Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

22. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Bremer) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, May 21, 1982

SUBJECT

• Brezhnev’s Reply to the President’s May 7 Letter

Soviet Chargé Aleksandr Bessmertnykh today gave Walt Stoessel Brezhnev’s reply to the President’s May 7 letter.² The May 20 letter³ neither accepts nor rejects our proposed late-June date for beginning START. After self-righteously chastizing us for a year and a half of footdragging, however, Brezhnev does agree that diplomatic discussions should begin “in the near future” on the questions of time and venue for the talks. The Soviets probably do not want to appear to have jumped at our proposed date, but we expect they will ultimately agree to begin talks in the June-July period. Moscow may want to drag things out to permit a formal announcement when and if Gromyko and Secretary Haig meet in New York during the SSOD (probably the week of June 21).⁴ Bessmertnykh told Walt Stoessel that he hoped to have further instructions on Monday⁵ concerning a START starting date.

The bulk of Brezhnev’s letter is devoted to an attack on our START proposal as presented in the President’s Eureka speech,⁶ followed by a pitch in support of Brezhnev’s May 18 proposal⁷ for a US-Soviet strategic weapons freeze. Brezhnev declares flatly that our proposal “is not a realistic position, not the path toward agreement.” He claims that our approach, by singling out one aspect of the strategic equation (land-based missiles), would mean substantial reductions only for the Soviet side. He fails to acknowledge the President’s subsequent assertions that “everything is negotiable,” including bombers and cruise missiles, and the fact that the U.S. would have to make substantial cuts in sea-based missiles.

On the question of a freeze, Brezhnev makes the predictable argument that such an agreement would create “favorable conditions” for START negotiations, and calls on the President to give his proposal careful consideration. He makes clear that the proposal would limit modernization and not just freeze the number of strategic systems, which makes it all the more one-sided in the Soviets’ favor.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

1. Source: Reagan Library, Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US—USSR) Jan.—May 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow; cleared by Simons, Scanlan, Burt, and Stoessel.
2. See Document 16.
3. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Document 171.
4. Haig met with Gromyko in New York on June 18. A record of their conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Document 186. Prior to the meeting, Haig informed Reagan that, regarding arms control, he would “put Gromyko on the defensive” by building on Reagan’s UNSSOD speech. “The message will be that we have a sensible and comprehensive program for negotiating improved security for both sides through significant reduction,” Haig added, and that “the Soviets cannot be serious when they accuse us of not being sincere; and that it is up to them to demonstrate in negotiations that they really favor arms control.” (Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Document 185)
5. May 24.
6. See Document 17.
7. Reference is to Brezhnev’s May 18 speech to the Komsomol, in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. 34, no. 20, June 16, 1982, pp. 1–23. In a May 19 memorandum to Reagan, Haig described the speech as “clearly aimed at public opinion in the United States and especially Western Europe. It emphasizes grand gestures, both in START and INF, but gives little insight into the Soviet negotiating approach.” (See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Document 173)