Office of the Historian

11. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State1

6867.
Tunis, September 17, 1981, 0933Z

SUBJECT

  • Tunisian Mediation Between Algiers and Rabat.
1.
Secret—Entire text.
2.
Foreign Minister Beji Caid Essebsi told me on Sept 15 that Tunisia has accepted Algerian request to assist in improving relations between Algiers and Rabat. When Prime Minister Mzali visited Algiers Sept 3–4, President Bendjedid asked that President Bourguiba help set up a meeting with King Hassan. Bourguiba has agreed to play this role. Caid Essebsi visited Rabat on Sept 8 to feel out Moroccan attitudes. Hassan, who recevied him, was positive. Tunisians are now working on time and venue.
3.
Tunisians made effort to broker Moroccan-Algerian rapprochement some two years ago when Bourguiba sent previous Foreign Minister to Algiers with what was thought then to be Moroccan offer for a Hassan-Bendjedid summit.2 Algerians rebuffed gesture, and Tunisian [Page 17] officials said at the time that they would resume mediation only when it was desired by both sides.
4.
Caid Essebsi said that several developments may help explain what he referred to as the “Algerian initiative”. The Algerian regime is becoming more internally stable and self confident, while it is increasingly clear that continuation of Sahara conflict is in the interest of neither Morocco nor Algeria. Caid Essebsi agreed with my observation that only area state which is gaining by current impasse is Libya, and he noted increasing Algerian irritation with Qadhafi following the Libyan occupation. The Foreign Minister stressed fact that Algerian willingness to seek Tunisian mediation reflects a new closeness in Tunisian-Algerian relations after a year of careful fence mending. High level contacts now occur every two or three months, and confidence building measures in economic and technical areas have finally overcome the mutual suspicions which grew out of the ambiguous Algerian role in the Libyan-organized Gafsa raid.
5.
Essebsi asked that the foregoing information be only for “the eyes of Secretary Haig”. Addressees—please protect his confidences.
6.
Comment: Bourguiba has long aspired to play the role of peacemaker between Algiers and Rabat. Morocco has been Tunisia’s most reliable friend in the area, but Tunisia’s strategists know that good relations with Algiers are essential for Tunisian security. They see the long running Algerian-Moroccan feud as a source both of regional instability and of Algerian reluctance to take a firm stand against Libya. Caid Essebsi has had sufficient experience in the politics of the Maghreb to arm him against false optimism, and the Tunisians will undertake a more ambitious good offices role only after they are convinced that both Algeria and Morocco want this. For the moment, it appears that the Tunisian role is limited to arrangements for a Hassan-Bendjedid meeting.
Mack
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D810493–0116. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers and Rabat.↩
  2. In telegram 7304 from Tunis, September 17, 1979, the Embassy reported: “Bendjedid had declined President Bourguiba’s invitation to meet with King Hassan in Tunis in search of peaceful settlement of Western Sahara dispute.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D790424–1010)↩