Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

159. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

2057.

Algiers, April 20, 1986, 1723Z

SUBJECT

• Algerian Reaction to Events in Libya.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. I saw General Belkheir April 20 at my request to get GOA reading on events in Libya and effects on U.S.-Algerian relations.

3. Algerian Reaction:
Belkheir started and ended session by reminding me that official Algerian reaction was to be opposed to U.S. military strikes against Libyan people (not Libyan state).² He said that Algeria could not sanction military attacks on region no matter what the cause. He underlined this point in an apparent effort to ensure that we did not misinterpret Algeria’s mild public reaction.³

4. Situation in Libya:
Belkheir said he had been sleeping in his office during the crisis handling the unending calls from Qadhafi. He said Qadhafi had been very unsettled, even panicky, at the beginning, but that in the last two days he has settled down and is now acting as a man in control of the situation. Belkheir’s personal view was that both the initial attacks and subsequent indications of unhappiness in Libyan armed forces had rattled Qadhafi. There was no doubt in Belkheir’s mind that the raids had triggered some dissension which led to a shootout in the general headquarters and that at one point two armored units had moved against Qadhafi’s apparent wishes, only to be confronted by the Air Force. Belkheir also believed that the Air Force had refused, at one point, to deploy aircraft when ordered to do so by Qadhafi. In his phone calls, Qadhafi had claimed to be under continuing attack. Belkheir looked to me to reassure him that this was not the case, which I did. In any case, Belkheir thought that, notwithstanding these interesting signs of dissent in Libyan military, Qadhafi was clearly back in control and probably enjoyed substantially more popular support than previously. He took note, however, of the inevitable distrust (mefiance) which would be left within the Libyan military after the attack and the possible opportunities this implied for removing Qadhafi. Belkheir left no doubt that this remained the preferred solution to the problem provided, he hastened to add, Qadhafi was not replaced by Khomeini (yet another manifestation of Algeria’s concern over fundamentalism in the region).

5. Libyan Request for Support:
Belkheir said that Qadhafi had called both privately and publicly for Algerian military support and immediate union. Both, of course, were rejected. Belkheir got in a poke at Morocco, noting that the only promise Qadhafi has ever kept was to the Moroccans. He shook his head over the fact that Qadhafi had said on television that Morocco could be excused for not sending military aid because they didn’t have much of a military capacity. He also raised an eyebrow over the Hassan letter to Qadhafi.⁴

6. Future U.S. Action:
Belkheir wanted to know what we would do next. I said I was there to solicit his advice and views. I did note that our actions would be predicated on Qadhafi’s own actions and that we had no plans to take further action if Qadhafi behaved himself. I opined, however, that even stronger U.S. actions could well be possible if Qadhafi continued to engage in terrorist actions. Belkheir groaned, saying that he could not believe this would serve U.S. interests. He said Qadhafi was once again trying to establish contact with the U.S. He had asked Algeria (again) to contact us on his behalf. Bendjedid had declined. The Algerians understand the Maltese Foreign Minister now is seized of the issue. I opined that we had nothing to talk about. Our opposition to terrorism was non-negotiable and agreements with Qadhafi were worthless. Actions would speak for themselves. I was sure that we would pose no risk to Qadhafi if he behaved in a civilized way.

7. Arab League Summit:
Belkheir thought it unlikely to take place soon. He said Algeria would host it only if others were unanimous in asking for this.

8. Tunisia:
Belkheir was preoccupied by events in Tunisia. The Tunisians, he thought, were nervous and engaged in altogether too much fratricidal positioning for the succession. He had been disturbed by Tunisian allegations of an imminent Libyan attack which appeared to be based purely on hysterical speculation.⁵

9. Terrorism:
Belkheir expressed categoric disapproval of terrorism (as distinct from Palestinian actions in occupied territories or Israel—a distinction which means everything here). He noted that party PermSec Messaadia had been sent to Tripoli to warn Qadhafi on the issue just before the U.S. strikes.⁶ Qadhafi flatly denied his involvement and Algerians, although totally disbelieving, are hamstrung by the lack of proof at their disposal. I asked to my regret if the Arab world would now bring pressure on Qadhafi to end his support of terrorism. Belkheir went on at some length on the lack of any such thing as an Arab world, noting that no group could have more diverse and incompatible objectives. He returned to the issue by expressing hope that at least some Arab states, certainly Algeria, would tackle Qadhafi on the issue in the strongest terms. Possibly this, coupled with internal voices carrying the same message, could have an effect. He asked if I thought the U.S. would talk to Qadhafi if he would give assurances that he would end support for terrorism. I opined that a Qadhafi assurance wasn’t worth the time of day whereas a Qadhafi moratorium on terrorist acts in effect for some time could not help but improve the climate. Belkheir said he thought the effort by some Arab states to cool Qadhafi would be made but he appeared skeptical as to results.

10. Public Opinion:
In closing, Belkheir gave me the usual line about building up Qadhafi by overt confrontation. He said that, although there was strong anti-Qadhafi opinion within the Algerian public, news of the strikes had mobilized the public on his side. I used the opportunity to point out that the press had presented a totally distorted view of events, thereby undermining the GOA’s own efforts at moderation. I asked how he could tolerate this. Belkheir agreed that the press had been hysterical and said he had personally banned further TV coverage of foreign demonstrations, fearing that such footage would provoke problems here. I pointed to a multitude of other press sins. He said he was seized of the problem and that the press would calm down.

11. Hamdani:
Belkheir attached considerable significance to the impending Hamdani visit to Washington—a sign, he implied, of Algeria’s willingness to continue business a la status quo ante.

12. Comment:
Belkheir is clearly more upbeat on divisions within Libya than is his military security chief. This may be due to genuine differences of interpretation of events or different shading of events for our benefit. In all our conversations here, it is clear that our action in Libya has highlighted for the Algerians the menace posed by Qadhafi for the regime, but it has also reconfirmed their view that Algeria’s interests are best served by constant contact with Qadhafi and, more importantly, the other principal players in the Libyan political/military structure. Continued public contact with, and private antipathy toward, the Libyans is likely.

13. Additional points contained septel.⁷ Department please pass Tunis and Rabat.

Johnstone

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. On April 14, the United States bombed Libya in retaliation for the bombing of a disco in West Berlin that killed a U.S. servicemember and a Turkish woman and injured 230 others, including 50 U.S. servicemembers. Documentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.
3. In telegram 2008 from Algiers, April 17, the Embassy reported that on April 16 “the Politburo of the FLN, Algeria’s sole political party, held an extraordinary session during which it ‘studied American aggression against the brotherly Libyan people,’ according to ‘El Moudjahid,’ the country’s leading French language daily. The Politburo also called for the ‘urgent’ convening of an extraordinary Arab summit in order to examine the consequences of the American ‘aggression’ and to take ‘appropriate collective measures.’” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860297–0676)
4. In telegram 3730 from Rabat, April 16, the Embassy transmitted the text of Hassan’s letter to Qadhafi, which reads in part: “I have learned, both with amazement and consternation, the news of the air attacks against the cities of Tripoli and Benghazi.” Furthermore, Hassan stated: “The conflict that today confronts the Libyan Jamahriya and the United States of America goes beyond, far beyond, the context of relations between those two countries. Aggressions aimed at civilian targets, the victims of which are unarmed, innocent people, can find no justification and should henceforth be the object of general reprobation. The entire international community, and in the first place the Arab nation, find themselves affected.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860289–0844)
5. In telegram 3707 from Tunis, April 16, the Embassy reported that the Tunisian Minister of Defense had telephoned the Embassy to report that the “Libyans are mounting air raid on Tunisia and planes may be en route” following “Libyan charges this afternoon reported AFP that Tunisia permitted U.S. to use its territory and airspace during our ‘aggression.’” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860932–0227, D860290–0526) Shortly thereafter, in telegram 3708 from Tunis, April 16, the Embassy reported that “threatened incursion could be by land, sea or air although land confrontation still deemed relatively unlikely.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860932–0253, D860292–0590)
6. The Algerian warning to Libya is in telegram 1925 from Algiers, April 14. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860284–0414)
7. Not found.