Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

285. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 23, 1988, 11:45 a.m.–2:35 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze of the USSR (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• US

  • The President
  • The Vice President
  • Secretary of State George Shultz
  • Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci
  • Chief of Staff Howard Baker
  • Deputy Chief of Staff Kenneth Duberstein
  • Colin L. Powell, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Under Secretary of State Michael Armacost
  • Ambassador Jack Matlock
  • Counselor Max Kampelman
  • Ambassador Paul Nitze
  • Ambassador Edward Rowny
  • Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne Ridgway
  • Robert E. Linhard, NSC
  • Thomas Simons (State, Notetaker)
  • Fritz W. Ermarth, NSC (Notetaker)
  • Dimitry Zarechnak (Interpreter)

• USSR

  • Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
  • Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksander Bessmertnykh
  • Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin
  • Ambassador Yuriy Dubinin
  • General Nikolay Chervov
  • Ambassador Victor Karpov
  • Ambassador Aleksey Obukhov
  • Foreign Ministry Deputy Director Georgiy Mamedov
  • Foreign Ministry Official Teymuraz Stepanov
  • Foreign Ministry Official Sergey Tarasenko
  • Pavel R. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

The Soviets arrived at 1135 in the Oval Office. Following initial pleasantries and a multiwave photo-op, the President opened the meeting by saying that he wished to raise a few personal thoughts before convening the larger plenary session.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

PLENARY MEETING IN CABINET ROOM

When the plenary session convened in the Cabinet Room at 1200, the President noted that the discussion had already begun and invited Secretary Shultz to start this round. (U)

Secretary Shultz said that the now regular pattern of small meetings with principals, including Colin Powell and Roz Ridgway on the US side, had been applied during this ministerial. He noted that working groups on all the arms control issues and on regional conflicts had met, that ambassadors had met on bilateral matters, and that working-group talks on human rights would be underway during the day. He said that all areas of concern were in play and that reports would be heard about them. But, first, he asked whether the Soviet visitor would like to comment on the overall ministerial. (S)

Shevardnadze began by conveying to the President the personal regards of Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev who, he said, warmly remembered their visit to Washington and their talks with the President and with the American people. They believed that this was a truly historic occasion. In the dynamic of US-Soviet relations, especially regarding security issues, Shevardnadze continued, the first constructive phase of the relationship starting with Geneva in 1985 could now be said to be over, and we were moving into a new phase. There was no need, he said, to elaborate on the importance of the INF agreement signed in Washington. The General Secretary had recently received the President’s message conveyed through Secretary Shultz saying that the US side was willing to move forward on security issues, especially to accomplish a 50% reduction of strategic forces within the context of compliance with the ABM Treaty and the parameters of the Joint Statement agreed to in Washington. (S)

Shevardnadze observed that he had had 23 meetings with Secretary Shultz, and could report that the dialogue was constructive and businesslike. Good experience had been gained in using a unique mechanism involving summits—an unprecedented fourth summit now impending—and the continuing dialogue of foreign ministers and experts. Now the state of US-Soviet relations was focused particularly on the task of completing a 50% START agreement. The President and the General Secretary had instructed the ministers and, in turn, the Geneva delegations to accelerate their work. The latter had prepared very substantial documents—on inspection, elimination and conversion, and an MOU on data exchange—which provided a basis for progress. Informed by the INF experience, these were important forward steps, in Shevardnadze’s view. Despite many areas of disagreement and little time to resolve them, Shevardnadze said there was a good basis for a joint effort to reach a 50% START agreement by the Moscow Summit. The Soviet leadership believed, he said, that, while difficult, this goal could be achieved. (S)

Shevardnadze observed that this ministerial would lay a good basis for the Moscow summit if there was agreement on the basic question of compliance with the ABM Treaty. The General Secretary had said and the President had agreed that there would be no 50% reductions agreement if there were no agreement on the ABM Treaty, according to Shevardnadze, and it was important to be guided by this in preparing for the summit. Additional requirements existed to amplify on certain aspects of verification so as to assure against circumvention. Shevardnadze said that he had shared new suggestions with the Secretary. Another very complex issue, he continued, concerned SLCM. As discussed since Reykjavik, without a solution to the SLCM problem no START agreement could be hoped for, but a basis for proceeding had been achieved. First, it had been agreed that there would be a limit on SLCMs. The Soviets had proposed a ceiling which, whether accepted now or not, provided a basis for discussion. Both sides agreed that the verification problem, secondly, was very difficult, but susceptible to solution through hard work by the experts. The Soviet side had presented to Secretary Shultz a comprehensive concept for SLCM verification. It had not yet heard a response, but understood that this might take time to study. Shevardnadze said this concept deserved serious study, and expressed the conviction of the Soviet side the SLCM limits could be verified. Another issue, he said, concerned ALCM counting rules. Both sides had proposed counting rules, and now the effort to reach agreement must be intensified. (S)

Shevardnadze said it was realistic to work for documents on nuclear testing for signature in Moscow. There were two aspects that needed to proceed in parallel, the preparation of protocols and the preparation of joint verification experiments. If willingness to accelerate both processes existed, a basis for agreement existed. The Soviet side had accepted the US technical approach and the US side did not object to the Soviet seismic approach. Moving to chemical weapons, Shevardnadze said that, since a completed convention banning chemical weapons was not realistic by the time of the Moscow summit, then a statement on accelerating the effort to complete a convention should be sought, a worthwhile draft of which had been submitted by the Soviet side. (S)

Regarding conventional arms, specifically in Europe, Shevardnadze said there was every reason to accelerate work on defining the mandate and substance of talks. Good progress was being made and acceptable language was attainable. Gorbachev, Shevardnadze recalled, had said the Soviet side was ready to put all its cards on the table, all its forces data. It was ready to begin negotiating on all asymmetries regarding conventional arms. Even before negotiations, it was ready to publish jointly all data about weapons pertinent to the goal of limiting conventional forces from the Atlantic to the Urals, data covering Warsaw Pact and NATO countries. The Soviet side was ready to publish data by region, including central, southern, and northern Europe. (S)

This in broad outline, Shevardnadze said, was the state of his dialogue with the Secretary. As to regional matters, he said he could not yet report conclusions. Agreed language regarding Afghanistan had not yet been reached, but he was hopeful it could be reached based on the Soviet decision to withdraw its forces. There had been discussion of Iran-Iraq and the Middle East, but no agreement yet; there would be discussion of Central America and Kampuchea, and some on southern Africa. (S)

This was the agenda, the mosaic of the ministerial, Shevardnadze said, and the ministers would work in a businesslike manner to build a good basis for the Moscow summit. After this ministerial in Washington, Shevardnadze proposed another ministerial in Moscow, suggesting a date somewhere in mid-May, to assure that the Moscow Summit was as productive as possible, something the Soviet Union and its people keenly desired. (S)

LUNCH DISCUSSION

Repairing for lunch in the Roosevelt Room at 1315, the party sat down at 1325 for a discussion that ranged over many topics.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

Secretary Shultz turned to arms control topics noting the importance of coming to grips with chemical weapons. The US side, he said, wanted to see results in the effort to get a ban on chemical weapons. Toward this objective he said that maybe a suitable statement for issuance at the Moscow summit could be constructed. He then asked Ambassador Nitze for a run-down on arms control. (S)

Ambassador Nitze reported that one large working group on arms control had subdivided into several separate groups on nuclear testing, conventional arms, START, Defense and Space. Verification problems generally, ALCMs, mobile ICBMs and their verification, heavy ICBMs, and SLCMs had been addressed. The two protocols on elimination and inspection and the MOU on data tabled in Geneva had been examined and some progress made on eliminating differences. Nitze observed that it would be important and feasible to exchange data called for by the MOU even before completing the full outline of the START agreement because the first informed the second action. The US side moved from 6 to 10 as an ALCM counting rule in response to Soviet concerns, but the Soviet side still had problems with the US position. (S)

Shevardnadze charged that the US was understating the ALCM carrying capability of its very good bombers. Nitze responded that the counting rule of 10 was fair for the force as a whole. He went on to say that mobile ICBM verification had seen hard work and some progress. On heavy ICBM, the sides’ positions were clear and disagreed. There remained problems on sublimits, but progress was being made. The main problem remain SLCMs, where the Soviet side, Nitze reported, had made substantive proposals which the US side was examining. (S)

Shevardnadze agreed that the MOU on data was important; categories needed to be defined; it would provide the basis for speeding up exchange of data. But, he said, it remained unacceptable that SLCMs were not included. Nitze said that the sides should start exchanging data as soon as possible. He then broached Defense and Space. (S)

Shevardnadze interjected by proposing to the President that the language of the December Joint Statement simply be used as the text of a document to be signed in Moscow. Not only had the two top leaders already accepted it, others present had worked on it, including Shultz, Carlucci, Baker, and Powell. If the Washington language on the ABM Treaty was still in effect, then things could move boldly ahead. (S)

Secretary Shultz responded that this matter was actively being discussed; the Washington language was valid. But, he said, it contained areas of ambiguity which even the Soviets could see. This had to be cleared up. (S)

Shevardnadze said that efforts were being made to go beyond the Washington language; these might lead in a negative direction which would be unfortunate. (S)

The luncheon broke up at 1435. Departing, Shevardnadze asked the President to consider the proposal of spending more time and doing more travel in the USSR than currently planned. (C)

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining the United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, 3/88 Washington/Shultz—Shevardnadze. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Oval Office, the Cabinet Room, and the Roosevelt Room. The complete memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 138.