Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

286. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 23, 1988, 2:30–8:10 p.m.

SUBJECTS

• Ministerial Dates, Iran-Iraq, Afghanistan, Other Regional Issues, Working Group Reports, Joint Statement

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • THE SECRETARY
  • Gen. Powell
  • Under Secretary Armacost
  • Amb. Ridgway
  • EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)
  • Mr. Zarechnak (Interpreter)

• U.S.S.R.

  • FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE
  • Amb. Bessmertnykh
  • Amb. Adamishin
  • Shevardnadze Aide Stepanov
  • Shevardnadze Aide Tarasenko
  • Soviet MFA Notetaker
  • Mr. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

Working Group Reports

The Ministers then decided that, as the joint statement was still being prepared, they should hear from working groups. Nitze and Obukhov were summoned, and Obukhov briefly summarized the results of the Nuclear and Space group’s discussions.

The thrust of OBUKHOV’s opening remarks was that the U.S. had insisted on language which had nothing to do with the Washington Summit statement, which ministers had agreed in Moscow should be the basis for a new agreement on observance of the ABM Treaty. SHEVARDNADZE asked if that meant that nothing had been achieved in this area. OBUKHOV said that the issue had been discussed both in the working group and by Kampelman and Karpov. Obukhov was not informed on the outcome of their discussions.

NITZE challenged Obukhov’s presentation of the subject, noting that the real problem was that the Washington Summit Statement language was never intended to be a self-standing agreement. A formal agreement would require greater specificity as to the meaning on “non-withdrawal.” It would also have to deal with issues like the supreme national interest clause, and what should happen at the end of the non-withdrawal period. So a number of questions remained on which work had to be done.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that there were also verification questions to be addressed. There seemed to have been some headway, but more was needed. We had some ideas on how to reduce ambiguity. NITZE said that our proposal on space sensors was one such idea.

SHEVARDNADZE asked Nitze what he meant by “sensors.” Nitze briefly explained the concept.

OBUKHOV noted that the Soviet side had just received the U.S. proposal. It would require expert analysis and assessment.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the key was to determine what would take place during the non-withdrawal period. The Soviet side thought that should be compliance with the ABM Treaty. If the two sides could agree on this, it would make open the field to progress across the board.

THE SECRETARY noted that that was the virtue of trying to work from a joint draft text. As had proven the case in other areas, such a device forced negotiators to identify for ministers where the problems lay. This could be done for the April meeting.

SHEVARDNADZE said this could be considered. But the important thing was not the text itself, but knowing where the differences lay. The bottom line was that the present visit had added nothing to what had been achieved during the Washington summit. If anything, the situation was less clear. So, work should continue.

THE SECRETARY agreed, but on the basis of a joint text. SHEVARDNADZE said that the Soviet delegation didn’t consider that a useful idea. OBUKHOV explained that the U.S. text would “drown” the principles which had been agreed to in Washington. Perhaps the U.S. could provide a revised text, which dropped the additional points. NITZE noted that the U.S. text contained all of the elements of the Washington Statement, as well as other elements we considered necessary.

SHEVARDNADZE said he disagreed with something Nitze had said earlier—that the Washington statement was only “communique language.” Rather, it should be seen as the basis for everything. THE SECRETARY pointed out that Nitze had said the Washington Statement language was incorporated into the U.S. text, adding that it did not provide adequate clarity. We had provided some ideas on how to achieve that.

“OK,” SHEVARDNADZE said, “let’s work on a joint document.” But that was not the solution. It could not be recorded that progress had been made. NITZE noted that agreement to work a joint draft text was progress. THE SECRETARY said that, whether it was progress or not, it should be done. He agreed with Shevardnadze that, on the whole, little had been achieved. SHEVARDNADZE said that the two sides had gotten nowhere, and asked Obukhov to continue his report.

When Obukhov had finished, Shevardnadze asked him where, in the Soviet working group’s view, there had been progress during the visit. OBUKHOV said that there had been some movement on ALCM’s, in that the U.S. had revised upward its proposals for a counting rule. This did not solve the problem, since, in the Soviet view, the only realistic rule was the maximum number for which bombers could be configured, but the U.S. move suggested that this issue could ultimately be resolved. While there had been no definitive progress on the SLCM question, the U.S. had agreed to intensify experts discussions on verification questions, and this, too, was a step forward.

SHEVARDNADZE asked if there had been a discussion of the detailed proposals the Soviet side had made on SLCM verification. OBUKHOV said that the Soviet side had made a thorough presentation, that the U.S. had asked a number of questions, and that Nitze had raised no objections. From this, Obukhov assumed that the Soviet ideas would be studied. NITZE interjected that he had said the proposals would be studied. He had made no commitments.

THE SECRETARY asked if any brackets had been eliminated in the texts prepared to date. NITZE said Hamner felt it would be possible to remove some brackets. SHEVARDNADZE said that, as best he could tell, there had been no serious movement on NST. If the other groups had done no better, it was not clear there would be anything for the ministers to review in April.

Nitze and Obukhov were then dismissed, and Holmes and Palenykh summoned to report on the nuclear testing group’s discussion.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

Joint Statement/Final Assessments

At this point, the ministers received copies of the draft joint statements for their review.

After reading the texts, THE SECRETARY expressed regret that the Soviet side had not, as Shevardnadze had earlier indicated, been willing to include a reference to “strong actions” which would be undertaken in the event the UN Secretary General’s early April consultations with Iran and Iraq produced no results. SHEVARDNADZE said that such language was not needed, as nothing was said about Afghanistan. THE SECRETARY said, “OK.”

The ministers authorized release of the statements.

Reflecting on the results of his visit, SHEVARDNADZE reiterated that if progress continued at this rate there would be no serious documents to sign at the Moscow summit. It was of course possible to meet and talk without signing documents. But it was discouraging that the two ministers and their delegations could meet for two days without accomplishing anything substantive. The statement was a good one, but it contained no specifics.

Shevardnadze suggested that this pointed to the need for particularly thorough preparations before the ministers’ next meeting. He would be in favor of removing as many brackets and disagreements as possible.

What then, should be said to the press? Was a press conference really necessary? How would the ministers assess their work?

THE SECRETARY said that he agreed that the visit had not been very productive. He had been asking himself why this should be. In the past, the ministers had dealt more successfully with some very difficult problems. That had not happened this time.

The problems which remained were the hard ones. But the Secretary felt that, with the right spirit on both sides, the ABM issue could be resolved. The ALCM discounting rule also seemed to be resolvable, even if, thus far, it had not proved possible to identify conceptually common ground. The SLCM issue remained tough, but we would look at Soviet suggestions. We thought that a declaration was a realistic way out of the problem; we were not optimistic about being able to verify a limit.

The U.S. desire to limit strategic arms was strong, the Secretary affirmed. The President shared this view. He wanted to get the job done. And the prospect was tantalizing when we looked at how much had been accomplished since the Secretary and Shevardnadze had first met in Helsinki. The difference was like night and day. The two START protocols and MOU which the ministers had commissioned in Moscow had been produced, albeit with lots of brackets. Many of these had to do with technical issues which should yield to further efforts. Others required resolution of broader questions.

The Secretary said he was as discouraged as anything by the failure to accomplish anything in the regional area. He felt that the overall effort we had been making in this area had been soured. Even at the most difficult moments in their relationship, e.g. during the Daniloff affair,² he had not felt such a sourness, even though the discussions were tough.

The Secretary said that he had gained the impression from his experience going back to the Nixon administration that there were rhythms to the relationship. One of the accomplishments of the past few years had been to atenuate the swings of the pendelum, while keeping the trend line moving in a generally positive direction. Perhaps the relationship was entering a downward cycle; the Secretary hoped we could pull out of it.

POWELL said that, while both sides obviously would have liked to accomplish more, they knew that they would be dealing with the most difficult questions—particularly on arms control. Powell agreed that we could work on ALCM’s; SLCM’s would be harder, even with the new Soviet ideas.

For his part, Powell had been most disappointed over the failure to make progress on the question of the ABM Treaty. We had felt after the Secretary’s Moscow visit that there would be movement in this area. Since then, the Soviet side had not engaged. Powell emphasized that steps must be taken to eliminate the ambiguity in the Washington Summit Statement. This was an essential political imperative for the U.S. After the Washington summit, our negotiators had been instructed to use the Statement as the basis for a treaty, not as the text of a treaty itself. This ambiguity had to be resolved before we could take a possible treaty to the Senate. That was why we had put forward our proposals on sensors and verification procedures. Soviet acceptance of these would create a common understanding of what had been intended in Washington.

THE SECRETARY stressed that the approach Powell had described was intended to get away from the debate over the broad versus the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. It sought to put out information on the nature of each side’s programs. This would provide greater predictability and certainty, something which the Soviet side had sought, as well as a clearer idea of what would happen during the non-withdrawal period.

RIDGWAY said that she had been reminded by some of her colleagues that in “off cycle” periods, bilateral progress could provide useful buoyancy. The report of the bilateral working group had identified a number of areas where constructive progress was being made.

THE SECRETARY observed that, seen in the long term, there were clearly stages in the development of our relationship, each with its own dynamics. The Geneva summit had had a certain air. Reykjavik was a different sort of meeting—highly charged, but, as summits went, the most productive ever. The Washington summit was a magnificent event, crowned by the signing of the INF Treaty. We hoped that there would be an even more important treaty to sign in Moscow.

But one could ask: “What about a 1989 summit?” If we concluded a START agreement for Moscow, what could be done for an encore? This was by way of saying that, for the relationship to become more normal, the time had to come when our leaders could meet, and, while it would be a major event, it need not be marked by gigantic achievements. This was a mark of maturity in the relationship. As people thought about the management of the relationship over the next five to ten years, that needed to be kept in mind.

So, the Secretary concluded, he felt a little disappointed with their meetings. But the way one accomplished things in this area was to keep plugging away. Our people would be working in Geneva. It would be even more important that people in capitals do their homework. The work in Geneva reflected what was being done in capitals.

SHEVARDNADZE said he did not think that the meetings had been useless—particularly when he read the joint statement. What disturbed him was that he had expected to be able to identify some concept for the Moscow summit, even if only in general terms. If he were asked what that concept might be at this point, he could not answer. This did not imply that the ministers should set grandiose tasks for themselves, but they needed a clear idea of where the process was leading. Shevardnadze agreed that it would be possible to have a meeting which did not produce major results. There was plenty of precedent for that in visits by other world leaders. But U.S.-Soviet relations were special.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed completely. He thought that something could be accomplished in the time remaining. So did the President.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the ministers should try to move positions closer together during their April meeting. They should try to identify more clearly a concept for the summit.

Shevardnadze said he did not want to return to all the problems the ministers had discussed. ABM was central. Unless some decisions were taken, there could be no expectation of progress in other areas. SLCM’s were another important area which the Soviet side hoped the U.S. would be ready to address urgently. Shevardnadze wanted to emphasize that if there were not understanding on the ABM Treaty, there would be no agreement on 50% strategic reductions. The same went for SLCM’s.

The U.S. and Soviet Union, Shevardnadze continued, had a unique chance to close off the main channels of the arms race. He did not know how Moscow’s relations with the next administration would be. Perhaps they would be better. But the Soviet leadership felt that there was a unique chance to negotiate an agreement now. It should not be missed. Guided by this principle, the two sides should act more vigorously in Geneva, Washington and Moscow.

By way of a second general observation, Shevardnadze said he had known the Secretary now for some time. The Secretary knew the Foreign Minister did not hide his feelings. Shevardnadze had been deeply disappointed by the results of their discussion of Afghanistan. He did not know how to continue the discussion. The U.S. had simply decided it didn’t want to help solve the problem. A major chance had existed to do something together, to resolve “the most acute problem of our time.” Moscow would resolve the problem. But it would have been well to demonstrate to the world that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. could work together to solve such problems. This was Shevardnadze’s most acute disappointment as he left Washington.

Shevardnadze said he did not want to overdramatize this. But he had believed the two sides could do better. There was every reason to expect success.

So, Shevardnadze summed up, he had been very frank. No purpose would be served by going over the issue once more. But success would have helped in the resolution of other problems, e.g. the Iran-Iraq war, the Middle East. The two sides had to cooperate if these issues were to be resolved. Moscow knew the mentality of the Arab world. Resolution of the Afghanistan conflict on a negotiated basis would have been a good stimulus in the Middle East.

But the meeting had been useful, despite the disappointments. There was a clearer idea of our differences. That was progress. And the atmosphere, as always, had been hospitable and constructive. Shevardnadze asked that the Secretary convey his thanks to the President for the time he had made available.

THE SECRETARY asked to respond on a few points.

On the ABM question, he urged that Soviet negotiators in Geneva be instructed to engage on a joint draft text. They should try to eliminate the inconsequential problems, e.g. the supreme national interests clause issue. We were surprised at the adverse reaction to our proposal that the ABM Treaty should remain in effect at the end of the non-withdrawal period unless a side exercised the six-month notice of withdrawal option, and hoped the Soviet side would look again at that. We urged the Soviet side to look closely at our sensors and verification proposals as a means of giving clarity to the Washington Summit Statement. Our objective was to put the issue on an operation basis, avoiding the question of broad versus narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

On Afghanistan, the Secretary expressed his own disappointment, for reasons paralleling those Shevardnadze had expressed. The Secretary felt the two sides had come close to an understanding. He hoped Shevardnadze had a better appreciation of the difficulties we had. Our moratorium proposal was an attempt to find solutions consistent with the Soviet need to maintain a certain posture, and with what, in practical terms, Moscow would want to do. It would give us the necessary sense of balance and even contribute to a solution to Afghanistan’s internal problems.

If asked, the Secretary would say that there had been a thorough discussion of Afghanistan and that, from our standpoint, there were some positive results. We would welcome acceptance of Cordovez’s mediation efforts. We would describe where the talks had ended up. We would not put it in a cataclysmic way, but would express our disappointment.

SHEVARDNADZE said that, if he were asked by the press whether the U.S. and Soviet Union would sign as guarantors in Geneva, he would say, “no.” Was that correct?

THE SECRETARY said he would say the U.S. was prepared to act as a guarantor, and that the arrangements which had been agreed to were close to what we needed to do so. But he would indicate that an essential element—balance—was missing. He would say we had tried to resolve this and were not succesful. We remained glad to be a guarantor if the issue could be resolved.

SHEVARDNADZE said that, if he were asked what the U.S. would do, he would say the press should ask the Secretary.

The meeting concluded with a brief discussion of plans for press conferences that evening.³

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, 3/88 Washington/Shultz—Shevardnadze. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in Shultz’s outer office at the Department of State. The complete memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 139.
2. Refence is to Nicholas Daniloff, a U.S. journalist who was arrested by the KGB in Moscow on September 2, 1986, and held on charges of espionage. Documentation pertaining to U.S.-Soviet negotiations leading to his eventual release is in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986.
3. The joint statement of March 23 noted Shultz and Shevardnadze had “reaffirmed the strong commitment made in the Washington summit joint statement to make an intensive effort to complete a treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and all integral documents at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature of the treaty during the next meeting of the two leaders.” (Department of State Bulletin, May 1988, pp. 42–43.)