Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

117. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

290955.

Washington, October 22, 1982, 0022Z

Following sent action Algiers info, USUN, Tunis, Rabat, Damascus, Jidda, Cairo, Nairobi, Tel Aviv 16 Oct.

Quote. Subject: Algerian Foreign Minister’s Call on the Vice President. Refs: A. State 287167;² B. State 285232.³

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Summary:

3. Algeria’s FonMin Mohamed Taleb Ibrahimi accompanied by Ambassador to the U.S. Layachi Yaker and MFA’s Political Affairs Director Kerroum called on Vice President Bush October 12 at their request. The Vice President was seconded by senior staff, Messrs Gregg and Hughes; State NEA DAS Schneider and FN Director Sebastian also sat in. Exchange of views lasted approximately 3/4 of an hour and was cordial throughout.

4. Invited by the Vice President to do so, Ibrahimi opened by summarizing salient events which had occurred in the four months since he last spoke with the Vice President.⁴ He initially introduced these three subject headings (bilateral, gas and military) prefacing Algeria’s political leadership wished to have good relations with the U.S. and to pursue a dialogue between the two governments. Bilateral relations, he said, were as he had described them to Secretary Shultz a few days ago (cf ref B para 5).

5. On gas, Ibrahimi said that after signing gas agreements with France, the UK, Italy and Belgium, Algiers wishes to give a new impetus to the conclusions of agreements with American consumers.

6. Regarding military matters, Ibrahimi said that Algeria had decided three years ago on a policy of diversification of military procurement. Purchases of equipment have been made in the U.S. and, the Minister said, he hoped that Algeria’s upcoming requests in this area would also be agreed by the USG.

7. Having gone through these bilateral points Ibrahimi then turned to multilateral issues. He again summarized, saying that since his last conversation with the Vice President there had been (unspecified) Moroccan visits to Algiers and his participation in the Fez Arab League Summit.⁵ On the latter, he had, Ibrahimi said, met with King Hassan II “in margins of the conference”. They had discussed their countrys’ bilateral relations in terms of the Saharan issue. Ibrahimi said he had told King Hassan once again that Morocco should support the organization of a referendum in the Western Sahara. Although he preferred not to go over old ground, the Vice President should know of the GOA’s wish to renew the dialogue with Morocco and to practice a policy of cooperation with it, Ibrahimi said. The minister explained that Algeria is being logical with itself in giving Maghreb issues priority over broader inter-Arab differences. Ibrahimi said that Algeria thus favors efforts at regional coordination in North Africa along the lines of the Gulf coordination committee, the activities of which Algeria approves. This led Ibrahimi into a discussion of the situation within the Arab world.

8. Since the last conversation, Ibrahimi told the Vice President, the Fez summit and “the events in Beirut” have dominated the Middle East scene. Last June, he said, Algeria had deplored the absence of a joint Arab reaction to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Better late than never, there now is, as a result of the Fez summit, such a joint Arab reaction and this constitutes a positive.

9. Ibrahimi said he had told the Secretary that the international situation favored U.S. efforts to bring about a durable as well as an equitable solution to the Arab-Israeli problem. These favorable circumstances could prove evanescent, however. The opportunity, therefore, needs to be seized. In any event, the solution to the problems of the Middle East requires a solution to the Palestinian problem. The situation, currently, is favorable—Ibrahimi continued—because “the moderates dominate the PLO; they are ascendant within the Arab world and have the wind in their sails. Israeli public opinion has been powerfully affected by the Beirut events and U.S. public opinion is aware as never before of the issues which agitate the region. The Soviet Union, finally, is focused on its own internal and external problems (Poland and Afghanistan).[”]

10. The Vice President, responding, then said that on the Middle East President Reagan had put forward his own principles since he (Bush) had last met with Ibrahimi. This shows U.S. interest in the region as well as determination to address the Palestinian question. We agree, the Vice President continued, that the climate is more conducive now to positive action than it has been. Paradoxically, the horrors in the refugee camps in Beirut have helped bring a better understanding of the issues. The Vice President agreed with FonMin Ibrahimi’s characterization of Israel’s public opinion and also accepted that the U.S. is favorably placed to be a catalyst for peace in the Middle East.

11. There then followed the discussion of the Israeli credentials issue reported fully in ref A.

12. The Vice President then returned to a discussion of Middle East developments. He said that we do not know how the conversations between King Hussein and Yasser Arafat are going. However, the mere fact that they are having their discussions is already a plus.

13. Ibrahimi responded that the Algerian Government believes the pursuit of a Jordanian-Palestinian federation would lose us precious time. Sooner or later we will need to face up to the necessity of a Palestinian state, Ibrahimi said. He said that he expected Arafat to make the King understand the validity of this point.

14. The Vice President said that if the federation concept were to be seen as a step towards peace, it would facilitate progress. The Vice President opined that one would expect it to be difficult for Arafat to drop his demand for a state. He noted that negotiations were needed to explore if it were not better to go the federation route. Going that route promised to become a gigantic step forward towards peace.

15. Mr. Gregg then invited Ibrahimi’s comments on the state of Algerian efforts to mediate the Gulf war between Iran and Iraq.

16. Ibrahimi opened by stressing that the prerequisite to a successful mediation was secrecy. Too many cooks had too many oars in this issue. For example, the OIC, NAM, the UN and its SYG were all attempting to play a role. Algeria was attempting to make a quiet contribution. The Iranians had posited three conditions which needed to obtain before mediation became possible: A return of the armies behind the pre-war international borders of the two countries; the problem of reparations and the problem of Iraqi refugees in Iran. Since last June’s contact between the Vice President and himself, Ibrahimi said, the Iranians had abandoned another prerequisite—the overthrow of the Iraqi regime—and Iraq no longer insisted on becoming the venue for the next meeting of the non-aligned. “We solved that issue by asking India to host the seventh NAM conference.” On the first and last point, return of the armies to their home territories and problems of Iraqi refugees, negotiations now seem possible, Ibrahimi continued. The major remaining problem is that of reparations but Algeria hopes to get the parties to the negotiating table nevertheless. The Vice President then said that, once again, Algeria was in a special position to be useful. He recalled the constructive role Algeria had played in connection with the release of the American hostages in Iran and told Minister Ibrahimi that the American people continue to be grateful to Algeria for what it had achieved in that context. “You may not think that we have shown our gratitude appropriately, the Vice President said but the American people remember and are grateful.”

17. Ibrahimi thanked the Vice President for these words. He said that it was important to Algeria to know the sentiments of the American people “because the feelings of a people are usually more meaningful than those of their princes.”

18. In closing, Ibrahimi noted that Algeria had also attempted quietly to settle current “U.S.-Iranian financial difficulties.” (read the Iranian claims payments problem). He was confident that Algeria would succeed in this effort as well. Shultz

Unquote

Shultz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820534–0603. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeat of telegram 290955 to Algiers, October 16. Drafted by Marc Grossman (NEA/ARN); cleared by Gary Usrey (S/S–O), David Mack (NEA/ARN), and Alan Corky (NEA/ARN); approved by Veliotes.
2. See footnote 5, Document 116.
3. See Document 115.
4. See footnote 4, Document 115.
5. See footnote 2, Document 115.