Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

283. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 23, 1988, 8:45–10:50 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• US Side

  • Amb Nitze
  • Amb Kampelman
  • Col Linhard
  • Amb Rowny
  • Amb Hamner
  • Amb Cooper
  • Amb Lehman
  • Gen Burns
  • ADM Howe
  • Mr. Harrison
  • Mr. Graham
  • Mr. Joseph
  • Mr. Foley
  • Mr. Castillo
  • Mr. Timbie
  • Ms. Moon
  • Mr. Stafford
  • Mr. McConnell
  • Mr. Farr
  • Mr. Korobovsky

• Soviet Side

  • Amb Obukhov
  • Amb Masterkov
  • Amb Kuznetsov
  • Gen Chervov
  • Gen Lebedev
  • Mr. Khromov
  • Mr. Koltunov
  • Mr. Khripunov
  • Mr. Korchikov

Nitze began by outlining the US position on mobile ICBMs. He said that in Moscow the two sides had a good discussion of the conflicting considerations regarding mobile ICBMs. On the one hand, the features that contributed to survivability made verification very difficult; on the other hand, it made no sense to design a verification scheme that unduly compromised the survivability of these missiles. Nevertheless, the US side had said that, if the verification problem could be resolved, we would be prepared to reconsider our position on banning mobile ICBMs, and that, if permitted, mobile ICBMs would need to be tightly constrained.

Nitze said that the US had reviewed the ideas tabled by the Soviet side in Geneva on mobile ICBM verification. We now had some ideas of our own for a mobile ICBM verification package and were prepared to sketch out in a preliminary way the approach we had in mind. Our approach would build on the basic START verification arrangements—data exchange, short-notice OSI, perimeter/portal monitoring of missile production facilities, suspect-site inspection, etc. To this, we would add provisions for monitoring deployed mobile ICBMs such as the following:

Mobile ICBMs and their launchers would be confined to restricted areas. In these areas, they would be subject to periodic inspection by enhanced NTM and OSI.

Missiles and launchers could depart these areas only with prior notification, and only a small portion of the force could be away at any given time.

As an exception, dispersal would be permitted in certain limited circumstances. The return of the missiles and launchers would be confirmed by NTM and OSI. There would be simultaneous notification at the time of the dispersal. The reason for the dispersal would be provided at an appropriate time.

Nitze said that monitoring non-deployed mobile ICBMs was another difficult challenge that would require further measures. If the two sides could agree on specific measures that would provide for effective verification, then we could consider allowing a strictly limited number of mobile ICBMs.

Obukhov replied that the ideas presented by Ambassador Nitze would be studied by the Soviet side, particularly within the context of the goals of the START Treaty and of permitting the survivability of mobile ICBM launchers. He added that the Soviet side would have additional ideas to explore on this issue later in this session, but that he would prefer to allow the US side to say what it had to say on this and other issues first, given the little time available.

Nitze then proceeded to the subject of sublimits. He said the two sides had come a long way on warhead sublimits and it was time to finish the job. The US had dropped its 1650 sublimit, and understood the Soviet side was prepared to drop its 1100 sublimit in the context of agreement on how to count ALCMs. This would leave us with one last pending sublimit, that for ICBM warheads.

On this subject, Nitze continued, we had given much thought to the concerns Marshal Akhromeyev expressed in our meetings in Geneva and Washington. But the Soviet side should also realize the importance of this issue to the US, especially as we contemplate the treaty ratification process. The important thing to the US is that we be assured that the Soviet Union would not exceed 3300 ICBM warheads if there were a START agreement. Akhromeyev had told us in Washington that, in fact, the Soviet Union would not exceed such a level.

If we could record this fact, the problem would be resolved. Obviously, the most straightforward way would be to include this as a sublimit, but we were prepared to consider other ways to establish that neither side would deploy more than 3300 ICBM RVs.

Nitze concluded by adding that, as the US side had frequently said, we did not believe that sublimits on SLBMs would be appropriate.

Obukhov replied that the question of sublimits was indeed ripe for solution, with due regard for understandings reached last December in Washington. Taking into account the ideas presented by both sides after the Washington summit, the Soviets now proposed the following:

For ALCMs, that the missiles on each type of heavy bomber be counted in accordance with the maximum number it is equipped to carry with a range capability of more than 600 kilometers. Specifically, this meant setting limits for each type of heavy bomber as follows—for B–52s, 28; for B–1s, 22.

If this solution were adopted, Obukhov said, the Soviet side would not insist on the 1100 limit on ALCMs and other types of heavy bomber armaments.

On the question of sublimits for ICBM and SLBM warheads, the Soviet side proposed a sublimit of 3300 on warheads of ICBMs or SLBMs, combined with 1100 ALCMs and other heavy bomber armaments.

An alternative approach would be that each side would retain the right to determine for itself the correlation or ratio of warheads on ICBMs or SLBMs.

Thus, Obukhov concluded, the Soviet side was proposing several options, convinced that each would ensure a mutually acceptable resolution of the issue.

Nitze said that, with respect to ALCMs on heavy bombers, Obukhov had provided numbers for the US bombers, but not for Soviet bombers. Could he provide them now?

Obukhov replied that, at this stage, he did not have those figures, but the Soviet side would be willing to consider any US suggestions on the matter. Clearly, figures for both sides would be specified in any Treaty.

Nitze reminded Obukhov that the US side had suggested that each ALCM carrying heavy bomber be counted as having ten ALCMs against the 6000 warhead ceiling.

Obukhov responded that the coefficient suggested by the US side had been discussed yesterday, and that it seemed there were still differences between the two sides. While the Soviet side favored counting those long-range ALCMs for which heavy bombers were really equipped, the US proposal was based on different principles.

The Soviets had in mind a counting rule for each heavy bomber that reflected the maximum extent possible it could be equipped with long range ALCMs. Speaking candidly, he had to say the Soviet approach was more accurate, precise and fair. It would take into account all long-range ALCMs a side might deploy on heavy bombers. As Nitze knew, the Soviet side had also proposed a verification package which would make it possible to reliably verify the limits they had proposed.

Nitze said that the two sides had been discussing this issue since 1968, or at least the Spring of 1969. The original US view was that bombers and defenses against bombers should not be included in the negotiations. The US had finally agreed to the Soviet desire to limit bombers, but air defenses had never been limited, and remained uncontrolled.

This, in turn, raised the problem of trying to weigh the value of bombers against that of missiles. It was an understatement of relative value to say the MX and the heavy bomber should count one to one. Nitze believed the US proposal was imminently fair.

He did not, however, believe the sides could resolve this problem today, and he suggested they move on to the subject of SLCMs.

Admiral Howe added that he was disappointed in the Soviet reaction to the US proposal for counting ALCMs. It appeared to him that the discussion had retrogressed, in particular with regard to the Soviet return to the 3300 sublimit on ICBM and SLBM warheads.

Obukhov responded that it would be erroneous to consider the discussion a retrogressive step. The Soviet side had some time ago proposed a limit of 1100 on heavy bomber armaments, and the US side had expressed its doubts. The Soviets were now doing their best to find a solution to this and other problems, and they expected the American side carefully to study the proposals and give a positive reply.

With respect to air defenses and limits on heavy bombers and their armaments, it was true that the US side had raised these issues long ago, but attempts now to include air defenses in these talks could hardly be considered helpful. Also, it was not justifiable to subdivide strategic arms into types some of which allegedly may be less destabilizing than others. The US is concerned about mobile ICBMs. The Soviet side also has a serious concern with US heavy bombers, in particular given the fact that US forward bases and forward-based systems encircle the Soviet Union.

Obukhov continued that the only correct way out was to try and find objective criteria for counting the respective armaments of each side. For long-range ALCMs, he believed the criterion should be, to the extent possible, the real equipment of heavy bombers for such missiles. Otherwise, we would inevitably face the possibility of more imbalances emerging, in this case in favor of the US. Such a development would work to neither side’s advantage; it would undermine the viability of the Treaty.

Nitze repeated that the two sides had discussed these views for many years. He believed they were thoroughly understood on both sides, but that both sides would continue to work toward a more stable situation.

Obukhov said the START Treaty could reduce the risk of conflict only if its limits were fair and equal for both sides, and the military-strategic balance were maintained, subject to strict verification which could provide confidence that obligations were observed. The Soviet side had presented far-reaching proposals, such as test flights for inspectors, with inspectors operating both on the ground and in the planes.

Nitze said he believed the sides had made great progress in reducing the risk of war, and that they would make more progress. He suggested they go on to the next subject.

Obukhov agreed that this was just the right moment to proceed to SLCMs.

Nitze said the US had given careful study to the SLCM verification ideas the Soviet side had provided in Washington, and we did not see how they could work as a reliable means of verification.

Obukhov asked whether Nitze was referring to proposals from yesterday’s meeting.

Nitze said he was referring to ideas expressed during the Washington summit, and expounded by Sagdeev, Velhikov and others.

Obukhov asked whether this was the “remote verification” idea.

Nitze replied that it was. The Soviet idea, as originally expressed, was that you could use a neutron gun to detect nuclear warheads from 400 feet.

Even if, Nitze continued, the detectors could overcome shielding and the background created by nuclear propulsion units, which we did not believe was possible, we could not see how they could discriminate between nuclear SLCMs and the other nuclear weapons aboard a ship. It appeared, therefore, that the technique proposed by the Soviets would not allow a side reliably to detect and count nuclear SLCMs.

Nitze said that, in addition to studying the Soviet verification ideas, the US had continued to investigate other possibilities for verifying SLCM limits. To date, we had been unable to devise a scheme in which we could have confidence. But the US was prepared to continue to seek a satisfactory means of verification; the experts meetings in Geneva should contribute to this effort. As that work went forward, however, we should keep in mind the possibility that an adequate verification scheme could prove unattainable. In that event, we could not agree to formal limits; constraints that could not be verified would not contribute to stability and could not be supported before our Senate.

If a verifiable scheme did not prove attainable, it could not include limits on conventional SLCMs. The US was not about to put itself at a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis all the other countries that are free to deploy conventional SLCMs without limitation. We also could not accept the concept of designating certain ships as carriers of nuclear SLCMs. As before, the first task for nuclear SLCMs was to determine if effective verification was possible.

Nitze concluded by noting that the Soviet side had presented another concept yesterday. He requested that it be repeated again today to ensure that the US side fully understood it.

Obukhov said that the Soviet side had a more optimistic view on verifying long-range SLCMs. They believed that with the cooperation of both sides verification was possible, but that in any case verification could not be an obstacle to agreeing on limits for this dangerous type of strategic offensive weapon.

Nevertheless, recognizing the importance of the verification issue, the Soviets had sent an additional group to Geneva to work with the US delegation on the matter. He noted with satisfaction the willingness of the American side to seek more vigorously a system of verification on long-range SLCMs.

Specifically, Foreign Ministers had agreed to set and observe ceilings on long-range nuclear armed SLCMs. This had been an important step, without which the whole problem of the buildup of strategic offensive arms would remain open. The time had come, said Obukhov, to agree on a figure. The US side had not responded to the Soviet proposal, but he wished to confirm that the limit on nuclear-armed long range SLCMs could be set at 400.

As to verification, if the American side believed SLCM limits could not be verified, the Soviet side was ready to take joint action to ensure they were made verifiable. Their earlier proposals had envisaged NTM, remote verification, and inspections on submarines and surface ships at the points where such ships were based.

In addition, he proposed that the experts study the possibility of verification of SLCM limits by continuous inspection at specified points where SLCMs were equipped with warheads, and at which they were loaded on ships of agreed types. A certain number of such points would be specified in the MOU; equipping of ships at other points would be prohibited. Compliance with these obligations would be verified by suspect site inspections under an annual quota.

There would also be a ban on loading nuclear SLCMs on submarines and surface ships in the open sea, beyond the points at which they were based. If at the time of entry into force either side had submarines or surface ships already equipped with long-range nuclear SLCMs, that side would display each ship for the purpose of counting. Display procedures would be subject to agreement.

Nitze asked whether by “remote verification” Obukhov meant “inspection from a distance.”

Obukhov replied that he did mean inspection from a distance. Further, he wished to propose a joint experiment in this regard, perhaps in April, employing Soviet equipment on ships or helicopters. The US would designate those ships which would be and would not be equipped with nuclear-armed SLCMs. US specialists could monitor Soviet instruments. The experiment could be conducted in the Meditterranean Sea or elsewhere as agreed. The US could also test its own equipment, with Soviet participation.

Obukhov concluded that he would like a positive reaction from the US side on these supplementary considerations. The joint experiment in particular, he said, would be helpful in removing US concerns.

Nitze said the US side would study the Soviet proposal carefully. In the meantime, Admiral Howe or Dr. Graham might care to comment.

Howe said that even if we could devise a scheme to distinguish whether a ship had nuclear weapons or not, many questions would need resolution before the sides could have confidence in their ability to verify nuclear SLCM limits. The US concern involved the possibility that weapons could be shielded or moved, or that other relatively simple measures could be employed in order to defeat verification. For example, a side could undergo an inspection one day and switch its conventional SLCMs to nuclear SLCMs the next. He asked Obukhov what he envisioned such an experiment as he had proposed would demonstrate. Would he expect it to demonstrate, for example, the capability to distinguish a nuclear SLCM from other nuclear weapons on board a ship?

Obukhov said that General Chervov would answer Howe’s question.

Chervov replied that the two sides could discuss shielding and other measures to impede verification, but this would be a discussion of ways to circumvent Treaty obligations. He had also noted that the US had proposed nothing on SLCM verification, and had expressed only a negative attitude.

Concerning the proposed joint experiment, Chervov said that agreement had been reached in Berne, when Howe and Mr. Lehman had been present, to carry out this experiment. There, the US had expressed a more positive attitude. He did not know why the US now was expressing doubts.

Obukhov said that an experiment was just that—an experiment. The two sides should simply do it and see what it resolved and what additional measures were required. It was impossible to predict what it would yield; indeed, if we knew in advance what the results would be, no experiment would be required. He was proposing a purely scientific test.

Also, inspection from a distance was just one element of the Soviet proposal. It also included inspection on warships, verification of production along the perimeter of production plants, as well as NTM.

Obukhov then noted that time was running short. He wanted to address two other questions of concern today, prior to departing for the White House lunch.

Graham said that the US attitude regarding the proposal for a joint experiment was not negative, but was shaped by the laws of nature. The problem was the use of the technique and the signal to background problem. In this case, the background derived from other nuclear material in the reactor, other nuclear weapons, and natural radiation.

Graham also noted that Obukhov said an experiment was to test something impossible to predict. The US had studied this problem for many years and believed it could predict the result with accuracy. He was convinced this was not a useful verification measure because it could be rendered ineffective so easily. As a purely scientific test, he saw nothing this experiment could add to Soviet or to US understanding.

Obukhov responded that a negative attitude expressed in advance was hardly productive. Any scientific prediction could only be tested in practice. Since the most popular philosophy in the US was pragmatism, the two sides should be pragmatic.

Nitze then proposed that the two sides break at 10:50 am, and reconvene at 2:30.

Obukhov said that the two sides must report to their leaders after lunch, and that there would be no time for another meeting. Having covered SLCMs, he would like the the US reaction to the Soviet proposal on heavy missiles, and, if there was then time, he would cover Soviet ideas on mobile ICBMs.

Lehman said that he first wanted to point out that, with regard to the proposed joint experiment on SLCM verification, there was no difference between what the US side said in Berne and what the US side was saying here today. The US was addressing SLCM verification internally, here, and in Geneva. As for the experiment, even if it had a technically positive result, it would not help resolve the problem of verification. He believed the two sides should focus on the real issues of verification and not a side show. That would be the real pragmatic approach.

Obukhov said he did not want to pursue this philosophic discussion, and he would simply ask the US to study the Soviet proposal.

He then turned to the subject of mobile ICBM launchers. He said he believed the US was taking a more confident look at resolving the problem than before. In order to remove US concerns, the Soviet side expressed its willingness to set a separate sublimit of 800 mobile ICBM launchers.

In order to verify this provision, the Soviet side had already proposed, for example, NTM, continuous inspection of production facilities, and notifications of changes in the number and locations of launchers. He said they could also accept other measures. For road-mobile ICBM launchers, in order to determine the declared number on missile bases, the Soviet side could agree to open the roofs of fixed structures of such launchers, perhaps once a year for each base. The MOU could give coordinates for these bases.

Rail-mobile ICBM launchers, Obukhov continued, could be concentrated at missile bases during baseline inspections for counting. Other rail cars could then be subject to suspect-site inspection to verify that there were no missile launchers in excess of the numbers verified during baseline inspection.

The number of non-deployed ICBMs could be limited at each missile base. Storage sites could be a specified distance away in order to preclude the possibility of rapid reload. These measures in their totality present an expanded basis for resolving the issue.

Now, said Obukhov, the Soviet side would like to hear the US response to its proposal on heavy ICBMs.

Nitze responded by saying that the US had proposed a package for the future treatment of heavy ICBMs: a ban on new types, a ban on modernization, and a ban on flight testing. This package implied the gradual phase-out of existing heavy ICBMs as they aged and would preclude the deployment of new heavy ICBMs by either side in the future. In other words, this package would achieve a balanced result for the sides.

In Moscow, Nitze continued, the Soviet side had proposed to accept one element of the package—the ban on new types—while rejecting the other two elements. This would result in a decidedly unbalanced outcome; the Soviet side would be able to retain a heavy ICBM force indefinitely, while the US would have no corresponding right. We could not take a treaty with such an unequal provision to the Senate; we must have equal rights.

Obukhov responded that the Soviet proposals were serious and a major step forward. At the Washington summit, the leaders had reached a clear understanding on heavy ICBMs: the number was to be reduced to 154. The US proposal did not correspond to the Washington agreement, and seemed to suggest a zero solution.

He said the time had now come to agree on the reports to ministers. He suggested the reports be presented in parallel, and that they outline those expanded areas of understanding where progress had been made and areas where more work remained.

Nitze said he agreed with Obukhov’s proposal regarding the reports to ministers. He wanted to point out, however, that the US side was not proposing something different from the 154 limit on heavies. The US was talking about follow-ons and new types. It was not a zero proposal.

Nitze asked, with regard to the proposal of a limit of 800 on mobile ICBM launchers, whether it would not be better to limit reentry vehicles.

Linhard asked whether the Soviets had any ideas on reentry vehicle limits on mobile ICBMs.

Obukhov said that Soviet ideas on heavies had been presented, and he requested the US side to analyze them. The Soviets had no intention of exceeding the aggregate levels with mobiles or with heavy bombers and their armaments.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, 3/88 Washington/Shultz—Shevardnadze. Secret. The meeting took place in the Secretary of State’s Conference Room.