Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

115. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations and the Embassy in Algeria¹

285232.

Washington, October 9, 1982, 0142Z

SUBJECT

• The Secretary’s bilateral with the Algerian Foreign Minister

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Summary: Algerian FonMin called on Secretary October 6 in New York. At Secretary’s invitation, Ibrahimi reviewed Algerian views on Mid East. In so doing he stressed Algiers agreement with Fez Arab League’s summit eight points² and its participation in summit committee formed to contact permanent members of UNSC. Ibrahimi qualified American September 1 principles on ME³ as step forward but urged establishment Palestinian state which U.S. could “impose”. Secretary disagreed but stressed we also believe in centrality of Palestinian question. On Gulf war, Ibrahimi described Algerian mediation efforts which continue. Progress being made slowly. Regarding Northwest Africa, Ibrahimi reaffirmed GOA’s support for OAU’s cease fire/referendum formula for ending Saharan war and its desire have good relations with Morocco. Ibrahimi charged U.S. had abandoned neutrality in that conflict when it decided install bases in Morocco. He said GOA is satisfied with its economic tie to U.S. but thought political relations needed to be developed. Secretary affirmed desired friendly relations with both Algeria and Morocco. Ibrahimi asked for help with Algeria’s Chancery problem and volunteered to settle question of villa belonging to Embassy Algiers. End summary

3. The Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi accompanied by New Algerian UN Perm Rep Mohamed Sahnoun, Algerian Ambassador to the U.S. Yaker and political director, Algerian MFA called on the Secretary in New York on October 6, 1982. Under Secretary Eagleburger, NEA DAS Schneider and NEA/AFN director also sat in.

4. Secretary opened with an expression of condolences for the passing of Ibrahimi’s predecessor. This evoked an expression of personal and official appreciation from the Algerian Minister.

5. Ibrahimi, expressing pleasure at this opportunity to continue a high level dialogue with the USG begun four months ago with the Vice President,⁴ began by characterizing our bilateral relations. These relations, he said, suffer from a contradiction in Algerian eyes in that the GOA is pleased with the state and development of our economic relations but considers that our political relations “remain to be developed.” Ibrahimi, continuing, said that Algeria as we knew is attached to its independence and non-alignment. As its war of national liberation from France has clearly shown, it is and remains unprepared to accept domination from any quarter. At present, he said, there is no conflict between Algeria and the U.S. and there will be none so long as these principles are shared. Ibrahimi considered that current circumstances permit political relations to become more complementary with our bilateral economic cooperation “with which we are satisfied.” So much for principles.

6. The Minister then offered to discuss the Middle East and Northwest Africa. On the Middle East, he said that he had already stressed four [garble] ago “when we were on the threshold of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon” that all efforts to solve the Middle East problem had failed because they had not addressed the heart of the issue—the Palestinian question. He had put it to the Vice President, Ibrahimi continued, that events in Lebanon might lend themselves to the correction of this shortcoming. Since then, the PLO had evacuated Beirut; the Fez summit had convened and the world had witnessed the massacre in Beirut.⁵

7. FonMin Ibrahimi then adverted to the Fez summit. He insisted, in his words, on Algeria’s “responsible and moderate participation in that summit.” He noted that the summit had adopted “a joint resolution reflecting joint Arab positions.” He underlined that this result was achieved despite the fact that “the events in Beirut did not operate to strengthen either Palestinian or Arab moderation.”

8. Ibrahimi then characterized the U.S. role: the U.S. ceased being a simple mediator in the last four months in this context, he asserted. It has now committed its prestige fully which is why a positive outcome is needed. The Minister gave it as Algeria’s view that the international situation now favors the “imposition” of a durable solution in the Middle East by the creation of Palestinian state. The U.S. can exploit several salient features of the situation “to impose a just solution:” there is a strong moderate trend running in the Arab world favorable to such an approach. Domestic Israeli opinion “is hostile to Begin’s policies.” The Algerian people find it hard to understand that the U.S., which has always defended the right of self determination, does not appear willing to vouchsafe this right to the Palestinian people.

9. The Secretary then said that it appears to us, now that various groups have taken positions on the issues, that the [time?] is near for the principals to come together to discuss their differences and propose compromises “particularly in so far as the Palestinian problem is concerned which, I agree, is central to a solution.” The President’s September 1 proposals address the issues. Now is the time for dialogue. We think, the Secretary said, that King Hussein should be centrally involved. This is because the population of Jordan is roughly 2/3 Palestinian; because, historically, Jordan has had jurisdiction on the West Bank and because economic exchanges of scope exist between Jordan and the West Bank. Affiliation thus seems sensible. This said, the Secretary continued, we do not believe anyone is in a position to impose a solution on Jordan or on Israel. One can, however, argue with Israel as we do that there will be no peace in the region without a solution to the Palestinian problem. Israel has a tremendous stake in peace, the Secretary said. Israel’s claim of sovereignty over the West Bank/Gaza will not bring peace. We have said as much to the Israelis. There is now a great debate in Israel and within world Jewry on this point. To illustrate, the Australians and New Zealanders told us today that Jewish quarters in their respective countries are deeply engaged in this debate, the echoes of which certainly reach Israel. The Secretary summarized: “We cannot impose a solution but you are correct in saying that the Palestinian issue must be confronted and dealt with. I am interested to hear you say in this connection that moderate views dominated in Fez.”

10. Ibrahimi then said he wished to explain that his use of the term “impose” was intended to convey that in Algeria’s view the U.S. has the means to give a durable impetus to a solution. Algeria believes that the President’s September 1 principles represent an important step forward. Concerned, however, that a further delay in the creation of a Palestinian state, for example by emphasis on some sort of link between Palestine and Jordan, will lose us time. Algeria considers that a Palestinian state must be created on the West Bank/Gaza.

11. At Fez, Ibrahimi said, there was unanimity on the eight points in the Fez summit declaration as well as on the committee which is to be sent to make contact with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and especially with the U.S.

12. The Secretary responded that we looked forward to a visit by the committee. All details have not repeat not yet been settled but we currently anticipate receiving the delegation October 21–23 or there abouts. Ibrahimi seemed a bit surprised by the dates pointing out that the committee would meet beforehand. The Secretary reiterated that we had responded affirmatively to the request for a meeting to the committee but that timing had to fit with the President’s schedule because the President wishes to receive the committee himself. Ibrahimi said that, whatever the date, we hope the dialogue would help to move things forward.

13. The Secretary then asked about the Gulf war and the status of the efforts the Algerian Government was making “to play a constructive role in its settlement. How do you see the prospects and the situation in both of the belligerent countries?”

14. Ibrahimi replied that as soon as the war had broken out Algeria had attempted to offer its mediation. Unfortunately, he said, Iraq began by refusing Algeria’s offer “because Arab countries could, in its view, only side with Iraq.” Later on, the Minister continued, both belligerents agreed to this mediation and Algeria began this difficult process. The cost to Algeria of this effort is already high because it lost its best sons (in the crash of his predecessor’s aircraft).
Despite this the GOA issued a statement at the level of the FLN Politburo of its willingness to persevere. Accordingly, mediation efforts resumed last June. Positions were still soft. There were problems. Iran demanded the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Iraq wished to maintain Baghdad as the venue of the Non-Aligned Summit. In July, during the Iranian Prime Minister’s visit in Algiers, the Iranians dropped their major pre-condition to negotiation above cited. Three points remained: (a) the return to pre-war borders; (b) the return to Iraq of Iraq’s refugees in Iran; (c) reparations. Algeria continued its efforts “and I can tell you that the atmosphere now is propitious to the initiation of negotiations”. The most difficult remaining problem is that of reparations. Algeria, Ibrahimi continued, suggested an international fund from which payments might be made to Iran but Iran rejected this suggestion. The Secretary inquired how such an international fund might be financed? Ibrahimi replied that the idea was launched by India and accepted by the Gulf states. Algeria believes that the Gulf states would pay. Ibrahimi explained that Iran wants the money directly from Iraq. Iran does not care, however, where Iraq gets the funds. The Secretary observed wryly that third parties were being asked to pay for the belligerent and the Algerians responded wryly that as the Arabs were paying for the war, they might just as well pay for peace. Ibrahimi pointed out how sad it was to see the return of the status quo ante bellum presented by both sides as a victory after the expenditure of much blood and treasure.

15. Turning to Northwest Africa Ibrahimi reminded that he had expressed Algeria’s concern to the Vice President last June over the turn of U.S. policy vis-a-vis Algeria. Ria felt that the U.S. had “abandoned neutrality by building bases in Morocco.” We believe the U.S. can play a role to achieve a solution of the Saharan problem on the basis of self determination, Ibrahimi said. Algeria was pleased in 1981 that King Hassan had finally agreed to accept that basis. The GOA had saluted King Hassan’s acceptance of the OAU formula in a speech by President Chadli expressing satisfaction and asking that the details and guarantees of a cease fire and referendum in the Sahara be worked out promptly. President Bendjedid had also discussed the prospect of economic cooperation with Morocco following the end of the Saharan war. Ibrahimi explained that such cooperation could involve phosphates, the iron ore in N’gara-Djebilet and a pipeline feeding gas to Europe across the Mediterranean via Spain. Algeria’s political leadership had delayed this latter project “in the hope that the end of the Saharan war would allow Moroccan industry to benefit from this Algerian gas.”

16. Ibrahimi then said that he wished solemnly to reaffirm that Algeria had never had a problem with the Moroccan monarchy. At the time of the attempted Skhirat coup “we could easily have helped to topple it but did not do so because we think each people must be free to choose their own regime.” King Hassan had told him, Ibrahimi said, that he would never forget that Boumediene was the only Arab leader to send a delegation to Rabat to wish the King well after Skhirat. Ibrahimi hoped that the Saharan problem would be solved on the basis of the OAU decision and the principle of self determination. Ibrahimi then noted that Algeria has an interest in the survival of the OAU and hopes that efforts now in course would lead to an OAU summit “soon.”

17. The Secretary then said that he shares Algeria’s views on the importance of the OAU. “We want to see its continuation as a vehicle for solving problems.” The Secretary welcomed Ibrahimi’s expressions of friendship for Morocco. He said that the U.S. has friendly ties to Morocco and sees no reason why we should not also have friendly ties with Algeria particularly since a reciprocal view seems to emerge from Foreign Minister Ibrahimi’s presentation. In so far as the OAU formula and self determination in the Sahara are concerned King Hassan, to our knowledge, still accepts them both. We have the impression that establishing the conditions necessary to carry out these steps is proving difficult “but hope it happens.” We would try to help, the Secretary said, although this is an issue at some remove from us. The Secretary then stressed our agreement with Algeria’s views of the importance of the OAU and again welcomed Minister Ibrahimi’s remarks on Algerian desire for friendly relations with Morocco. It seems to us to follow, the Secretary said, that friendship between Algeria and the U.S. should also be possible. Ibrahimi responded by saying that, although Algeria was disappointed when Hassan after Nairobi II began talking of a “confirmatory referendum”, Algeria still favors the rapid organization of a referendum which is also the desire of many African governments.

18. Turning to bilateral relations, FonMin Ibrahimi opined that matters were progressing well. Secretary Baldrige expects to come to Algeria in December and this will further reinforce our ties.

19. As FonMin Ibrahimi prepared to take his leave, he told the Secretary that there was a small problem on which he requested the Secretary’s help. There is a villa (Mustapha Rais) belonging to the American Embassy in Algiers. Its status has been a problem “which we will now solve.” This [garble] the purchase by Algeria of a new chancery in Washington, D.C. The question of the villa in Algiers will be settled as Ambassador Newlin requests, Ibrahimi said, and reiterated his hope that the Secretary would help Algeria with the acquisition of its badly needed chancery in Washington. The Secretary responded that we would do our best.

20. Ibrahimi told the Secretary he hoped to see him in Algiers in his current capacity. He noted in passing that former Deputy Secretary Christopher would see Sonatrac official Youssefi in a few days and said “things are progressing.”

Dam

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820522–0982. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. Drafted by Peter Sebastian (NEA/AFN); cleared by David Schneider (NEA), Richard Sherman (S/S–O), McManaway (S/S), and E. Anthony Wayne; approved by Shultz. Sent for information Immediate to Tunis, Rabat, Damascus, and Paris.
2. Reference is to the Arab League summit held in Fez, Morocco, September 6–9. The eight-point plan in part called for Israeli withdrawal from all lands it had captured in the 1967 war, the establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, and a UN Security Council guarantee that would “guarantee peace between all states of the region, including the independent Palestinian state.” A translation from the original French is in telegram 6811 from Rabat, September 10, 1982. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820469–0512) Documentation on the eight-point plan is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.
3. See footnote 2, Document 114.
4. No record of the Bush-Ibrahimi meeting, which took place June 10, was found.
5. See footnote 6, Document 28.