968.

Washington, May 1, 1986, 0225Z

SUBJECT

• Under Secretary Armacost Meetings With Algerian Secretary General Hamdani: Libya & Western Sahara.

1. Secret—Entire text

2. Summary: Under Secretary Armacost had wide-ranging discussions with Algerian MFA SecGen Hamdani on April 28. Re Libya, Armacost expressed USG reservations about GOA policy of engaging Qadhafi in dialogue; Hamdani contended USG policy of isolating Qadhafi has not worked and repeatedly took line that Libya should be dealt with in Maghreb context, going so far as to posit that solution to Western Sahara conflict would obviate problem of Qadhafi (or at least issue of Algerian-Libyan rapprochement.) Hamdani thus urged USG pressure on GOM to encourage “political will” for resolution. He demurred on possible Bendjedid/Hassan meeting, stating that GOA must be convinced that Moroccans are not just trying to buy time. Hamdani voiced GOA continuing opposition to terrorism but differentiated Palestinian struggle “inside their own country” as distinct from terrorist activity. End summary.

3. Under Secretary Armacost hosted Algerian MFA SecGen Smail Hamdani for meetings in Washington on April 28. During two hour session, discussion focused on Libya, touched on Western Sahara, Chad, and Tunisia.

4. Libya/Terrorism: Adverting to views expressed by Hamdani in earlier, restricted session, Armacost stated that USG has no conceptual problem with regional associations per se. However, USG seeks to isolate Qadhafi pending a change in his conduct; hence GOA approach of drawing him into some sort of Maghreb configuration as a way to influence him will not be effective in our view. At time of Oujda Accord,² King Hassan argued that he would tame Qadhafi as well, but Oujda has benefitted Libya with no evidence of positive change in Qadhafi’s behavior. GOA should be aware of near certain negative American reaction should Algeria persist in drawing closer to Qadhafi. USG and GOA policies are in basic conflict on this point.

5. Assistant Secretary Murphy underlined that USG efforts to combat Qadhafi are a major effort with broad public support. Several willing intermediaries have approached USG over time with suggestions of dialogue with Qadhafi. Our response has been consistent; USG will judge Qadhafi by actions and not words. We have clear evidence of his ties to terrorist activity.

6. Hamdani said that USG set undesirable precedent with use of military force; Armacost responded that it was Qadhafi who set the undesirable precedent with terrorist activity; Qadhafi has isolated himself by attacks on Chad and Tunisia, turning Iraqis and Europeans against him, and generally alienating governments by engaging in increasingly widespread “global” actions. He asked Hamdani how Libyans respond when GOA raises issue of terrorism. Hamdani replied that Qadhafi denied that Libyans were behind these actions. Armacost then stated that USG will not play by Qadhafi’s rules and thus is engaging Libyans where they are unable to compete. He then asked Hamdani’s assessment as to possible Libyan domestic consequences of our recent actions.

7. Hamdani stressed he would not defend Qadhafi, only speak for GOA. GOA made clear to Qadhafi that it opposes terrorism. Stemming from Algeria’s revolutionary experience, GOA makes distinction between “act of liberation in place to be liberated” and actions committed outside. Thus GOA recognizes Palestinians’ right to use violence “in their own country,” but not elsewhere. GOA disagrees strongly on USG policy of isolating Qadhafi; contrarily, our actions have made him a hero in eyes of Libyan public, others in Arab world. For example, Qadhafi was disliked in Algeria before the U.S. bombings; since, voices have arisen in FLN expressing support for Qadhafi. In GOA view, Tunisia also faces more difficult circumstances as a result of USG actions. Hamdani reiterated argument that GOA seeks to demonstrate friendship for Libyan people which transcends differences with Qadhafi. He said he had no detailed knowledge of internal Libyan situation, but repeated view that Qadhafi is now a hero in that context.

8. Algerian Ambassador Sahnoun said that attack on Libya appeared very sudden to rest of world. “Thousands” of Americans were continuing to work in Libya. It was not until January sanctions³ that there was a perception of real USG purposefulness in dealing with Qadhafi. Sahnoun felt that action should have been taken in international fora in an effort to gather momentum and force similar to that garnered on Cambodia and Afghanistan issues.

9. Murphy took issue, noting that our bombings had been preceded by five years’ of graduated measures to constrain Qadhafi. It appears that Qadhafi and his immediate cohorts believe they are untouchable. USG and GOA may differ on issue, but it is not correct to perceive our latest actions as either unprovoked or “sudden”.

10. Hamdani lamented that an unmerited side effect of recent events has been to create suspicion of all Arabs as potential terrorists. He cited Italian decision to require visas for Algerians. There are Italian, French, Spanish and Irish terrorists, but countermeasures apply only to Arabs. Italy and Austria are countries friendly to Palestinian cause, leading Hamdani to muse rhetorically about who benefited from Rome and Vienna bombings; it was “not the Arabs”. Terrorism is result, not cause of problems. If it is to be defeated, basic issues (i.e. Palestinian issues) must be addressed.

11. Borg of S/CT noted that Italian passport/visa restrictions stem from fact that terrorists have made frequent use of North African travel documents. Ambassador Johnstone underscored that indeed Arab world as a whole gets blame for Arab terrorist actions; concerted Arab action to combat terrorism is needed if this image is to be corrected. Armacost said USG accepts need to address root causes, among them Palestinian issues, but terrorism tarnishes image of Palestinians and does nothing to bring closer realization of Palestinian rights.

12. Hamdani then discussed GOA call for a meeting of Palestinian factions in Algiers. He cited need for an initiative to help heal divisions among Palestinian groups. GOA objective is to see one organization with one voice “to control” all of the groups.

13. Western Sahara: At several points, Hamdani raised Western Sahara conflict as most important Maghreb issue, even in terms of dealing with Qadhafi. He noted that Oujda Accord had grave consequences for Algeria, forcing it to deal with two potential military fronts. Oujda Accord benefits Morocco, but Qadhafi even more. “Behind” Oujda Accord is Western Sahara conflict. Hamdani several times pressed idea that USG could and should exert influence on King Hassan to settle Western Sahara conflict. This would be in interest both of area stability and domestic tranquility within Morocco—an expressed interest of GOA. If negotiated solution is found, this “will change whole face” of Maghreb. Hamdani proposed that both Libyan and Western Sahara issues should be handled in context of greater Maghreb of Six—i.e. to include SDAR.

14. Hamdani said that the question of a Bendjedid/Hassan meeting, rumored in recent weeks, should be put to Hassan. GOA wants a meeting with substance, not a Moroccan ploy to gain time as has happened before. GOA is hopeful that resumption of proximity talks on May 5⁴ will lead to real progress—if GOM is ready to implement principles of UNGA resolution including a ceasefire and referendum without presence of Moroccan Army and administration.

15. Other topics will be covered in septels.⁵

Whitehead

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860212–0731. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Richard Fisher (NEA/AFN); cleared by Murphy, Ussery, Michele Bova (S/S), Zweifel, Johnstone, Bishop, Andrew Steinfeld (P), George Harris (INR/NESA), Borg, John Hawes (PM), and James Collins (S/S); approved by Armacost. Sent for information Immediate to USUN, Paris, London, Rome, and Cairo.
2. See footnote 2, Document 138.
3. Reference is to the sanctions imposed by the United States on Libya in the wake of the Rome and Vienna airport bombings. Documentation on the sanctions is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.
4. Reference is to the next round of UN-sponsored talks between Morocco and the Polisario.
5. In telegrams 135820 to Tunis, May 1; 139375 to Algiers, May 3; and 139479 to Algiers, May 3, the Department reported on Armacost’s discussions with Hamdani about Chad, the Middle East peace process, and Bendjedid’s recent visit to Moscow. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860334–0410, D860342–0641, and D860342–0796, respectively)