The speech took a predictable posture in its critique of the U.S. position
and in advocacy of a freeze. Nevertheless, as Al’s memo points out, it
“constitutes a relatively mild and constructive-sounding reply” to your May
9 speech.
Tab A
Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan
3
SUBJECT
-
THE BREZHNEV KOMSOMOL SPEECH
Brezhnev’s speech is clearly aimed at public opinion in the United States and
especially Western Europe. It emphasizes grand gestures, both in START and INF, but gives little insight
into the Soviet negotiating approach. It nevertheless constitutes a
relatively mild and constructive-sounding reply to your Eureka speech.
Brezhnev’s major points and our comments follow.
START
Brezhnev proposes a prompt
interim quantitative freeze and qualitative restraints
on strategic nuclear weapons. Playing to the nuclear freeze
movement, this proposal is a logical extension of Soviet proposals for
an INF freeze. It does not specify the units which would be frozen or
the way in which modernization could be limited. We can expect Brezhnev’s call for a strategic weapons
freeze to feature prominently in Soviet propaganda.
Concurring in the need for substantial reductions, he welcomes US
willingness to negotiate on strategic arms and says the talks should begin immediately. He gives no
signal on a date or venue, but I expect to hear from the Soviet side
through diplomatic channels in the near future.
Brezhnev predictably criticizes your START proposals as facilitating a quest for US
military superiority and jeopardizing Soviet security. These criticisms
fall short of rejecting the US proposals, although the Soviets will
clearly seek to broaden the focus of START negotiations well beyond the US proposals when talks
begin.
He proposes banning or severely restricting the
development of new types of strategic weapons. While this
posture has public appeal, it also probably results from the Soviet
desire to restrain US technology, particularly development of the
D–5.
He proposes three general principles for
successful strategic negotiations: the pursuit of actual limits and
reductions, not camouflage for a [Page 557] continuing buildup; respect for each other’s legitimate security
interests and the principle of equality and equal security; and
preservation of “everything positive” which has been achieved earlier.
Brezhnev stopped short of
mentioning SALT II.
INF
Brezhnev pays more detailed attention to INF than to START and says that “the key task today
(in the quest for peace) is to lower the nuclear confrontation in
Europe.”
Brezhnev expresses readiness to
consider deeper INF reductions than the two-third
cuts the Soviet Union had previously proposed. The meaning of
this will have to be explored in the INF negotiations.
He reports reduction of a “considerable” number of INF
missiles. These are presumably obsolete SS–4s and SS–5s
undergoing normal retirement.
He announces that “no medium-range missiles will be
additionally deployed in places from which both the FRG and other countries of Western
Europe could be within their reach.” We believe that the Soviet
moratorium offer of 16 March included SS–20s at some Asian bases within
range of Western Europe. If this is true, he is making explicit an
aspect of their original offer, but in so doing he admits the validity
of our position that limits on missiles “in Europe” alone are
inadequate.
He confirms that the Soviet INF freeze “envisages” termination of preparation for missile deployments, including
construction of launch sites. This clarification is aimed at
hampering our own site preparations, and it responds to US criticism
that construction was continuing at some sites even after the
moratorium. Very recent intelligence indicates ongoing construction at
SS–20 sites, and we will watch closely to see if it stops after the
speech.
Calling our desire for a US-Soviet agreement on global INF limitations
“absurd,” he announces that the question of missiles
in the Eastern part of the USSR
could only be addressed in negotiations “with those in whose hands
are the nuclear means which are opposed by our missiles.” Without
calling for Asian INF negotiations involving China, Brezhnev says that the USSR “does not object” to such
negotiations. Soviet INF negotiators will presumably now use this line
in rejecting our global approach.
