Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

282. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 22, 1988, 1:40–4:15 p.m.

SUBJECTS

• START, ABM Treaty, Nuclear Testing, Chemical Weapons, Conventional Weapons/Vienna CSCE, Naval Limitations Proposal

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • THE SECRETARY
  • Gen. Powell
  • Ambassador Ridgway
  • EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)
  • Dimitri Zarechnak (Interpreter)

• U.S.S.R.

  • FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE
  • Ambassador Bessmertnykh
  • Ambassador Karpov
  • Shevardnadze Aide Tarasenko (Notetaker)
  • Pavel Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

START

THE SECRETARY suggested that he respond to Shevardnadze’s morning remarks on strategic arms. The Foreign Minister had listed the areas where agreement had already been reached. It was a good list.

When the ministers had met in Moscow, they had agreed to emphasize verification. They had set their delegations the task drafting the inspection protocol, the conversion/elimination protocol, and the data MOU by the present meeting. Both sides had tabled drafts. There were joint texts to work from. There were many brackets in these texts. Some reflected larger treaty issues—mobile missiles, cruise missiles, non-deployed systems. But many of the brackets seemed susceptible to removal without much difficulty.

Brackets

For example, the two sides had agreed to build on the verification provisions of the INF Treaty. The language we had proposed in Geneva did that, while providing additional measures necessary because strategic systems continue to exist. The Soviet side had bracketed most of those initiatives, arguing that to change or move beyond the INF provisions might call the INF agreement into question. To the contrary, if the two sides did not go well beyond the INF verification measures, we would not be able to establish an effective strategic offensive arms verification regime. So those brackets ought to drop out.

A second issue was that there were non-substantive technical and linguistic problems in the treaty and protocols which were cluttering up the documents and wasting the delegations’ time. The Secretary proposed that delegations be directed to clear these up. In the inspection protocol, for example, the Soviet side consistently bracketed the term “monitoring” and its variations, which the U.S. had applied throughout the protocol to differentiate perimeter/portal monitoring (PPM) activities from “inspections.” This problem accounted for at least half the brackets in the protocol.

KARPOV asked if it were really only a matter of words.

THE SECRETARY repeated that we used “monitoring” only to differentiate between PPM activities and other forms of verification. Maybe some other terminology could be found. We meant no substantive difference.

KARPOV asked why, in that case, the same terminology could not be used as had been agreed upon for challenge and base line inspections. THE SECRETARY said that the U.S. was simply trying to differentiate between different types of activities by using different words. We were not trying to make a substantive point. In that case, KARPOV suggested, why not say that these were a “unique” kind of inspection. There were precedents for such situations in the INF Treaty; they should be used. THE SECRETARY said that this was a hang-up which did not reflect substance. We should try to resolve it.

With respect to the protocol on conversion or elimination, the Secretary continued, the U.S. view was that removal from accountability derives from substantially unambiguous actions as to a side’s intent to proceed with elimination. Consequently, we could not agree to procedures such as the Soviet proposal that silos be considered no longer to contain an accountable missile when the silo door had been opened. Our position was that removal from accountability could only occur when a silo door had been removed, and its headworks destroyed. The Soviet proposal would allow change of accountability by means simply of notification of intent and opening of the silo doors. Since this was a commonly occurring event, and was easily reversible, we had to insist on more concrete steps.

The Secretary noted that he had tried to give Shevardnadze examples of steps which did not depend on resolution of the big issues, but which could remove many brackets.

KARPOV pointed out that it was best to eliminate silos with the doors closed, since explosives were more effective under those conditions. Why not take advantage of technical knowledge as we proceeded in these matters? THE SECRETARY said that, in that case, the doors should be removed after the explosion. KARPOV said that could be discussed.

The Secretary proposed that working groups be instructed to make an effort to eliminate as many such brackets as possible. This would result in real progress on the protocols and MOU.

ALCM’s

Moving on to ALCM’s, the Secretary first stressed that the two sides were dealing only with nuclear-armed cruise missiles, as had been agreed in Washington. In this context, we considered the 1,100 sublimit proposed by Moscow unnecessary, since for every ALCM-equipped bomber a side chose, it would have to give up a ballistic missile. This was a high price to pay. We had thus welcomed the Soviet side’s indication in Moscow that, if there were agreement on a counting rule and verification regime, there would be no need for the 1,100 sublimit.

SHEVARDNADZE said that it was the experts’ job to come up with an ALCM counting rule, and the sooner the better.

THE SECRETARY said he wanted to address that subject. The Soviet side had complained in Moscow that the number the U.S. proposed to assign to each bomber was too low. We had given the matter further thought, and were prepared to consider a higher number. The numbers that Shevardnadze had proposed that morning were not in the ballpark. But we were prepared to consider a package along the following lines:

—An agreed number per bomber;

—No 1,100 sublimit;

—Attribution of 10 ALCM’s to each heavy bomber equipped to carry ALCM’s;

We understood the Soviet point on the need to distinguish between ALCM heavy bombers and systems not constrained by the Treaty, the Secretary continued. There were basically three situations which had to be considered: nuclear ALCM-carrying heavy bombers; non-ALCM bombers carrying other nuclear weapons; and conventionally equipped bombers. We were prepared to talk about means of distinguishing between the three systems. What we could end up with would be something like the bomber counting rule which had been agreed in Reykjavik.

The number we had chosen, 10, accurately reflected the loadings our bombers would normally carry. The protocol would provide a regime for verifying their basic capacity. Just as there would be no limit on the number of conventionally equipped bombers in each side’s inventory, there would be no limit on ALCM inventories. Rather, the number would be based on the capabilities of the aircraft equipped to carry them.

This, the Secretary concluded, was our proposal on ALCM’s. If there were agreement on a counting rule and verification scheme, the issue could be disposed of.

SHEVARDNADZE asked how the right solution could be found. KARPOV pointed out that B-52’s normally carried 12 ALCM’s. Why was the U.S. proposing they be counted as carrying only 10? SHEVARDNADZE asked if agreed verification procedures would help.

THE SECRETARY said that was exactly what needed to be explored. Each side needed to be able to verify that 10 was the number that the aircraft was equipped to carry. This could be given to the working groups.

KARPOV asked what would happen if it were determined that the aircraft could carry more than 10 ALCM’s.

THE SECRETARY said that one would have to look at how they were configured, and, if necessary, configure them in such a way that 10 was the right number.

KARPOV pointed out that the Soviet “Bear” bomber could carry no more than 6 ALCM’s. THE SECRETARY said the U.S. should have stayed with its original ALCM counting figure. KARPOV said at least that would have been right for Soviet bombers. SHEVARDNADZE said that the counting rule should be based on the load for which a bomber was equipped.

POWELL said that what was needed was an understanding on what the expected load would be. We had set the number 10. KARPOV asked if that was the average or planned capability. Powell said it was “planned.” But the working group could discuss this.

THE SECRETARY said that he assumed the Soviet side designed its aircraft for different configurations, depending on their missions. Verification regimes would have to be developed to determine how the relevant bombers were configured. We would be configured to carry 10 ALCM’s. There would be a regime to verify that.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the issue be referred to experts. THE SECRETARY agreed.

SLCM’s

On SLCM’s, the Secretary said that he had listened carefully to the ideas Shevardnadze had presented. It was clear that Moscow had given the matter a lot of thought. We would look at what had been proposed, but were unable to say more at this time.

Mobile ICBM’s

As for mobile missiles, the Secretary had noted in Moscow that the very features which made them attractive from a survivability standpoint made them a problem from the standpoint of verifiability. We had some ideas, which the Secretary was prepared to share on a preliminary basis. Some seemed to coincide with ideas the Soviet side had put forward.

What we had in mind was to build on the basic START verification arrangements—data exchanges, short notice OSI, perimeter/portal monitoring of missile production facilities, suspect-site inspection, etc. To this, the U.S. would add specific provisions for monitoring deployed mobile ICBM’s, taking into account their unique characteristics. For example, mobile ICBM’s and their launchers would be confined to restricted areas. They would be subject to periodic inspection by enhanced NTM and OSI. Missiles and launchers could depart this area only with prior notification, and only a small portion of the force could be away at any given time. As an exception, dispersal would be permitted in certain limited conditions. Their return would be confirmed by NTM and OSI. There would be simultaneous notification at the time of the dispersal. The reason for the dispersal would be provided.

The problem of monitoring non-deployed mobile ICBM’s was another difficult challenge, which would require further measures. Shevardnadze had suggested this morning that all such missiles would be confined to storage areas removed from operational bases. This would amount to a kind of “zero option,” except in the designated areas. This was something we could think about.

If adequate verification methods could be found, the Secretary said, the U.S. was ready to consider modification of its insistence on a mobile missile ban. In this case, there would obviously have to be a sublimit. Shevardnadze that morning had spoken of 800 launchers, but there would have to be a warhead figure as well. We felt that number should be small. 800 times any figure looked on the high side.

After consultation with Bessmertnykh, SHEVARDNADZE said that most of the missiles involved would carry only a single warhead. THE SECRETARY said that warheads would have to be limited along with launchers. SHEVARDNADZE added that it would all have to be verifiable.

Sublimits

Moving on to sublimits, THE SECRETARY said he had thought that the only additional sublimit issue had to do with ground-based ICBM’s. We recalled Akhromeyev’s statement that the Soviet Union did not intend to field more than 3,000 ICBM’s, 3,300 at the outside. So we had the impression that figure was acceptable to Moscow.

The U.S. had always been unwilling to equate ICBM’s with SLBM’s because of command and control considerations and the different “on station” ratios of the two types of systems. That morning, Shevardnadze had linked the two. We could not agree to that. If the Soviet side would accept the 3,300/3,000 ICBM figure, and the 1,100 ALCM bomber number fell away, we could close out the sublimit issue.

The Secretary put down a marker on suspect-site inspections under a START treaty. The basic concept had been agreed at the Washington summit. It seemed to us that the main task for such inspections should be to give confidence that the other side was not covertly producing, storing or deploying ballistic missiles or launchers beyond what was permitted by the treaty. We were not yet ready to put forward detailed ideas on this, but perhaps the ministers could address the subject during their April meeting.

SHEVARDNADZE said he had already addressed the question of a sublimit for ICBM’s and SLBM’s. It should be 3,300.

THE SECRETARY said that the problem was that it applied to both types of systems. ICBM’s could not be equated with SLBM’s.

SHEVARDNADZE said that in that case there should be simple freedom to mix within the 4,900 ballistic missile sublimit.

THE SECRETARY said that that would be the practical effect of the 3,300 limit, since, as Akhromeyev had said, the Soviet Union had no plans to exceed that figure. ICBM’s warranted special consideration, in our view, because of their unique characteristics. There were strong views on this point in the U.S. Senate, he added.

KARPOV noted that the Secretary’s quoting Akhromeyev did not remove from the agenda the need for an SLCM sublimit. The alternative was no new sublimit. The U.S. proposal for an ICBM sublimit was unfair in that 80% of the Soviet arsenal was deployed on such systems.

BESSMERTNYKH wondered, if the U.S. were to ask an “Akhromeyev” of its own how many SLCM’s the U.S. intended to build, how he would respond.

THE SECRETARY quipped that “ours” wouldn’t answer.

KARPOV noted that the U.S. and Soviet Union each had about 6,400 warheads on, respectively, SLBM’s and ICBM’s. The Soviet proposal would cut both by half.

THE SECRETARY said that was just a coincidence of numbers. The 3,300 ICBM sublimit was equitable in that it applied to both sides. SLBM’s were qualitatively different because of the factors the Secretary had mentioned.

KARPOV pointed out that American SLBM’s had a far higher “on station” ratio than their Soviet counterparts. The U.S. had 6,400 SLBM warheads; the Soviet Union only 2,400. But the Soviet side had more ICBM warheads. There were real structural differences, but the two sides were in relatively the same position with respect to the number of warheads on American SLBM’s and Soviet ICBM’s.

THE SECRETARY observed that both sides would be limited by the 4,900 sublimit. Both would be limited by the desire to have more than one ballistic missile leg. There were historically different structures. But that did not change the fact that there were qualitative differences between ICBM’s and SLBM’s. The Secretary had thought this issue was resolved in Moscow. He was surprised it had resurfaced.

KARPOV said there had been no change in the Soviet position. SHEVARDNADZE said that experts should work on the problem.

Defense and Space

THE SECRETARY agreed, noting that he had some material on defense and space. He and Shevardnadze had gotten into the subject a bit the night before. The Secretary had asked Kampelman to look into the problem. Perhaps the ministers could see what, if anything, he had been able to accomplish.

KARPOV said that when he and Kampelman had spoken at lunch, Kampelman had said that the working group was dealing with the problem. But, Karpov said, the working groups could reach no conclusions. Kampelman had made some personal suggestions, which, since they were personal, Karpov did not feel comfortable commenting on. But, so far, the working groups had made no progress.

THE SECRETARY suggested that Kampelman and Obukhov be invited to join the group, and they were sent for.

SHEVARDNADZE said he wanted to emphasize the fundamental importance of this question. He had set forth Moscow’s views the day before, but could repeat them if necessary.

THE SECRETARY said he had listened the day before, but was not in a position to respond in detail. He suggested that the ministers hear from the experts.

When Kampelman and Obukhov arrived, the Secretary asked if he could state the problem. The two sides, he said, agreed on the language of the Washington Summit Statement. That language, assuming the duration of the non-withdrawal period were agreed and the issue of the supreme national interest clause resolved, left ambiguity as to what actions were to be conducted during the non-withdrawal period. The two sides had different views on this point. The Soviet side said, in effect, “Let it ride.” We felt the need for greater clarity. Otherwise, any strategic withdrawal schedule which might be agreed to would be made hostage to potential disagreements over how research on strategic defense was to be conducted. So there was a need to clarify this ambiguity.

The Secretary had thought that Shevardnadze’s comments in Moscow on the need for work on the verification aspects of the Washington statement could be useful in this regard. The Soviet side had put forward some predictability ideas, and we had welcomed them. We had some ideas of our own on how to reduce or eliminate the ambiguity in the Washington statement. The Secretary asked Kampelman to comment.

SHEVARDNADZE asked to speak first. He agreed with the Secretary that the Washington Summit Statement language was good. Indeed, it could not be improved upon. The only addition he had ever mentioned had to do with the need to give the document a legally binding character. Moscow had since given the matter much thought, and could now agree with the U.S. that this should take the form of a separate agreement.

As for the non-withdrawal period, this should be regarded by both sides as a period to ensure stability and predictability during the process of reducing strategic arms. This would comprise both the reduction period itself and a period during which negotiations would take place on future arrangements. For Moscow, the obligation not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty during this period should be unconditional. As to the period of non-withdrawal, the U.S. in Moscow had said it should be longer than the reduction period itself. The Soviet side agreed. It was now ready to accept the U.S. proposal for a seven year reduction period. That would mean that the total duration of the non-withdrawal period would be nine or ten years.

It was true, Shevardnadze continued, that confidence that both sides would observe the ABM Treaty as signed during this period could be enhanced by verification measures. The Soviet side had thus proposed an exchange of information to clarify ambiguous sites. They attached much importance to this proposal. It would involve notification of permitted activities, as well as on-site inspections of facilities as necessary to satisfy concerns. A special protocol could be drawn up to this effect. Full use would also be made of the SCC, which should deal not only with past compliance questions, but seek to prevent the emergence of new concerns. Taken as a whole, such measures would significantly enhance confidence that the ABM Treaty was being observed.

What was not needed, Shevardnadze said, was new language. The General Secretary and President, with the help of those in the room, had succeeded in hammering out a formula. Now totally new elements were being added. This was totally inadmissable if one were serious about reducing strategic arms.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed with the way Shevardnadze had formulated the problem, particularly with respect to verification. At the same time, the Secretary believed it was possible to add verification provisions which would further reduce ambiguity. We wanted to discuss this problem. We would like to see less contention in the SCC, with its associated fall-out on a possible strategic arms reduction schedule.

The Secretary said we also had to insist that our standard supreme national interest language be included in an agreement. It was in all our agreements. We were prepared to say that this right would not be exercised on the grounds that development of strategic defense systems in themselves were a matter of supreme national interest.

The Secretary noted that he had raised these two issues with General Secretary Gorbachev in Moscow, and had thought that discussion had cleared the air. The first, verification, was very important, and we realized we owed the Soviet side some ideas. In that context, he would ask Ambassador Kampelman to speak.

KAMPELMAN said that, based on his discussion with Karpov, it was the Soviet view that any attempt to agree on language beyond that of the Washington Summit Statement would complicate matters for two reasons. First, it would be time consuming, and might not be done in a reasonable time. Second, the issues themselves created new problems which could not be resolved in the near future. If that perception were accurate, the Secretary was correct when he suggested that any words on which agreement might be reached would be interpreted differently by each side.

Over lunch, Karpov had told Kampelman that Moscow would like the words of the Washington statement to mean that the U.S. would restrict SDI. Whether he actually said that or not was not the point. That was clearly the objective. If the U.S. intended to proceed with its SDI program—and it did—it would be misleading to sign an agreement which would certainly lead to tension at a later date. We did not need a formula which would guarantee future arguments. We wanted one which would minimize them.

Kampelman said he had taken the liberty of trying out on Karpov some ideas, which he had shared with U.S. scientists, for dealing with the problem. Karpov had resisted the ideas, on grounds that they would be troublesome to work out, and take time. Kampelman would be glad to summarize them.

The first was that, since the Soviet Union was concerned by U.S. defensive programs—and vice versa—perhaps there could be an exchange of information on what each side was planning. Moscow might find that some of our plans were not so troublesome as it thought.

The second idea was to try to separate weapons out of our planning. It was possible, Kampelman pointed out, to distinguish between weapons and sensors. The two sides might agree that during the non-withdrawal period neither side would deploy or test space-based weapons. This, too, could give some confidence.

Kampelman noted that there might be other approaches he had not thought of. The point of the exercise, he stressed, would be to avoid arguments which would break out as soon as a piece of paper were signed. The idea would be to see if mutually acceptable arrangements could be worked out, without trying to resolve all the possible questions. That would take too long. Rather than argue over what had been signed in 1972, we should try to address what was in each side’s interest today.

SHEVARDNADZE said that these ideas would have to be discussed. KARPOV suggested that he and Kampelman be excused to do so. THE SECRETARY said he hoped it would advance things to have heard some of our ideas. SHEVARDNADZE said it was the first time he had heard of the notion of singling out sensors. Kampelman said it might prove to be a terrible idea, but it could be explored.

SHEVARDNADZE said he wanted to remind the Secretary of one thing. When the Soviet side had agreed in Washington to the 4,900 sublimit, it had said that the formula on observance of the ABM Treaty was the final word, which could not be appealed. Now the U.S. was seeking new language.

THE SECRETARY said the U.S. stood by the words of the Washington Statement. We were simply acknowledging that, in the area of what was permitted during the non-withdrawal period, there was room for differences of interpretation. We wanted to clarify that. With this exception, the Washington language served both sides well. And even in the area of permitted activities, it provided a good start.

KAMPELMAN said he looked upon what the U.S. was trying to do in Geneva as carrying out the Washington Statement’s charge. It was in no way an attempt to backtrack on what was signed. KARPOV said that much could be said on this point, but that the ministers’ time should not be taken up with it.

SHEVARDNADZE said that this was a question that needed to be resolved before he left. If it were not, the two sides would have to recognize that there would be no strategic arms agreement.

THE SECRETARY said the U.S. might be able to make additional proposals along the lines of those Kampelman had outlined. He hoped the Soviet side would be receptive. But it would be unwise to proceed with an agreement with built-in ambiguities on observance of the ABM Treaty. The ambiguity had to be removed.

POWELL reminded Shevardnadze that the issue had emerged within a week after the Washington summit. Congress had been promised the ambiguity would be cleared up. THE SECRETARY reiterated that we were prepared to share ideas on how this might be done.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that Kampelman and Karpov should get to work—and quickly.

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, 3/88 Washington/Shultz—Shevardnadze. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in Shultz’s outer office at the Department of State. The complete memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 134.