Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

284. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 23, 1988, 9–11 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• UNITED STATES

  • Amb. Max M. Kampelman
  • Amb. Henry F. Cooper

• SOVIET

  • Amb. Viktor Karpov

In a two hour discussion with Ambassador Karpov, Ambassadors Kampelman and Cooper probed the Soviet proposal for a D&S Agreement consisting of principal provisions quoting the Washington Summit Joint Statement (WSJS) (responding to Soviet concerns) and a protocol on predictability measures to clarify the meaning of the WSJS (responding to U.S. concerns). While Karpov refused to work on bracketed language for a joint draft text and no agreement was reached on how to proceed, several issues were discussed and clarified, including:

—U.S. side corrected Karpov’s statements that the U.S. side in Geneva was insisting on explicit references to “transition” in the JDT;

—Karpov agreed the “agreement” and “protocol” could be worked in parallel, but argued that the agreement should be completed first; the U.S. side agreed to study the Soviet approach and try to work with it, but insisted that the agreement and protocol would have to be worked and finalized as a package;

—The U.S. side insisted that the agreement would have to deal with withdrawal and termination rights;

—The dispute over the duration of the agreement is central to the issue of what happens after the specified period—the Soviet position would have the agreement expire at the end of the period, thereby nullifying each parties’ right after the period “to decide its own course of action” (which means the right to deploy as negotiated at the Summit); the president insisted on (and obtained) this right in exchange for the nonwithdrawal period that Gorbachev wanted at the Summit;

—Karpov made clear the Soviet desire to set up a process of perpetually challenging U.S. testing activities through the activities of a “strengthened” SCC, a position rejected by the U.S. side;

—The Soviet verification measures approach is intended to support such challenging approach in contrast to the U.S. predictability measures approach;

—Karpov noted U.S. interest in a provision clarifying the WSJS language by stating that the parties would agree not to argue about the activities of sensors in space;

—Cooper noted that Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov’s concerns regarding having a hundred objects in space turn into a defacto territorial defense was perhaps a common concern and a possible basis for reaching an agreement of mutual interest.

ACTIVITIES IN GENEVA

Early in the discussion, Karpov said he wanted to avoid a repetition of the arguments in Geneva which were based on incompatible positions: the Soviets sought to implement the WSJS language but the U.S. side sought to replace the WSJS language, alleging to improve that language. He said that to escape such a repetition, the sides should not speak of transition and stick to the essence of the WSJS. Cooper disputed Karpov’s inference and noted that the U.S. proposed merged text did not mention transition; he said this was not because the U.S. side had dropped its view that a cooperative transition was desirable but because of Soviet stated concerns regarding the January 22 U.S. Treaty. At the same time, the U.S. proposal included a provision on withdrawal rights, which had to be dealt with, and predictability measures in keeping with suggestions from the Moscow Ministerial that pursuing this approach might settle the outstanding issues on “activities during the period.” Regarding the references to “transition” in the January 22 U.S. Treaty, Cooper noted that it had included this language to counter balance Soviet language in previous proposals—for example, their references to the “ABM problem” as the subject of the 3 years of intense discussions.

Karpov showed no inclination to accept Cooper’s accounting of the U.S. position, insisted that the Geneva approach was futile, and several times during the meeting urged that the agreement be worked out now, in Washington. The U.S. side refused to engage in this approach. At the end of the meeting, Cooper gave Karpov a copy of the March 17 U.S. Merged Text with the WSJS language highlighted, and urged Karpov to review it more carefully.

SOVIET PROPOSED AGREEMENT

Kampelman described his understanding of the Soviet proposal that called for an agreement and a protocol to the agreement. The agreement would surround the words of the December 10 WSJS with a title, a short preamble, and ending provisions. The Soviets proposed to meet U.S. concerns in an attached protocol which would seek to reduce ambiguities associated with the WSJS language and reduce tensions between the sides through confidence-building/verification measures.

Kampelman indicated that Secretary Shultz had said we should see what could be done with the Soviet proposal. The Secretary had emphasized that, while we would not pull back from the Washington Summit language, we could not accept an agreement framework where the protocol gets separated from the body of the agreement.

Karpov agreed the protocol could be negotiated in parallel with the body of the agreement, but argued that the body was easy to finish and should be done first. He argued that we should complete it at this meeting by quoting the WSJS and accepting the Soviet position on all unsettled issues, e.g., the duration of the agreement would be the specified period, and the sides would return to the ABM Treaty after the specified period. He refused to accept the idea of working bracketed text.

Kampelman suggested that Karpov outline his view of the suggested protocol; last night,² Karpov had mentioned the Soviet list proposal and Kampelman had said this was not a workable approach. Karpov said that had only been a suggestion and added that Kampelman last evening had mentioned something on sensors—perhaps some approach could build on Kampelman’s idea. Karpov noted that the various confidence building measures to be included in the protocol should be directed toward enhancing the verifiability of the ABM Treaty—augmenting NTM. To complement NTM verification procedures with respect to questionable activities, he suggested greater exchange of information “on demand” and enhanced systems of verification including on-site inspection. He was cool to U.S. arguments to enhance predictability and objected to exchanging planning data because he said it would create a situation where a side would either have to object to or give tacit approval to planned tests. He stated that other specific cooperative measures, including something like the U.S. proposal for mutual observation of tests, might be worked out.

In the discussion, the U.S. side indicated its willingness to consider the Soviet proposed agreement/protocol approach, but insisted that both the agreement and its protocol would have to be negotiated in parallel together. Also, the body of the agreement would have to include a provision dealing with “supreme interests” withdrawal rights and there would be brackets dealing with unresolved issues such as the duration of the agreement, the specified period, and when the agreement would enter into force. Karpov took note of the U.S. position but refused to indicate any flexibility regarding his insistence that everything be agreed in the agreement (no brackets).

DURATION OF AGREEMENT/RIGHTS AFTER THE PERIOD

Perhaps the most contentious part of the discussion was associated with Karpov’s insistence that the duration of the agreement be equal to the specified period, after which the parties would return to the ABM Treaty with their currently existing Article XV withdrawal rights that could be exercised only in the event of extraordinary events. He insisted that this was the meaning of the WSJS and refused to acknowledge that the U.S. position of an unlimited duration was consistent with the WSJS. He argued that the U.S. position of an unlimited duration was the essence of the dispute: the Soviets wished to preserve the ABM Treaty and the U.S. wish to replace the ABM Treaty. He was oblivious to the U.S. proposal that, thru the specified period and until a side exercised its freedom to decide its course of action, the sides would observe the ABM Treaty.

He was equally oblivious to the point that, if the D&S agreement expired at the end of the specified period, there would be no legal manifestation of the WSJS agreement that after the specified period, unless the sides agreed otherwise, “each side will be free to decide its course of action.”

The U.S. side emphasized that at the Summit, it had been agreed that these words meant the right to deploy—as reaffirmed on the final morning by an exchange between Secretary Carlucci and Shevardnadze in Marshal Akhromeyev’s presence. That meant the right to deploy without further negotiation and without making arguments about extraordinary events; this was part of what the U.S. side got for meeting the Soviet sides’ demand for a period of nonwithdrawal. The U.S. side would not agree that this right could exist for only a nanosecond at the end of the specified period. Karpov did not dispute that the U.S. side got the freedom to decide its course of action after the period in exchange for meeting the Soviet demand for a nonwithdrawal period, but still insisted that the D&S agreement should terminate at the end of the period at which time the sides should return to the ABM Treaty regime, including Article XV.

LINKAGE AND ACTIVITIES DURING PERIOD

During this discussion on rights of the parties after the period, Cooper emphasized that the Defense and Space agreement would have to stand on its own merits—there would have to be something in it for both sides. This was contrary to the Soviet argument that it was necessary only to provide the condition for fifty-percent reductions. This meant that in exchange for the nonwithdrawal period, which the Soviet side wanted, the U.S. side would get something in return, including the freedom to decide its course of action after the period as described above. In addition there would have to be clarity on withdrawal rights and on the activities during the period. Kampelman emphasized the need for an agreement that met both sides concerns and that the Soviet side appeared to be insisting that only its views be accommodated—especially regarding the activities during the specified period.

Karpov reiterated the standard Soviet line on needing a nonwithdrawal commitment for fifty percent reduction and went on to argue that the way to deal with any ambiguities was for the sides “to exercise restraint” and discuss problems in the SCC. During the exchange, Karpov made clear what he had in mind was setting up a process of perpetually challenging U.S. testing activities as being inconsistent with a Soviet restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty—not necessarily the U.S. “narrow interpretation.” At one point he acknowledged that the Delta 181 experiment³ was legal under the terms of the ABM Treaty, but that the Soviets were concerned about the trend of such experiments. The U.S. side insisted that the U.S. side could not accept an agreement under the conditions Karpov described.

SPACE SENSORS GO FREE

During the discussion on “activities”—and after an extended exchange on U.S. suggestions that the sides should avoid arguments over sensors in space, Karpov indicated his understanding that the U.S. side wished to see the WSJS ambiguities clarified by a provision in the protocol stating that the parties would agree not to argue about sensors during the term of the agreement.

In the exchange, Cooper noted that, with modernization on both sides, there would be increasing difficulty distinguishing between space-based sensors without ABM capability and those with ABM capability; and furthermore, that neither side should wish restraints on warning and attack assessment satellites. He referred to the fact that the ABM Treaty imposed restraints on basing ground-based radars inside a country’s perimeter did not have any analog for space-based sensors. Therefore it was in both sides’s interest to simply agree that space-based sensors would be free from dispute regarding ABM Treaty restrictions.

Karpov noted that there had never been any restraints on space-based warning systems—which had existed when the ABM Treaty was signed and asked if he was now proposing any restraints or bans. Cooper said no, to the contrary he was suggesting simply that the sides clarify that there would be no dispute on space-based sensors—that space-based sensors go free—because of the difficulties of distinguishing between ABM-related and other space-based sensors.

VORONTSOV’S CONCERNS

Cooper pointed out that it had been reported to him that Vorontsov, in his discussions with the press, had raised two issues. First, he had said components but not systems could be tested in space, then he took this back. This issue related to the “broad-narrow” interpretation issue of Article V which the sides disagreed on. The second was an Article I issue regarding providing a base for a territorial defense—and Cooper thought there was a basis for agreement here. Vorontsov had said there was a concern that 100 objects in space for testing might turn into a defacto territorial defense overnight. Cooper said he thought that maybe there was basis for agreement in dealing with this concern and requested that Karpov think about it.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, 3/88 Washington/Shultz—Shevardnadze. Secret.
2. No minutes of this meeting were found.
3. Reference is to a February 1988 test by the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization.