Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

116. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

4230.

Algiers, October 17, 1982, 1800Z

SUBJECT

• U. S. Efforts to Moderate Algerian Behavior and Joint Exercises With Morocco.

Ref:

• A. Algiers 4195²
• B. State 286172³
• C. Rabat 7593⁴
• D. State 287167⁵
• E. State 290328.⁶

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. I believe it important for Washington to understand that the U.S. is at present engaged in two endeavors which in my judgment run at cross purposes. On the one hand are our efforts to persuade Algeria to support a negotiated settlement with Israel and to abandon efforts to expel Israel from the UN and its organs. On the other hand is our increasingly high-profile military relationship with Morocco, and in particular the U.S.-Moroccan joint naval exercises scheduled for early November.

3. As reported in ref (A) two high-ranking Algerian officials (one of whom—Col. Belkheir—ranks among the three most powerful men in Algeria) reacted with unaccustomed anger to the information that U.S.-Moroccan naval exercises are to be held Nov 9–12 at Al-Hoceima on the southern Mediterranean littoral. I was asked how the maneuvers met the strategic objectives related to the Gulf which General Walters and other U.S. officials assured Algeria were the purpose of increased U.S. military cooperation with Morocco.

4. As Washington knows, Algeria not only considers U.S. military assistance to Morocco the main impediment to a Western Sahara settlement, but tends to regard the U.S.-Moroccan military relationship (however wrongly) as a strategic threat to Algeria itself. There is still another dimension: the Bendjedid government wants to lessen Algeria’s military dependence on the USSR, but considers that difficult to do while its rival for Maghreb preeminance intensifies its defense relationship with the U.S. Algeria may also find it harder to reject Soviet overtures for joint exercises given U.S.-Moroccan maneuvers.

5. In all of this the facts may not be as important as the perceptions. Indeed, Algerian reaction to the U.S.-Moroccan military relationship seems to me both emotional and obsessive. It is, nevertheless, obvious that our influence with the Algerians on matters of importance to us is constrained when we are doing what angers them most.

6. I have some hope that Algeria will help us on the issue of Israeli credentials in UN bodies, largely as a result of the Vice President’s intervention with Foreign Minister Ibrahimi. Nevertheless, I cannot be certain that more influential people than Ibrahimi (like Belkheir) will not advise Bendjedid to go slow at a time when the U.S.-Moroccan military relationship appears to have been raised a notch by the invitation of joint amphibious exercises. In present circumstances, clearly the most effective way to assure our multilateral goals would be cancellation of the Al-Hoceima exercises—or at least postponement. I must leave it to others to balance the interests involved—both bilateral and multilateral. I recognize that joint naval exercises must be planned months in advance, but I hope that there is flexibility in such planning to take into account the political climate at the time of the actual maneuvers.

7. Turning to the more general problem of maintaining influence in Algeria while continuing our special relationship with Morocco. It is crucial to keep in mind the distinction between private joint planning between U.S. and Moroccan military staffs and joint exercises which cannot but come to Algeria’s attention. These two kinds of cooperation have very different consequences for our dialogue with Algeria. As we move into a period of Middle East diplomacy when Algerian support (like that of Morocco) will become increasingly important to us, our bilateral relationship with Algeria rests on an uncertain base. Important figures (like the President and Foreign Minister) wish to see that relationship rapidly improve, while other powerful forces perceive U.S. interests as unalterably opposed to those of Algeria. A decision not to proceed with the Al-Hoceima exercises at a time when we are working hard to build an Arab consensus on the Arab-Israeli conflict would obviously enhance our influence with an important Arab participant in the Middle East diplomatic scene.

8. Assertions that U.S.-Moroccan joint maneuvers are not directed against third parties (i.e. Algeria) are simply not believed here.

Newlin

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Africa, Algeria (01/24/1982–09/26/1983). Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Cairo, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Tunis, USCINCEUR, and USUN. Sent for information Priority to Nairobi. Sent for information Immediate to Rabat and the Secretary of Defense. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.
2. In telegram 4195 from Algiers, October 14, Newlin reported that when he informed Acting Foreign Minister Hadj Azzout about the joint U.S.-Moroccan military exercises scheduled for November 9–12, “Azzout replied that such exercises would be viewed with ‘great apprehension’ by the GOA and that he would report the information to President Bendjedid. He anticipated that I might be called back to the MFA for a GOA protest.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820529–0981)
3. In telegram 286172 to Algiers, October 12, the Department instructed the Embassy to inform the Algerians about the upcoming joint exercises with Morocco and state that “the exercises are not intended to threaten any third country.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820526–0988)
4. In telegram 7593 from Rabat, October 6, the Embassy reported on the joint exercise conference held between the Moroccan armed forces and U.S. Naval Forces Europe, September 30–October 1. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820518–0483)
5. In telegram 287167 to Algiers, October 13, the Department summarized an October 12 meeting with Ibrahimi, in which Bush said the “international situation now offered new opportunities for progress in Mid East. It thus unfortunate that effort under way to ‘kick Israel out of UNGA.’ This would be important error in context Arab as well as American peace plans. Expulsion/suspension of Israel would set back opportunities which now exist for progress on peaceful solution of Palestinian problem. UN would be rendered more irrelevant. Moreover, should expulsion or suspension eventuate, U.S. would not remain behind.” Ibrahimi replied: “As matters stood now where even the Fez Arab League Summit speaks in its point seven to the status of Israel, ‘we agree it is an error of strategy (to attempt expulsion/suspension) and this question should not rpt not be posed now.’ Ibrahimi added that he was speaking only for Algeria in so stating.” Bush later suggested that “perhaps Algeria could use its undoubted influence to play a moderating role.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820527–0008)
6. In telegram 290328 to Algiers, October 15, the Department instructed the Embassy to remind Ibrahimi that the “USG is deeply concerned over effort now in course in international organizations, which it considers unfortunate in both substance and timing, to suspend credentials of representatives of the state of Israel.” The Department also instructed the Embassy to “ask that Algeria take action which will avoid a successful challenge” to Israeli credentials at the UN. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820533–0561)