Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

12. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State and the Embassy in Turkey¹

9008.

Rabat, December 5, 1981, 1730Z

Ankara for SecDef Weinberger. Dept pass: Ambassador Walters; CIA (Admiral Inman); [name not declassified] and to Ambassador Reed (in care of Assistant Secretary Veliotes). Subject: Secretary Weinberger’s Meeting With King Hassan: Foreign Relations Items. Ref: Rabat 9004.²

1. (S—Entire text)

2. Summary. Hassan told Secretary Weinberger that a Moroccan-Algerian summit is likely within three weeks, and that Hassan is “75 percent sure” it will lead to an understanding that will deny further Algerian help to the Polisario. That summit, plus the anticipation of a favorable referendum result all countries would respect, made Hassan optimistic about prospects for resolving the Sahara problem. In other views expressed during the audience Hassan urged the U.S. to bring more pressure to bear on Libya by cutting off oil transactions; disclosed (please protect) that the Fez Summit would reconvene after April, perhaps with Egypt in attendance; and urged that the U.S. involve Spain in NATO to the fullest extent as soon as possible, as insurance against a socialist victory in the Spanish elections of 1963.
Hassan indicated that he looks forward to the visit of Secretary Haig³ and to a very substantive “working visit” of his own in the U.S. early next year so that he may meet and confer with President Reagan. End summary.

3. This message reports various aspects of Morocco’s relations with third countries discussed during the meeting of Secretary Weinberger with King Hassan at Fez December 3. Bilateral items are reported septel.⁴

4. Western Sahara.
The King described the situation as likely to acquire some significant new aspects “in the next three weeks.” He explained that, based on impressions derived from talks with Algerian Foreign Minister Benyahia at the Fez Summit, Hassan and Chadli should be meeting at some point on the frontier “in twenty days”. The Algerians are excited about this meeting and want it well publicized. He and Chadli will discuss the Saharan situation; economic cooperation (movement of iron ore from Tindouf to Moroccan Atlantic ports and of Algerian natural gas to Europe via Morocco and Gibraltar); resumption of the Fez Summit; and regional security matters, a “hot issue”. Algeria, Hassan continued, is concerned about both the Saharan problem and the anticipated reaction of Libya if Algeria and Morocco reach an understanding on the Sahara. Relations between Algeria and Libya were very strained at present, and Qadhafi could become the sole supplier of the Polisario. Hassan added that it was important the referendum in the Sahara not be a “reflection” of hostility between Morocco and Algeria.

5. Thus, Hassan continued, after six years of war Morocco seems to have two breakthroughs for ending it. If things go well at the Chadli meeting, and Hassan was “75 percent sure” that they would, there was one way to resolve the Sahara problem; another way, should the Chadli meeting misfire, would be the referendum, whose results everyone would have to accept. Hassan hoped that both means would succeed, for it is better to have a little margin of safety. Hassan declined to make any precise predictions about the Saharan situation until after the Chadli meeting had occurred. Meanwhile, Moroccan forces must remain on the alert in the Western Sahara.

6. Secretary Weinberger expressed the appreciation of the U.S. for the peacemaking initiatives of the King and indicated we were happy to hear of the prospective meeting with the Algerian President. Hassan remarked, somewhat ironically, that it had taken some courage to put forward a proposal that Saharan Moroccans be asked if they wanted to remain Moroccans. However, once the problem was solved, regional security problems would be reduced greatly. Morocco would have friendly relations with all countries of the area, Mauritania excepted. “For some decades” there would be difficulties between Morocco and Mauritania. (He did not elaborate.)

7. Libya.
Hassan asked the Secretary to urge the President to continue the “U.S. oil policy” concerning Libya. That policy had had more impact than realized, according to Hassan, so that in a matter of months Qaddhafi “will be brought to his knees”. The Secretary responded that the administration is considering suspension of all oil transactions with Libya. As President Mubarak had told the Secretary,⁵ Libya constitutes a great danger to all of us. It appears that Libya is becoming isolated. The King rejoined that Mr. Hammer,⁶ of Occidental Petroleum, should join in “turning off the taps.”

8. Fez summit.
The King volunteered an analysis of what had occurred at the recent, brief Fez Summit of the Arab League. He said that most countries had favored the 8-point plan of Saudi Crown Prince Fahd;⁷ a small number of countries opposed it and were closed to persuasion, and a small number opposed it because they were holding out for more money. Only one country—Iraq—had opposed it but remained open to persuasion. The Iraqi Vice President had told Hassan this was the case. Soon Fahd will visit Baghdad, proof of close Saudi-Iraqi relations, and the persuasion may occur then.

9. Everything at the Fez Summit revolved around the Fahd plan, Hassan continued. As he saw it, the great danger had been that Saudi credibility might have come into question because of the summit proceedings. So, although told it was unprecedented, Hassan had decided that the wise course was suspension of the summit. The latter will reconvene “after April”. He said that timing was highly secret, as was the hope of the Arab moderates that the Camp David Accords will be observed on schedule, so that perhaps Egypt can be persuaded to attend the resumption of the summit. He reiterated that secrecy of this was the key to success, and that Fahd’s Baghdad visit will be most important for the cause of Arab unity. Hassan, Fahd, and King Hussein are to remain in close touch during the adjournment of the summit.

10. Spain.
As described in greater detail in septel, Hassan advocated military cooperation between Spain and Morocco, holding that a military agreement between them would not only serve their own interests, but provide a context facilitating Moroccan contingency planning with the U.S. Hassan maintained that he and Juan Carlos were on the best of terms, telephoning each other frequently, sometimes only to inquire after the respective families. The importance of Spanish membership in NATO was such that Hassan would advise the U.S. to push Spanish participation as fast and as far as possible. Thus by the Spanish elections of 1983, when the socialists might come into power, Spain would have passed the “point of no return” on NATO. So, it is essential to “get Spain involved to the hilt”. Hassan also asked the U.S. to speak with Spain about the increasing use of the Canary Islands by the Soviets as a base for surveillance by their “fishing boats”. Secretary Weinberger took note of these points and said that we would act on them.

11. Greece.
Mention by the Secretary that Greece was a possible hold-out against Spanish affiliation with NATO prompted Hassan to mention a message passed to him by former President Tsatsos. When attending the recent session of the Royal Academy of Morocco, Tsatsos had sent word that President Karamanlis retained a great deal of influence in Greece, even after the elections. Hassan suggested that the U.S. keep this in mind.

12. Comment. It was noteworthy that Hassan did not make a single reference to Moroccan needs for additional military equipment to be used in the Western Sahara. Instead, in consonance with remarks to Admiral Inman two days earlier,⁸ the King seemed to be placing all his hopes on diplomatic leverage, i.e. a favorable outcome of his anticipated talks with President Chadli. As reported above, Hassan exuded optimism about that meeting and the favorable consequences that would flow from it. In his tour d’ horizon with the Secretary, Hassan repeatedly vouchsafed confidences that were surprising before so large an attendance. That he did so is testimony to the increasingly close, yet discreet, relationship he seeks to establish with the U.S. The meeting was also a preview of the topics he will want to take up with Secretary Haig two weeks from now, after the NATO Ministerials.⁹ Hassan’s current mood is self-assured, both over the Western Sahara and inter-Arab affairs, so that, as he repeatedly indicated, he is greatly looking forward to meeting with President Reagan on the occasion of the King’s “working visit” to the U.S., presumably in January. End comment.

Sebastian

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–83–0104, 1981 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 13, Morocco (Jun–Dec 1981). Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. At the top of the telegram, an unknown hand wrote: “Sec Def has seen ca 12/6.” Underneath the note, a stamped notation reads: “13 DEC 1981 SECDEF HAS SEEN.”
2. In telegram 9004 from Rabat, December 4, the Embassy reported that during a 90-minute meeting in Fez, Weinberger and Hassan “covered a full agenda of bilateral security issues,” including “access and transit for contingent U.S. use,” although Hassan “made it clear that he was sympathetic but concerned that such cooperation could make Morocco vulnerable to Soviet and Arab actions.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810577–0643)
3. See Document 199.
4. See footnote 2 above.
5. No record of the Weinberger-Mubarak conversation has been found.
6. Arnold Hammer, President of Occidental Oil.
7. Documentation on Fahd’s eight-point plan for the Middle East is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.
8. A record of the Inman-Hassan conversation is in telegram 8907 from Rabat, December 2. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N810009–0490)
9. The NATO Ministerial meeting took place December 8–12.