Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

281. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 22, 1988, 9:25–11:25 a.m.

SUBJECT

• The Secretary’s Meeting with Shevardnadze, March 22 Morning: Human Rights, START

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • George P. Shultz, Secretary of State
  • Colin Powell, National Security Advisor to the President
  • Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State (EUR)
  • Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Deputy Secretary of State (EUR) (notetaker)
  • Dimitri Zarechnek (interpreter)

• USSR

  • Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Aleksander A. Bessmertnykh, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Viktor P. Karpov, Directorate Head, Soviet MFA
  • Teymuraz A. Stepanov, Assistant to Shevardnadze
  • Sergei P. Tarasenko, General Secretariat Head, MFA (notetaker)
  • Unidentified Embassy notetaker
  • Pavel Palazhchenko (interpreter)

[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]

The Secretary suggested, if Shevardnadze agreed, that they turn to strategic arms. Shevardnadze joked that they should turn to them, not use them. The Secretary said Shevardnadze could lead off if he wished. Shevardnadze said he never refused a legitimate privilege.

Shevardnadze said he had already mentioned that little time was left before the President’s visit to Moscow. At the present meeting they had to hammer out the principles needed to resolve problems related to the treaty on 50% reductions. The main questions were clear.

Shevardnadze continued that he would like to say the Soviet leaders considered the President’s visit an important event, and believed it could become a major landmark in international politics. They had every right to see it in this way, provided the appropriate documents were ready. The ministers had received clear instructions from their leaders in Washington. They were addressed first of all to the foreign ministers and their coworkers. He could not say these instructions had been acted upon in a sufficiently intensive way. Some complaints were due the negotiators, but the ministers were also responsible.

The day before,² Shevardnadze said, he had mentioned the important question of the ABM Treaty, and he would return to it later.

He wished first to single out a few difficult problems on the strategic offensive arms reduction treaty. They required collective efforts, especially at the foreign ministers’ level.

The first problem, Shevardnadze said, had to do with long-range SLCM’s. In Washington Mikhail Gorbachev had stressed that without resolution of that question there could be no START agreement, since without resolution a channel would be left open for building strategic offensive weapons, and nullifying the agreement to reduce them.

What should we decide?, Shevardnadze asked. Perhaps at this meeting they would have to reach agreement on a mutually acceptable figure. The Soviets had made a proposal, and had received no answer. He could reaffirm that such a ceiling on long-range SLCM’s could be set at 400. This was not a new figure. Why had the Soviets proposed it? Because they thought the figure should not be too high, in order not to negate the START agreement.

The Secretary, his colleagues, the President had mentioned that verification would be difficult, Shevardnadze went on. This was true. The problem existed. But the Soviets believed it was not hopeless. A solution could be outlined.

Concerning verification of mobile ICBM’s the Soviet side had submitted proposals, Shevardnadze continued. He was ready to continue the discussion, to provide more specifics. He expected the Secretary to act in the same way on a question of interest to the Soviets, on SLCM’s. If the U.S. believe they were not verifiable, the Soviets were ready for joint measures to ensure that they would be verified.

What was the concept?, Shevardnadze asked. Previous proposals had focussed on national technical means, including remote monitoring. They had also proposed inspections of submarines and surface ships and at basing facilities; he wished to stress the latter. In addition, however, they could ask their experts to study the verification of long-range SLCM’s by permanent inspections in specially designated arming facilities, where the systems were armed, after which they were loaded on submarines and surface ships of agreed types.

They had used this method in other areas, Shevardnadze went on, but they would have to designate a limited number of facilities, whose location would be designated in the memorandum of understanding. In the U.S. draft there had been no mention of baseline data for SLCM’s. This was not normal. Under the Soviet concept, arming them in any other location than those designated would be prohibited.

The Soviets also proposed suspect site challenge inspections, on a yearly quota. There would also be a ban on loading SLCM’s on submarines and surface ships anywhere except in basing areas, for instance on the open sea. They recognized this would be a difficult limitation, but there was no other way.

If some vessels were already equipped with such systems when the agreement went into force, there would have to be demonstrations to the other side for counting purposes. The procedures for such demonstrations would have to be agreed between the two sides.

The Soviets also proposed conducting a special remote monitoring experiment in April. There would be Soviet equipment on helicopters and airplanes. The U.S. would designate ships. U.S. experts would then observe with the Soviet equipment. This could happen in the Mediterranean or in some other area. The U.S. could also test its own equipment with Soviet participation.

The Soviet side recognized that remote monitoring was not a panacea, did not provide a complete guarantee. But together with other measures it could help provide a solution.

That was what he had to say on long-range SLCM’s, Shevardnadze concluded. If this key question were not resolved, one could hardly hope that a START agreement for 50% reductions could be concluded.

The Secretary said he thought Shevardnadze had identified perhaps the most difficult issue. Not that there were not other difficult issues, but this was the most difficult. We had thought a lot about it; we had examined it. We had not found a satisfying answer. We would take Shevardnadze’s ideas, and see if they added anything. Or, because they clearly added something, we would see if they added enough. We would also look at the Soviet proposal for an early experiment, and see what it yielded for us.

We were prepared to deal with these issues, the Secretary went on. But we had not yet seen possibilities comparable to those in other areas. We were not prepared to put down a flat “no.” But in the end it might not be possible to verify here. If verification proved impossible, we would be prepared to make unilateral statements, and live with them. But it would be more satisfactory to achieve agreed verification.

General Powell said we had spent a great deal of time examining these issues. Yazov and Carlucci had discussed them too. We would follow up Shevardnadze’s suggestions. The Secretary said Carlucci had reported he found his conversations with Yazov constructive. They had also talked about the prospect of our top military people meeting later this year. Shevardnadze noted he and the Secretary had been asking for that for a long time. It would be good if such a meeting took place. But it would be even better to agree on SLCM verification.

Shevardnadze said the question of principle was whether the sides agreed that inspections were possible. We would be having it for INF missiles. We should be applying this to ballistic missiles. The Secretary said the U.S. was in principle for inspection. Shevardnadze said if that were so, the sides were on the same wave length. The specifics could be resolved.

The Secretary said he wished to recapitulate what had been agreed: 1600 delivery vehicles, 6000 warheads, 4900 ballistic missile warheads, 1540 warheads on 154 heavy ballistic missiles, a bomber counting rule, various items on verification, 50% reductions in throwweight. In Moscow they had agreed to focus on verification and task their negotiators to develop three documents. This had worked out. It had been a good approach.

Shevardnadze said he would like to deal with the most difficult issues. If they were not resolved they would not be doing the protocols. Perhaps they should tell their experts to work especially intensively on SLCM’s.

Turning to ALCM’s, Shevardnadze said they should have clarity on this fundamental issue. The Soviets were proposing to count on the basis of the actual maximum number for which each bomber was equipped. This of course was on a basis of over 600 km. range. The actual maximum number for the B–52 was 28. Soviet experts believed that, and it was based on what was published in the U.S. The number for the B–1B was 22. If that were accepted the Soviets would drop their insistence on a sublimit of 1100 for ALCM’s and other heavy bomber weapons. This had been discussed, and he thought the Secretary understood the basic Soviet concerns. He thought that issue could be resolved.

The third issue was verification. The Soviets suggested there be inspection of heavy bomber bases. Inspectors should look at the bombers and their equipment, and there should be demonstrations of their functioning.

Karpov reminded Shevardnadze of the 600-km. range figure. Shevardnadze said he wished to stress once again that he was talking about a 600-km. range threshold.

Shevardnadze continued that he had some suggestions to make on mobiles. At Moscow the two sides had worked on this issue, and the Secretary said that the U.S. side was more confident progress could be made than in the past. To remove grounds for U.S. concern the Soviets had mentioned their readiness to agree to a separate sublimit for mobile ICBM launchers. He could now provide a figure of 800 launchers.

The Secretary asked how many warheads Shevardnadze had in mind. Or was he just talking about launchers? Shevardnadze replied that the actual number would not be as high as 800; but there should be a limit on the total. The Secretary said he understood the Soviets had one system with a single warhead, and another with multiple warheads. The unit of count would be critical. The sort of mixture was important. Shevardnadze replied that the Soviets would decide on the number of warheads. That could be resolved. What he was proposing now was 800 missiles for mobiles under the 1600 ceiling.

Shevardnadze continued that verification would not be simple, and the Soviets understood that. Previous proposals had included national technical means, continuous inspection of production, and notification of changes in the number and location of launchers. The Soviets were ready for an expanded system, particularly for ground-mobile ICBM launchers. For baseline purposes they could agree to open the roofs of the buildings for a period of time, to assist NTM. This was already agreed for INF. There would be one such opening a year for each base. The geographic coordinates of the bases of ground-mobile launchers would be given in the MOU.

Verification of rail-mobile launchers was the hardest of all, Shevardnadze went on. The Soviets suggested that during the baseline data inspection they be corralled at bases for counting. He would say that if this could be expanded to include SLCM’s all the problems would be solved. They also proposed suspect site inspection of rail cars to make sure that numbers were not greater than at the time of the baseline inspection.

The number of non-deployed ICBM’s should be strictly limited, Shevardnadze continued. There should be no more than an agreed number per base, and these should be those intended for replacement. Moreover, they should be at such a distance from the base that rapid reload would not be possible. This was of fundamental importance.

Shevardnadze said he understood the need to digest all this. Serious experts should examine these ideas. The major Soviet experts had worked on them. What was emerging was a uniform system of inspection procedures.

The Secretary asked if Shevardnadze had some comments to make on sublimits.

Shevardnadze said he saw two alternatives:

—First, concerning reentry vehicles for ICBM’s and SLBM’s, the text could record a sublimit of 3300 with regard to both, and also a sublimit of 1100 for ALCM’s and other heavy bomber weapons.

—Second, the possibility was open, within the 4900 warhead limit which the Secretary had said the U.S. would prefer to stick to, for each side to mix freely between ICBM and SLBM warheads. Each side would decide for itself.

That was what he had to say on sublimits. He had also mentioned the sublimit of 1100 ALCM’s and other heavy bomber weapons. But, as he had said, if the ALCM counting problem would be resolved that could be dropped.

The Secretary asked if they should continue on strategic arms. They had five minutes before the ceremony, and the Senators were waiting. Shevardnadze said in that case it was time to call a break. He had more on the protocols and the MOU. The Secretary agreed they should take a break and continue after lunch.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, 3/88 Washington/Shultz—Shevardnadze. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons. The meeting took place in Shultz’s outer office at the Department of State. The complete memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 133.
2. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 132.