Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

134. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 22, 1988, 1:40–4:15 p.m.

SUBJECTS

• START, ABM Treaty, Nuclear Testing, Chemical Weapons, Conventional Weapons/Vienna CSCE, Naval Limitations Proposal

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • THE SECRETARY
  • Gen. Powell
  • Ambassador Ridgway
  • EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)
  • Dimitri Zarechnak (Interpreter)

• U.S.S.R.

  • FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE
  • Ambassador Bessmertnykh
  • Ambassador Karpov
  • Shevardnadze Aide Tarasenko (Notetaker)
  • Pavel Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

START

THE SECRETARY suggested that he respond to Shevardnadze’s morning remarks on strategic arms.² The Foreign Minister had listed the areas where agreement had already been reached. It was a good list.

When the ministers had met in Moscow, they had agreed to emphasize verification. They had set their delegations the task drafting the inspection protocol, the conversion/elimination protocol, and the data MOU by the present meeting. Both sides had tabled drafts. There were joint texts to work from. There were many brackets in these texts. Some reflected larger treaty issues—mobile missiles, cruise missiles, non-deployed systems. But many of the brackets seemed susceptible to removal without much difficulty.

Brackets

For example, the two sides had agreed to build on the verification provisions of the INF Treaty. The language we had proposed in Geneva did that, while providing additional measures necessary because strategic systems continue to exist. The Soviet side had bracketed most of those initiatives, arguing that to change or move beyond the INF provisions might call the INF agreement into question. To the contrary, if the two sides did not go well beyond the INF verification measures, we would not be able to establish an effective strategic offensive arms verification regime. So those brackets ought to drop out.

A second issue was that there were non-substantive technical and linguistic problems in the treaty and protocols which were cluttering up the documents and wasting the delegations’ time. The Secretary proposed that delegations be directed to clear these up. In the inspection protocol, for example, the Soviet side consistently bracketed the term “monitoring” and its variations, which the U.S. had applied throughout the protocol to differentiate perimeter/portal monitoring (PPM) activities from “inspections.” This problem accounted for at least half the brackets in the protocol.

KARPOV asked if it were really only a matter of words.

THE SECRETARY repeated that we used “monitoring” only to differentiate between PPM activities and other forms of verification. Maybe some other terminology could be found. We meant no substantive difference.

KARPOV asked why, in that case, the same terminology could not be used as had been agreed upon for challenge and base line inspections. THE SECRETARY said that the U.S. was simply trying to differentiate between different types of activities by using different words. We were not trying to make a substantive point. In that case, KARPOV suggested, why not say that these were a “unique” kind of inspection. There were precedents for such situations in the INF Treaty; they should be used. THE SECRETARY said that this was a hang-up which did not reflect substance. We should try to resolve it.

With respect to the protocol on conversion or elimination, the Secretary continued, the U.S. view was that removal from accountability derives from substantially unambiguous actions as to a side’s intent to proceed with elimination. Consequently, we could not agree to procedures such as the Soviet proposal that silos be considered no longer to contain an accountable missile when the silo door had been opened. Our position was that removal from accountability could only occur when a silo door had been removed, and its headworks destroyed. The Soviet proposal would allow change of accountability by means simply of notification of intent and opening of the silo doors. Since this was a commonly occurring event, and was easily reversible, we had to insist on more concrete steps.

The Secretary noted that he had tried to give Shevardnadze examples of steps which did not depend on resolution of the big issues, but which could remove many brackets.

KARPOV pointed out that it was best to eliminate silos with the doors closed, since explosives were more effective under those conditions. Why not take advantage of technical knowledge as we proceeded in these matters? THE SECRETARY said that, in that case, the doors should be removed after the explosion. KARPOV said that could be discussed.

The Secretary proposed that working groups be instructed to make an effort to eliminate as many such brackets as possible. This would result in real progress on the protocols and MOU.

ALCM’s

Moving on to ALCM’s, the Secretary first stressed that the two sides were dealing only with nuclear-armed cruise missiles, as had been agreed in Washington. In this context, we considered the 1,100 sublimit proposed by Moscow unnecessary, since for every ALCM-equipped bomber a side chose, it would have to give up a ballistic missile. This was a high price to pay. We had thus welcomed the Soviet side’s indication in Moscow that, if there were agreement on a counting rule and verification regime, there would be no need for the 1,100 sublimit.

SHEVARDNADZE said that it was the experts’ job to come up with an ALCM counting rule, and the sooner the better.

THE SECRETARY said he wanted to address that subject. The Soviet side had complained in Moscow that the number the U.S. proposed to assign to each bomber was too low. We had given the matter further thought, and were prepared to consider a higher number. The numbers that Shevardnadze had proposed that morning were not in the ballpark. But we were prepared to consider a package along the following lines:

—An agreed number per bomber;

—No 1,100 sublimit;

—Attribution of 10 ALCM’s to each heavy bomber equipped to carry ALCM’s;

We understood the Soviet point on the need to distinguish between ALCM heavy bombers and systems not constrained by the Treaty, the Secretary continued. There were basically three situations which had to be considered: nuclear ALCM-carrying heavy bombers; non-ALCM bombers carrying other nuclear weapons; and conventionally equipped bombers. We were prepared to talk about means of distinguishing between the three systems. What we could end up with would be something like the bomber counting rule which had been agreed in Reykjavik.

The number we had chosen, 10, accurately reflected the loadings our bombers would normally carry. The protocol would provide a regime for verifying their basic capacity. Just as there would be no limit on the number of conventionally equipped bombers in each side’s inventory, there would be no limit on ALCM inventories. Rather, the number would be based on the capabilities of the aircraft equipped to carry them.

This, the Secretary concluded, was our proposal on ALCM’s. If there were agreement on a counting rule and verification scheme, the issue could be disposed of.

SHEVARDNADZE asked how the right solution could be found. KARPOV pointed out that B–52’s normally carried 12 ALCM’s. Why was the U.S. proposing they be counted as carrying only 10? SHEVARDNADZE asked if agreed verification procedures would help.

THE SECRETARY said that was exactly what needed to be explored. Each side needed to be able to verify that 10 was the number that the aircraft was equipped to carry. This could be given to the working groups.

KARPOV asked what would happen if it were determined that the aircraft could carry more than 10 ALCM’s.

THE SECRETARY said that one would have to look at how they were configured, and, if necessary, configure them in such a way that 10 was the right number.

KARPOV pointed out that the Soviet “Bear” bomber could carry no more than 6 ALCM’s. THE SECRETARY said the U.S. should have stayed with its original ALCM counting figure. KARPOV said at least that would have been right for Soviet bombers. SHEVARDNADZE said that the counting rule should be based on the load for which a bomber was equipped.

POWELL said that what was needed was an understanding on what the expected load would be. We had set the number 10. KARPOV asked if that was the average or planned capability. Powell said it was “planned.” But the working group could discuss this.

THE SECRETARY said that he assumed the Soviet side designed its aircraft for different configurations, depending on their missions. Verification regimes would have to be developed to determine how the relevant bombers were configured. We would be configured to carry 10 ALCM’s There would be a regime to verify that.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the issue be referred to experts. THE SECRETARY agreed.

SLCM’s

On SLCM’s, the Secretary said that he had listened carefully to the ideas Shevardnadze had presented. It was clear that Moscow had given the matter a lot of thought. We would look at what had been proposed, but were unable to say more at this time.

Mobile ICBM’s

As for mobile missiles, the Secretary had noted in Moscow that the very features which made them attractive from a survivability standpoint made them a problem from the standpoint of verifiability. We had some ideas, which the Secretary was prepared to share on a preliminary basis. Some seemed to coincide with ideas the Soviet side had put forward.

What we had in mind was to build on the basic START verification arrangments—data exchanges, short notice OSI, perimeter/portal monitoring of missile production facilities, suspect-site inspection, etc. To this, the U.S. would add specific provisions for monitoring deployed mobile ICBM’s, taking into account their unique characteristics. For example, mobile ICBM’s and their launchers would be confined to restricted areas. They would be subject to periodic inspection by enhanced NTM and OSI. Missiles and launchers could depart this area only with prior notification, and only a small portion of the force could be away at any given time. As an exception, dispersal would be permitted in certain limited conditions. Their return would be confirmed by NTM and OSI. There would be simultaneous notification at the time of the dispersal. The reason for the dispersal would be provided.

The problem of monitoring non-deployed mobile ICBM’s was another difficult challenge, which would require further measures. Shevardnadze had suggested this morning that all such missiles would be confined to storage areas removed from operational bases. This would amount to a kind of “zero option,” except in the designated areas. This was something we could think about.

If adequate verification methods could be found, the Secretary said, the U.S. was ready to consider modification of its insistence on a mobile missile ban. In this case, there would obviously have to be a sublimit. Shevardnadze that morning had spoken of 800 launchers, but there would have to be a warhead figure as well. We felt that number should be small. 800 times any figure looked on the high side.

After consultation with Bessmertnykh, SHEVARDNADZE said that most of the missiles involved would carry only a single warhead. THE SECRETARY said that warheads would have to be limited along with launchers. SHEVARDNADZE added that it would all have to be verifiable.

Sublimits

Moving on to sublimits, THE SECRETARY said he had thought that the only additional sublimit issue had to do with ground-based ICBM’s. We recalled Akhromeyev’s statement that the Soviet Union did not intend to field more than 3,000 ICBM’s, 3,300 at the outside. So we had the impression that figure was acceptable to Moscow.

The U.S. had always been unwilling to equate ICBM’s with SLBM’s because of command and control considerations and the different “on station” ratios of the two types of systems. That morning, Shevardnadze had linked the two. We could not agree to that. If the Soviet side would accept the 3,300/3,000 ICBM figure, and the 1,100 ALCM bomber number fell away, we could close out the sublimit issue.

The Secretary put down a marker on suspect-site inspections under a START treaty. The basic concept had been agreed at the Washington summit. It seemed to us that the main task for such inspections should be to give confidence that the other side was not covertly producing, storing or deploying ballistic missiles or launchers beyond what was permitted by the treaty. We were not yet ready to put forward detailed ideas on this, but perhaps the ministers could address the subject during their April meeting.

SHEVARDNADZE said he had already addressed the question of a sublimit for ICBM’s and SLBM’s. It should be 3,300.

THE SECRETARY said that the problem was that it applied to both types of systems. ICBM’s could not be equated with SLBM’s.

SHEVARDNADZE said that in that case there should be simple freedom to mix within the 4,900 ballistic missile sublimit.

THE SECRETARY said that that would be the practical effect of the 3,300 limit, since, as Akhromeyev had said, the Soviet Union had no plans to exceed that figure. ICBM’s warranted special consideration, in our view, because of their unique characteristics. There were strong views on this point in the U.S. Senate, he added.

KARPOV noted that the Secretary’s quoting Akhromeyev did not remove from the agenda the need for an SLCM sublimit. The alternative was no new sublimit. The U.S. proposal for an ICBM sublimit was unfair in that 80% of the Soviet arsenal was deployed on such systems.

BESSMERTNYKH wondered, if the U.S. were to ask an “Akhromeyev” of its own how many SLCM’s the U.S. intended to build, how he would respond.

THE SECRETARY quipped that “ours” wouldn’t answer.

KARPOV noted that the U.S. and Soviet Union each had about 6,400 warheads on, respectively, SLBM’s and ICBM’s. The Soviet proposal would cut both by half.

THE SECRETARY said that was just a coincidence of numbers. The 3,300 ICBM sublimit was equitable in that it applied to both sides. SLBM’s were qualitatively different because of the factors the Secretary had mentioned.

KARPOV pointed out that American SLBM’s had a far higher “on station” ratio than their Soviet counterparts. The U.S. had 6,400 SLBM warheads; the Soviet Union only 2,400. But the Soviet side had more ICBM warheads. There were real structural differences, but the two sides were in relatively the same position with respect to the number of warheads on American SLBM’s and Soviet ICBM’s.

THE SECRETARY observed that both sides would be limited by the 4,900 sublimit. Both would be limited by the desire to have more than one ballistic missile leg. They were historically different structures. But that did not change the fact that there were qualitative differences between ICBM’s and SLBM’s. The Secretary had thought this issue was resolved in Moscow. He was surprised it had resurfaced.

KARPOV said there had been no change in the Soviet position. SHEVARDNADZE said that experts should work on the problem.

Defense and Space

THE SECRETARY agreed, noting that he had some material on defense and space. He and Shevardnadze had gotten into the subject a bit the night before. The Secretary had asked Kampelman to look into the problem. Perhaps the ministers could see what, if anything, he had been able to accomplish.

KARPOV said he that, when he and Kampelman had spoken at lunch, Kampelman had said that the working group was dealing with the problem. But, Karpov said, the working groups could reach no conclusions. Kampelman had made some personal suggestions, which, since they were personal, Karpov did not feel comfortable commenting on. But, so far, the working groups had made no progress.

THE SECRETARY suggested that Kampelman and Obukhov be invited to join the group, and they were sent for.

SHEVARDNADZE said he wanted to emphasize the fundamental importance of this question. He had set forth Moscow’s views the day before, but could repeat them if necessary.

THE SECRETARY said he had listened the day before, but was not in a position to respond in detail. He suggested that the ministers hear from the experts.

When Kampelman and Obukhov arrived, the Secretary asked if he could state the problem. The two sides, he said, agreed on the language of the Washington Summit Statement. That language, assuming the duration of the non-withdrawal period were agreed and the issue of the supreme national interest clause resolved, left ambiguity as to what actions were to be conducted during the non-withdrawal period. The two sides had different views on this point. The Soviet side said, in effect, “Let it ride.” We felt the need for greater clarity. Otherwise, any strategic withdrawal schedule which might be agreed to would be made hostage to potential disagreements over how research on strategic defense was to be conducted. So there was a need to clarify this ambiguity.

The Secretary had thought that Shevardnadze’s comments in Moscow on the need for work on the verification aspects of the Washington statement could be useful in this regard. The Soviet side had put forward some predictability ideas, and we had welcomed them. We had some ideas of our own on how to reduce or eliminate the ambiguity in the Washington statement. The Secretary asked Kampelman to comment.

SHEVARDNADZE asked to speak first. He agreed with the Secretary that the Washington Summit Statement language was good. Indeed, it could not be improved upon. The only addition he had ever mentioned had to do with the need to give the document a legally binding character. Moscow had since given the matter much thought, and could now agree with the U.S. that this should take the form of a separate agreement.

As for the non-withdrawal period, this should be regarded by both sides as a period to ensure stability and predictability during the process of reducing strategic arms. This would comprise both the reduction period itself and a period during which negotiations would take place on future arrangements. For Moscow, the obligation not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty during this period should be unconditional. As to the period of non-withdrawal, the U.S. in Moscow had said it should be longer than the reduction period itself. The Soviet side agreed. It was now ready to accept the U.S. proposal for a seven year reduction period. That would mean that the total duration of the non-withdrawal period would be nine or ten years.

It was true, Shevardnadze continued, that confidence that both sides would observe the ABM Treaty as signed during this period could be enhanced by verification measures. The Soviet side had thus proposed an exchange of information to clarify ambiguous sites. They attached much importance to this proposal. It would involve notification of permitted activities, as well as on-site inspections of facilities as necessary to satisfy concerns. A special protocol could be drawn up to this effect. Full use would also be made of the SCC, which should deal not only with past compliance questions, but seek to prevent the emergence of new concerns. Taken as a whole, such measures would significantly enhance confidence that the ABM Treaty was being observed.

What was not needed, Shevardnadze said, was new language. The General Secretary and President, with the help of those in the room, had succeeded in hammering out a formula. Now totally new elements were being added. This was totally inadmissible if one were serious about reducing strategic arms.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed with the way Shevardnadze had formulated the problem, particularly with respect to verification. At the same time, the Secretary believed it was possible to add verification provisions which would further reduce ambiguity. We wanted to discuss this problem. We would like to see less contention in the SCC, with its associated fall-out on a possible strategic arms reduction schedule.

The Secretary said we also had to insist that our standard supreme national interest language be included in an agreement. It was in all our agreements. We were prepared to say that this right would not be exercised on the grounds that development of strategic defense systems in themselves were a matter of supreme national interest.

The Secretary noted that he had raised these two issues with General Secretary Gorbachev in Moscow, and had thought that discussion had cleared the air. The first, verification, was very important, and we realized we owed the Soviet side some ideas. In that context, he would ask Ambassador Kampelman to speak.

KAMPELMAN said that, based on his discussion with Karpov, it was the Soviet view that any attempt to agree on language beyond that of the Washington Summit Statement would complicate matters for two reasons. First, it would be time consuming, and might not be done in a reasonable time. Second, the issues themselves created new problems which could not be resolved in the near future. If that perception were accurate, the Secretary was correct when he suggested that any words on which agreement might be reached would be interpreted differently by each side.

Over lunch, Karpov had told Kampelman that Moscow would like the words of the Washington statement to mean that the U.S. would restrict SDI. Whether he actually said that or not was not the point. That was clearly the objective. If the U.S. intended to proceed with its SDI program—and it did—it would be misleading to sign an agreement which would certainly lead to tension at a later date. We did not need a formula which would guarantee future arguments. We wanted one which would minimize them.

Kampelman said he had taken the liberty of trying out on Karpov some ideas, which he had shared with U.S. scientists, for dealing with the problem. Karpov had resisted the ideas, on grounds that they would be troublesome to work out, and take time. Kampelman would be glad to summarize them.

The first was that, since the Soviet Union was concerned by U.S. defensive programs—and vice versa—perhaps there could be an exchange of information on what each side was planning. Moscow might find that some of our plans were not so troublesome as it thought.

The second idea was to try to separate weapons out of our planning. It was possible, Kampelman pointed out, to distinguish between weapons and sensors. The two sides might agree that during the non-withdrawal period neither side would deploy or test space-based weapons. This, too, could give some confidence.

Kampelman noted that there might be other approaches he had not thought of. The point of the exercise, he stressed, would be to avoid arguments which would break out as soon as a piece of paper were signed. The idea would be to see if mutually acceptable arrangements could be worked out, without trying to resolve all the possible questions. That would take too long. Rather than argue over what had been signed in 1972, we should try to address what was in each side’s interest today.

SHEVARDNADZE said that these ideas would have to be discussed. KARPOV suggested that he and Kampelman be excused to do so. THE SECRETARY said he hoped it would advance things to have heard some of our ideas. SHEVARDNADZE said it was the first time he had heard of the notion of singling out sensors. Kampelman said it might prove to be a terrible idea, but it could be explored.

SHEVARDNADZE said he wanted to remind the Secretary of one thing. When the Soviet side had agreed in Washington to the 4,900 sublimit, it had said that the formula on observance of the ABM Treaty was the final word, which could not be appealed. Now the U.S. was seeking new language.

THE SECRETARY said the U.S. stood by the words of the Washington Statement. We were simply acknowledging that, in the area of what was permitted during the non-withdrawal period, there was room for differences of interpretation. We wanted to clarify that. With this exception, the Washington language served both sides well. And even in the area of permitted activities, it provided a good start.

KAMPELMAN said he looked upon what the U.S. was trying to do in Geneva as carrying out the Washington Statement’s charge. It was in no way an attempt to backtrack on what was signed. KARPOV said that much could be said on this point, but that the ministers’ time should not be taken up with it.

SHEVARDNADZE said that this was a question that needed to be resolved before he left. If it were not, the two sides would have to recognize that there would be no strategic arms agreement.

THE SECRETARY said the U.S. might be able to make additional proposals along the lines of those Kampelman had outlined. He hoped the Soviet side would be receptive. But it would be unwise to proceed with an agreement with built-in ambiguities on observance of the ABM Treaty. The ambiguity had to be removed.

POWELL reminded Shevardnadze that the issue had emerged within a week after the Washington summit. Congress had been promised the ambiguity would be cleared up. THE SECRETARY reiterated that we were prepared to share ideas on how this might be done.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that Kampelman and Karpov should get to work—and quickly.

Nuclear Testing

Moving to nuclear testing, SHEVARDNADZE noted that he and the Secretary had discussed the issue the previous evening.³ The Soviet side believed that it was desirable to accelerate activity with respect both to a verification protocol and the joint verification experiment (JVE). Was there any need to revisit the issue? Or should the ministers await a report from working groups?

THE SECRETARY said that he had had a preliminary report from Ambassador Holmes. Holmes had indicated it might be possible to prepare a protocol for the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) and to complete a detailed plan and schedule for the JVE by the April ministerial meeting. By the time the JVE took place, it might prove possible to draft a protocol for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), although it would probably contain brackets. Both sides were ready to do the experiment as soon as possible. We still believed, however, that it could not be done before mid-June; the Soviet side was saying late May. In either case, it would be too late for the summit. This seemed to lead to the conclusion that the idea the ministers had discussed in Moscow of having the TTBT and PNET ratified by the summit could be ruled out.

The Secretary reiterated the U.S. view that a verification protocol could be worked out and signed in advance of the JVE if the Soviet side agreed to routine use by the U.S. of CORRTEX. But Moscow had taken the position that the test had to take place first. That ruled out the track that Shevardnadze and the Secretary had discussed in Moscow. This would make for a less impressive nuclear testing package for the May summit.

The Secretary speculated that in the Soviet Union, as in the U.S., there were differences of opinion among the community interested in nuclear testing. Those involved in weapons production wanted no restrictions; others did. In the U.S., we had broken the tension between the two groups, and were in a position to go for new protocols. The Soviet side did not appear to have accomplished this.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Moscow could easily revert to its former position—that there should be a complete ban on nuclear testing. THE SECRETARY suggested it do so, if it thought it a good idea.

SHEVARDNADZE said he personally did not know whether it was possible to complete the protocols without conducting the experiment. The Soviet side had agreed that the U.S. could use CORRTEX on a quota basis. But it was unclear whether the protocols could be wrapped up without the experiment. His concern was that the treaties might not be ratifiable unless the necessary technical work had been done.

KARPOV claimed that U.S. nuclear testing negotiator Robinson had stated that it would be impossible to ratify treaties without technically convincing verification protocols. But there were real practical difficulties to overcome. The U.S. and Soviet test ranges used different dimensions for their test holes and equipment. But CORRTEX would only work if conditions were similar. This made calibration tests necessary.

SHEVARDNADZE asked if it would be possible to produce a document on nuclear testing for signature at the summit. KARPOV said it would be if the right approach were adopted. One way would be to set forth in a draft protocol that the specifics of verification methods would depend upon the results of the JVE. Protocols for both the TTBT and PNET could be readily prepared on that basis. The Soviet side had provided a step-by-step schedule for conducting a JVE at its Semipalatinsk range by May 28. If pushed, that schedule could be compressed to test by May 25. But U.S. experts still believed that no test could take place before June or July.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that experts could be tasked with preparing a proposal for parallel efforts on a JVE and verification protocol, taking into account the objective of signing at a summit.

THE SECRETARY asked if what Karpov had suggested envisioned completion by the summit of verification protocols and documents describing the JVE.

KARPOV said his proposal was that verification protocols be prepared for signing with the understanding that an additional “technical” protocol would be appended after the JVE.

POWELL asked if Karpov meant that the two sides would simply sign at the summit a statement describing how far they had gotten.

KARPOV said he was proposing that the two sides prepare verification protocols for each of the two treaties. At the same time, the details of a JVE would be negotiated. The protocols could be formulated in such a way as to lay out the basic principles on which verification would be based. They would also specify that actual verification procedures would be developed on the basis of the JVE, and that additional documents outlining such procedures would become an integral part of the verification protocol. When the treaties were subsequently presented for ratification, they would include the texts of the treaties themselves, the verification protocols, and the documents detailing the verification methodology.

THE SECRETARY said this could be explored. He would want to hear his experts’ opinion as to the practicality of the approach. POWELL agreed that the working groups should look at Karpov’s idea closely. SHEVARDNADZE said he thought the working groups were already working in this direction.

Chemical Weapons

SHEVARDNADZE asked the Secretary if he had anything to say on Chemical Weapons (CW).

THE SECRETARY said he was not certain what kind of progress the working group was making. In general, the U.S. was proceeding on the assumption that there should be a global ban on chemical weapons as soon as possible. That was the object. At the moment, it was important to address certain key problems—verification issues, CBM’s, engaging third countries. The U.S. considered the Soviet proposal for trying out verification techniques in advance to be a good one. We were discussing how to respond in the Western working group in Geneva. As for stockpile size, we needed to have more than raw numbers; issues like distribution of stocks were also important. So this was a subject we were working hard on, and would continue to do so.

SHEVARDNADZE said that he thought bilateral discussion on the margins of the Conference on Disarmament were going well, adding that he had some additional questions. First, did the U.S. agree that there should be mandatory challenge inspections, regardless of the facility involved?

THE SECRETARY replied that that was the U.S. position.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Moscow had not been certain that that was the case. He acknowledged that the U.S. had once advocated such a view, but pointed out that that was before the Soviet side had endorsed the concept. The idea was basically a British one; if the U.S. supported it, that was good. KARPOV asked the Secretary to confirm that there had been no change in the U.S. position.

THE SECRETARY said there had not been. Some countries were uneasy with the concept, but the U.S. supported it.

SHEVARDNADZE asked if the U.S. agreed that all participants in a CW convention should have equal rights to issue inspection challenges. Perhaps, he added, this question was better addressed to working groups.

THE SECRETARY agreed that that would be a better way to proceed. As a matter of general principle, the concept appeared valid, but it would have to be managed to be workable. Perhaps something along the lines of the NPT regime should be the model.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed to defer the matter to working groups. In Moscow, he added, the Soviet side had made a number of proposals on CW, e.g., that experts should meet on a regular basis between rounds in Geneva, and that verification techniques should be tried out in advance of agreement on a convention. Perhaps the U.S. would have some response to these proposals.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that he had already indicated that we thought the idea of trouble-shooting verification techniques was a good one.

SHEVARDNADZE reminded the Secretary that another Soviet proposal in Moscow had been for a U.S.-Soviet statement on CW at the summit. Such a statement could have a strong positive effect on prospects for reaching agreement in Geneva. The Soviet side had drafted a possible joint statement which it could give the U.S. Maybe it would be possible to agree on a text in April.

THE SECRETARY said that he believed that the more we could pin down in advance for the summit, the better. This might be something in that category. We would look at the Soviet draft, and be ready with our own ideas. The Secretary recalled that the Washington Joint Statement had referred to CW. It would be well to go beyond the language of that statement, if possible.

SHEVARDNADZE said that he dwelt on CW because it was possible that a START agreement might not be reached in time for the Moscow summit. If so, what would be the result of the President’s visit? Issues like nuclear testing and CW could play a role.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed. That was one reason we had been pushing on nuclear testing. In the same context, he continued, we should also give some attention to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting. It would be well to have some results to point to—along with our allies—on conventional arms.

SHEVARDNADZE said that he would have something to say on that in a moment. Returning to the Soviet proposal for testing CW verification techniques, he explained that it would be a good idea for both sides to gain experience with the procedures involved. Each side should thus choose a typical, non-military facility.

THE SECRETARY said he understood the concept. SHEVARDNADZE said, “OK, so we agree.”

Moving on to conventional arms, Shevardnadze observed that the problem was becoming increasingly topical. Shevardnadze had followed closely NATO’s discussion of the problem in Brussels. Certain trends were emerging. They had been touched on by Defense Ministers the week before.

The Soviet side had a new proposal: by a date certain, the members of the Warsaw Pact and NATO should publish data on their armed forces and main types of armaments. Each side would publish data on not only its own armed forces, but those of the other alliance. Perhaps in mid-April, there could be an initial meeting between members of both groupings to negotiate the categories of data to be published. Publication itself might take place in mid-May. The data would cover the area from the Atlantic to the Urals. It could be broken down by regions—Central Europe, Southern Europe, Northern Europe. Publication of such data would create a solid basis for negotiations on reduction of conventional arms in Europe. This would be helpful in terms of reaching agreement on a negotiating mandate in Vienna.

Shevardnadze noted that he had heard many charges that the Soviet Union published inadequate or inaccurate data, that there were major asymmetries in conventional force balances. He proposed that the cards be put on the table up front, before conventional arms negotiations began.

THE SECRETARY said that the idea was an interesting one. We would discuss it with our allies.

As for the Vienna meeting, we needed to find a way to end it appropriately. That meant first of all, finding a mandate for conventional stability talks. Second, it meant a balanced outcome on the human rights side. To leap-frog over the second presented a serious problem. That was why the Vienna meeting should not go on forever, although we were prepared to stay as long as necessary to get the right results. It was the Secretary’s sense that the elements of a conventional mandate were falling into place, but that prospects for a satisfactory human rights outcome were receding. We had to push hard in Vienna to bring it to a proper conclusion.

SHEVARDNADZE said that human rights had been discussed earlier in the day. As for the conventional arms mandate, the Soviet side had presented a good formula in Vienna. He suggested that the U.S. and Soviet delegations work more closely to develop mutually acceptable language. Maybe it would be possible to create a group to expedite the process. It could work in Washington, Moscow, Vienna, . . . wherever. But the process needed to be accelerated.

Shevardnadze asked that the Secretary not simply turn aside his idea for publicizing conventional arms data. The mandate and data questions were related. There was a lot of discussion in the West about the need to “compensate” for the withdrawal of Pershing II’s. There were many mistaken impressions with respect to alleged asymmetries. It might be that they did not exist. Focusing on data would not mean ignoring work on a mandate in Vienna; the Soviets wanted to accelerate work there.

THE SECRETARY observed that Ambassador Ridgway had spoken to Ambassador Zimmermann that morning. Zimmermann said the situation in Vienna was not good. The human rights language being considered did not go as far as in Madrid, Helsinki, or even Bern. There was thus little reason for the optimism Shevardnadze had expressed with respect to quick action on a mandate.

SHEVARDNADZE asked why the U.S. was not happy with the Swiss package. RIDGWAY said its language was weak. It had been designed as a foundation on which to build, and, due to Soviet intransigence, had languished for weeks. Moscow had accepted it at the last minute.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Moscow had accepted the package nonetheless. How could progress be made if, each time the Soviets accepted something, there was nothing but complaints? The Soviets had had to study the package carefully. It carried important implications for Soviet domestic legislation. But it had accepted the package. Shevardnadze could remind the U.S., if he chose, of the 34 to 1 result in Bern, but he would not dwell on that. The Soviets had met the deadline for accepting the Swiss package. But even if it proved impossible to agree on language in Vienna, should that hold up conventional arms talks?

THE SECRETARY said that was the U.S. view. CSCE was a balanced process. Its human rights aspects were fundamental to security. The kind of openness and freedom of movement foreseen in the Final Act would, if they were given free play, cause many military issues to fall away. So we insisted on a balanced outcome which addressed our human rights concerns. That was why we believed that any statement which came out of Vienna be an improvement over past documents. But the most important thing was to implement what had already been agreed to. The two ministers had talked about this that morning.

SHEVARDNADZE said that he had no objection to this approach. There was an interrelationship between human rights and security. There was no disagreement on the need to address human rights and humanitarian issues. The Soviet Union was in favor of contacts and exchanges of visits. But it should not be an either/or proposition. Moscow had now agreed to the Swiss package. Movement on a conventional arms mandate should follow. The Soviet proposal for publicizing data was designed to promote such movement.

If such a proposal was unacceptable to the U.S., there should be intensified direct work on a mandate. THE SECRETARY and RIDGWAY pointed out that work was being done in other fora. SHEVARDNADZE countered that no mandate was in sight. Additional work was necessary on a bilateral basis. The Soviet side had thought some progress had been made during the Secretary’s last trip to Moscow, but Ambassador Ledogar had walked back what had been agreed in Moscow.

THE SECRETARY said he thought that bilateral consultations on conventional issues were proceeding satisfactorily. We were prepared to work on this, in close coordination with our allies. We should try to resolve our differences on substance.

SHEVARDNADZE said that this was what he was proposing. It would be good if the two sides could agree to intensify bilateral issues.

Naval Limitations

Shevardnadze said he wanted to raise a new issue, one which he had not discussed before with the Secretary—constraints on naval activities. This was a question of growing concern. Defense Ministers had touched on it the week before. The world was witnessing a continuous build-up of naval forces without any limits, even as efforts were made to bound other areas of the arms race. The Soviet side proposed for consideration the creation of an international forum or conference on naval constraints. It would involve large naval powers like the U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K. and France.

Shevardnadze recalled that limits on naval activities had been proposed by Gorbachev in his Murmansk and Belgrade speeches.⁴ The Soviet Union had earlier made similar proposals with respect to the Indian Ocean, which had been endorsed by the United Nations. Unfortunately, there had been no movement in this area. Shevardnadze said he could understand that this might be a problem for the U.S., but it was an issue which had to be taken up at some time.

THE SECRETARY said he had listened to what Shevardnadze had said. He would take the matter up with U.S. military leaders. He doubted, however, that the Navy would think much of the idea.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Moscow had anticipated this when it made the decision to make its proposal. But one way or another, the issue had to be addressed. The prospect of a second Stockholm CBM’s conference was not so remote. If, after the Vienna meeting, a second conference on CBM’s got underway, naval activities would be impossible to ignore. It made sense to get naval experts on both sides together now to begin to work on the problem. Even though the issue might not now seem urgent, it could not be postponed.

Shevardnadze noted that Gorbachev had recently proposed a major reduction in naval forces confronting one another in the Mediterranean. He had proposed the elimination of all ships capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The Yugoslavs had made a complementary call for a freeze on combatants. If the Soviet proposal was not acceptable, the Yugoslav should be. Perhaps experts could get to work on that proposal.

THE SECRETARY noted that Shevardnadze had spoken in terms of two different kinds of discussions: one on “Stockholm-type” CBM’s; the other on physical limits of the sort Gorbachev had suggested. The Secretary was glad Shevardnadze had raised the issue. It helped to put Soviet thinking in perspective. The Secretary suspected that the U.S. Navy would be more receptive to Shevardnadze’s ideas on CBM’s than to physical limits. CBM’s could be useful, the Secretary concluded, noting the key role he and Shevardnadze had played in the Stockholm end game.

SHEVARDNADZE said it was wrong to counterpose the two elements of the Soviet proposal. The Stockholm CBM’s amounted to inspections. The Soviet side had agreed to set aside their demands that naval forces be constrained in Stockholm, but had not given up the idea of constraints.

THE SECRETARY said he was only drawing a distinction between Stockholm-type CBM’s and the kinds of restraints on conventional forces which might be covered once a mandate were agreed to in Vienna. With respect to naval forces, a similar distinction could be made.

SHEVARDNADZE clarified that Gorbachev’s proposals envisioned reductions only if there were adequate inspections. There was no tension between the two.

THE SECRETARY said he understood. Stockholm I, he added, had been a breakthrough on the concept of on-site inspection (OSI). We had built on that concept in negotiating the INF agreement, just as we would build on INF in START.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that a good basis had been created. The Soviet side had had to work very hard to bring their military along on the INF Treaty verification provisions. The military had reacted strongly on the question of inspections. But now they were used to it. It was becoming routine. Naval commanders could get used to the idea as well.

THE SECRETARY said he doubted it, quipping that the U.S. Navy didn’t even let our Air Force on its ships. POWELL seconded this.

Noting that time had run out, the Secretary suggested that Press Secretaries be called in to discuss what might be given the media that evening. After agreeing that the two sides would simply describe organizational arrangements, and list areas covered during the course of the day’s discussions, the meeting adjourned.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, 3/88 Washington/Shultz—Shevardnadze. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris.The meeting took place in Shultz’s outer office at the Department of State.
2. See Document 133.
3. See Document 132.
4. See footnote 5, Document 82. In a March 16 address to the Yugoslav Parliament, Gorbachev called for a freeze on and eventual withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean.