Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

10. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

2828.

Algiers, August 10, 1981, 1600Z

Department/Rabat also for Ambassador Walters. Department pass CINCEUR for Polad. Subject: Algeria Consults USG on Tensions Between Libya and Egypt/Sudan.²

1. (Secret Entire text.)

2. Summary: MFA Secretary-General Dembri called Charge in urgently August 9 at express request of President Bendjedid and in context of dialogue established with Ambassador Walters to express GOA concern over escalation of tension between Egypt/Sudan and Libya and danger of superpower confrontation. GOA plans to send very high level delegation to Tripoli shortly to urge moderation on Qadhafi but wishes to benefit from USG analysis of and reaction to situation before delegation departs, especially since USG is well placed to urge moderation on Egypt/Sudan. Charge responded that he would report Dembri’s request to Washington and hoped to be back in touch shortly. Dembri said prompt response would be extremely useful and appreciated. We believe GOA prefers Qadhafi to unknown successor and is seeking help in protecting and at same time taming him. We also believe GOA wishes to forestall both USG action against Qadhafi (which would force it and others back into anti-American posture and arrest momentum toward more genuine non-alignment) and Soviet intervention on behalf of Qadhafi (which would bring superpower confrontation to Algeria’s doorstep). We recommend as rapid and forthcoming a response as present policy will allow. End summary.³

3. MFA Secretary-General and Acting Foreign Minister Mohamed Salar Dembri called me in urgently August 9 to discuss the situation between Libya and Egypt/Sudan. MFA Director of West European and North American Affairs Benouniche and PolCouns Thompson were also present.⁴

4. Dembri emphasized several times at the outset and in the course of our discussion that he was taking this initiative at the express request of President Bendjedid⁵ and in the context of the dialogue that the GOA and the USG had established thanks to Ambassador Walters on such issues as regional stability and Libyan over-armament. He went on to say that the proximate cause of his initiative was the GOA’s concern over the escalation of tension between Egypt and the Sudan on one hand and Libya on the other.⁶ It is particularly disturbing, he said, that the traditional verbal exchanges are now being engaged in by military-leaders as well as civilian politicians and are being accompanied by troop concentrations along the borders. It would be disastrous, he continued, if an armed confrontation were to develop,⁷ particularly since this could trigger superpower involvement and drag the region into a conflict between East and West. Algeria itself, he said, could not stand idle in a crisis involving a neighboring state.

5. Dembri then stated that the GOA plans to send a very high level delegation to Tripoli in a week or ten days specifically to put pressure on Libya to adopt a more conciliatory attitude. Before doing so however, he wishes to benefit from the USG’s analysis of and reaction to the developing confrontation between Libya and Egypt/Sudan. The USG, Dembri said, has good relations with Egypt and the Sudan and can help moderate their actions. The GOA would like to contribute to a solution of this matter in a strictly African context and is seeking the views of others about their possible contribution to such a solution.

6. Dembri observed finally that the problem of the Libyan presence in Chad seems to be moving toward solution in an OAU context with everyone agreed that the Libyan troops will be withdrawn when an African peace force (to which the GOA is prepared to contribute) is formed. The GOA has been encouraging Libya to withdraw from Chad, he said, and it would be very unfortunate if an African resolution of the Chadian crisis foundered in armed confrontation between Libya and Egypt/Sudan. Libya, Dembri said, was seeking to improve its relations with countries in the Middle East and in Africa, and its assumption of the OAU presidency would encourage its shift to greater responsibility and pragmatism.⁸

7. I told Dembri in response that I had no recent information on the state of affairs between Libya and Egypt/Sudan and would therefore not attempt to comment, but would instead report his initiative to the Department and request any information and analysis that I could share with him before the GOA delegation left for Tripoli. Dembri immediately agreed that a prompt response before the departure of the delegation would be extremely useful and appreciated.

8. I asked Dembri whether it could be said that the situation between Libya and Egypt/Sudan had been discussed with Major Jallud during his August 6 visit (Ambassador Walters had been told August 4 that Jallud was coming to discuss Algerian-Libyan border problems). Dembri responded that the situation in “the entire region” had been discussed with Jallud, as it had also with French Minister of External Relations Cheysson August 8–9.

9. Dembri brought our meeting to a close with the affirmation that the USG has a clear responsibility to work (by implication with Egypt and the Sudan) to dampen the escalation of tension, keep it at a verbal level, and even reduce it, while the GOA for its part has a responsibility to put pressure on Libya to moderate its actions.

10. Comment: We are not aware of any basis in fact for Dembri’s assertion that there has been a dramatic escalation of tension between Libya and Egypt/Sudan, although we do note that, in an August 4 memorandum to the President of the Security Council, Libya accused the USG of seeking to overthrow the Qadhafi regime, and liquidate Qadhafi himself and cited as evidence, inter alia, greater U.S. military assistance to Egypt and the Sudan and joint Egyptian-American military maneuvers near the Libyan border.

11. Dembri’s initiative follows closely on the visits of Ambassador Walters to Algeria (August 4–6) and Major Jallud to Algiers (August 6) as well as a telephone conversation between President Bendjedid and Colonel Qadhafi (August 3), and two possibly complementary explanations suggest themselves:⁹

— A) President Bendjedid and his advisers, sensitized to the Libyan arsenal during the Walters visit, asked Jallud to explain its purpose. Jallud responded that Libya faces a major threat from Egypt and the Sudan and must thus arm itself accordingly. Through Dembri’s initiative, the GOA is seeking to inform itself, warn the USG of the dangers inherent in a conflict between Libya and Egypt/Sudan, get the USG to commit itself to work for a mutual dampening of tensions, and then use this commitment to urge greater moderation on Qadafi.

— B) Jallud presented Algeria with its “proof” of U.S./Egyptian/Sudanese intentions and solicited the assistance of the GOA. Through Dembri’s initiative, the GOA is trying to get the USG to clarify its intentions, warn the USG of the dangers inherent in a conflict between Libya and Egypt/Sudan, and urge the USG gently not to work for the overthrow of Qadhafi.

12. Both of the above explanations are plausible, and both may indeed play their part. Algeria is becoming more and more of a status-quo power, and the GOA undoubtedly feels more at ease dealing with an unruly, but tamable, Qadhafi than with an unknown figure. It wants to continue its efforts to protect and at the same time domesticate Qadhafi and is seeking all the assistance it can get.

13. Whatever the genesis of the GOA’s concern may be, it probably sees itself as working as an honest broker to try and defuse a situation that threatens not only Qadhafi himself, but regional peace and stability as well. The Algerian leadership knows the USG has no particular admiration for Qadhafi, and it is almost certainly afraid that the USG intends to do something about him directly or indirectly (through Egypt and the Sudan). It most likely wants at all costs to avoid such an American move against Qadhafi, not just to save his skin, but for two other important reasons as well. Firstly, a move against Qadhafi whose origin the GOA perceived to be the USG would force it (and certain other Arab states as well) to consider providing him with concrete assistance and retreat into a more or less virulent anti-American stance that would arrest the momentum towards more genuine non-alignment that has been developing in Algeria. Secondly, the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies would, given the slightest opportunity (such as that caused by an unexpected delay in an anti-Qadhafi action), intervene themselves and activate the Soviet-made arsenal now stockpiled in Libya to support Qadhafi. This would result in a superpower confrontation on Algeria’s doorstep, a situation that Algerian foreign policy has consistently sought at all costs to avoid.

14. Action requested: We are not conversant with all the policy ramifications involved in the GOA request for information and consultation on ways to dampen the high tension it adduces between Libya and Egypt/Sudan. We do believe that it is in our interest, to encourage the GOA to continue to consult with us on issues such as Libya. Ambassador Walters’ two visits have created a basis on which the GOA professes to want to build, and we should take this profession at face value unless it proves insincere.

15. We believe Algerian-American bilateral relations and our desire to see the GOA cure Qadhafi’s ambitions would be well served by a prompt response setting forth our analysis of the situation between Egypt/Sudan and Libya, and if our present policy permits, giving the GOA the assurances it is seeking that we are indeed encouraging Egypt and the Sudan to avoid an open conflict with Qadhafi. Even if we cannot give the GOA full satisfaction with regard to our policy, we would like to be able to respond by the end of the Muslim work week (i. e. Wednesday)¹⁰ if possible.

Ross

1. Source: Library of Congress, Alexander Haig Papers, Day File, Box 51, August 13, 1981. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Cairo, Khartoum, and Tunis. Sent for information to Damascus, Jidda, Lagos, London, and Paris. Sent for information Immediate to Rabat. A stamped notation at the top of the telegram reads: “AMH.” Below the notation, Haig wrote and circled “8/13/81.”
2. Haig underlined the subject line.
3. Haig underlined the portion of this paragraph beginning with “We believe GOA” to “on behalf of Qadhafi.”
4. Haig underlined the first sentence of this paragraph. In the right-hand margin next to numbered paragraphs 2 and 3, Haig wrote: “Gerry. Had urgent meeting Thurs A.M. [August 13] with Walters, NEA & AF—Hope draft has been started [studied?]—A fascinating msg & an even more fascinating Ambassador who clearly knows or thinks nothing! AMH.” No record of the meeting has been found.
5. Haig underlined: “initiative at the express request of President Bendjedid.”
6. Haig underlined: “He went on to say that the proximate cause of his initiative was the GOA’s concern over the escalation of tension between Egypt and the Sudan, on one hand and Libya on the other” in this sentence and drew an arrow pointing to where he wrote “Woody” in the right-hand margin.
7. Haig underlined: “would be disastrous, he continued, if an armed confrontation were to develop.”
8. Haig underlined the first sentence of this paragraph.
9. Haig underlined most of this paragraph.
10. August 12.