Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983

186. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, June 18, 1982, 2:30–7:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• US-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• US

  • Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig
  • Dimitry Zarechnak, Interpreter

• USSR

  • Foreign Minister Andrey A. Gromyko
  • Victor Sukhodrev, MFA, USSR

Haig welcomed the Foreign Minister, and said that since he was the host at this meeting, it was Gromyko’s turn to make the opening remarks, and he would listen with interest to anything that Gromyko had to say. He hoped that Gromyko would be open and frank.

Gromyko indicated that he thought the structure of the conversation could be such that he would speak in short passages rather than long ones and that this would be better and more natural. If he were to give very long presentations, then Haig would want to reply in even longer ones since the Americans always like to be first; so this would be a more rational approach.

Haig replied that the US side tended to lag behind in such exchanges, and would try to catch up. He quipped that this leads to increased tensions.

Gromyko said he would like to start by asking one question, namely in which direction the policy of the present US Administration was directed—toward peace or toward war or preparation for war? He thought that it was difficult to contest that at the present time this was the main question of interest to people, governments, and most nations, that is, the question of whether peace can be preserved or whether mankind will fall into the abyss of a new war. He hoped that Haig did not consider this too direct a question, since the Soviet side considered that it was better to be direct than to take a zig-zag path, wherein one scratches the left ear with the right hand or vice versa. He wanted Haig to answer not in a purely formal way but in a substantive way.

Haig replied that, as is frequently the case, the Minister gets immediately to the point, and this is a good way to begin. It is clear that the President of the United States feels strongly that it is imperative for the nuclear superpowers to establish a framework for peace and stability. However, the experience of the past decade left not only the President, but also the American people and other countries of the world, with the strong feeling that atmospherics, slogans and similar things mean little when actions are taken that threaten peace. The President has set a special agenda in the search for more positive relations with the Soviet Union. As two superpowers we have a major burden to bear. We must be judged not by our dedication to slogans, but by our actions.

In the two previous meetings on this level, the US spoke of what Haig considered and the President also considered unsettling policies on the Soviet side.² But a great deal remains to be desired with regard to actions. This is an important aspect in response to Gromyko’s question.

When the President wrote to Brezhnev about his aspirations he expressed this very clearly, and he remains clear on this today. So Haig hoped that Gromyko’s response and his own response would facilitate specific actions to improve the climate for broader possibilities of peace and stability and the reduction of the levels of armaments, which would be of mutual benefit for the whole spectrum of relations between our countries.

Gromyko stated that he would like to stress the position of the USSR and the Soviet leadership with regard to the question proposed and the reply given by Haig. He wished to emphasize that the Soviet Union has always been and is interested in a policy of peace. The Soviet side, and Brezhnev personally, have always indicated a desire to have good relations with the US, and they had always followed this general line both in their internal and external policies. Their policy is a policy of peace. The actions they take are purely of a defensive nature. The Soviet Union has no other aims, and will have no other aims. He wished that the US Administration would understand this. He was saying this in part because of what had been said by the US President.

He wanted to ask Haig a second question about US policy. The Soviet side has a very definite opinion that the US, especially the present Administration, has set as an important goal the achievement of first place from the military point of view in the world. Is this a correct assessment of American goals? The Soviets had gathered this from US official statements.

Haig said that if we look back over the past 65 years, and examine the ideological differences between the Marxist and Leninist ideology in their Soviet model, on the one hand, and the capitalist and the market economy ideology in the American model, on the other hand, we find that the offensive and aggressive actions have always come from the East. President Reagan is a leader who believes in the principle of reciprocity. So long as the struggle continues in ideological terms, the rhetoric will be more inclined to point out our systematic differences.

American aims remain as before—to have sufficient defensive military capabilities to ensure that there is no incentive for disturbing the peace. The US is not striving for superiority or advantage over the Soviet Union. Indeed, the US currently has less than half the number of men under arms than the Soviet Union has—two million as opposed to over four million men. The US has fewer aircraft and less nuclear destructive power. In considering the threat faced by the two sides, one can see a dangerous imbalance. No American President can look upon Soviet policies as policies of peace. Perhaps this can change in the future. Meanwhile the US wishes to assure equity in the arms area, and an increase of US capabilities is now underway. This can be adjusted from the point of view of arms control but only in the context of some equitable changes in comparative systems and capabilities.

Gromyko said that the Soviet side had been watching American policies over many years and what the US does in the area of arms buildup. It has especially been watching the present Administration, which has openly said that the basis of its foreign policy is to achieve first place as a military power, and the US Administration has made statements to the effect that the US way of life should be accepted by everyone. He did not want to go too deeply into this and would say more about it later. The Soviet side condemns the philosophy of any country seeking to be first, including the superpowers. This is dangerous, since the logic of life (especially with superpowers) indicates that other nations cannot permit one power to become dominant. The US probably has people who like to calculate economics and other things which support this goal of being first. But if the US has such calculating people who are glad to see such results of their calculations, they are very much mistaken, and the Soviet side cannot agree with this approach. The Soviet Union has not set such a goal for itself, i.e., to be the best nation—neither in theory, nor in international affairs.

In the Soviet view, the basis of relations between the US and the USSR should be the principle of equality and equal security. This is the bedrock foundation on which our relations can be built, maintained, and developed. Haig had said in passing that in the Soviet Union there are more personnel in the armed forces than in the US, but Haig must know that the structure of the Soviet military and the structure of the US military, as well as the military structures of other countries, are not simply carbon copies of each other. The US and the Soviet Union can make good and precise calculations in defining the potential of both sides from the point of view of all of the components involved. In this regard, the two sides have military parity, which is tantamount to saying that there is military parity between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. He wished to emphasize that the Soviet side cannot depart from this principle and all hopes that the Soviet Union will tire of listening to all the speeches against it, or will be frightened by this, rest on sand. He wished to say these things to Haig especially in view of the very important negotiations coming up, i.e., continuation of the talks regarding nuclear armaments in Europe and strategic arms. During the negotiations and before them it is very important to know the positions of principle of both partners. This makes it easier to go forward.

Sometimes the US has accepted the position that the USSR and the US should build their relations on the basis of equality and equal security, and the SALT II treaty (in which Haig had been personally involved on occasion) was based on this principle. But now we are to believe that during the Administrations of Ford, Carter, and Nixon, the mathematics of the situation was not properly understood. Can the Soviet Union seriously accept that past US Administrations made a serious mistake in its mathematics and the present one knows mathematics better, and is correcting the mistake? No, it cannot. Any reasonable person would say that this is not possible, and that such an approach reflects a change of political aims.

So it would be good if the US really had a policy of peace and the intention to build relations with other countries on the basis of peace, and if it returned to this principle as the basis for negotiations, confirming it by concluding an appropriate agreement. Then it would be easier to live, to build relations between the USSR and the US, and it would be easier for other countries. It would be easier for the world to breathe.

Haig indicated that they had been through similar discussions in past meetings, and that he knew the Minister would recall our conviction that arms control such as START or INF or, for conventional weapons, MBFR, must inevitably proceed from the premise of equity. But the basis of our relations consists of a mosaic which goes beyond the general criterion of equal security and equity. There has been a continuing pattern of Soviet arms build-up which has contributed to a reassessment of military levels. But perhaps the most serious aspect of our relations, if we assess the past decade, is the deterioration of equality and equal security, and of the basic principles of relations agreed to between our countries at the beginning of the 1970’s—i.e., not to take unfair advantage of each other in the conduct of our mutual affairs. Immediately after that agreement, there was an alarming number of Soviet violations of the basic principles of international behavior. Haig had had a great deal of experience in Vietnam, when the US tried to get the Soviet Union to influence Hanoi, but without success. Only after the US escalated the conflict was an agreement reached, and then it was ruthlessly violated by Hanoi with arms furnished to it by the USSR. That was followed by Cuban troops in Angola, who were brought there by Soviet resources. Then there was the expansion into Ethiopia, and the events of the late 70’s, such as those in the Yemens. The Soviet Union then became involved in neutral (yet pro-Soviet) Afghanistan, and subsequently interfered directly in Afghanistan. During all of this, the US did nothing to increase its influence by military force or subversive means.

This week Mr. Rodriguez stated in the UN that Cuba’s arms have doubled in the past few years.³ This has happened as a result of Soviet arms shipments, despite what was said by the US over the past 18 months. President Reagan and all Americans have been greatly influenced by the bitter experiences of the past decade, and by the size of the Soviets arms buildup.

After the era of detente, Soviet arms have increased by 4–5 percent every year, while American arms were steadily decreasing until the last year of the Carter Administration and the first year of the Reagan Administration. So if equity existed in the early 70’s, the Soviet Union has now changed that situation, and this is clearly an obstacle today in US-Soviet relations. President Reagan wishes to reverse this situation, but not because of a desire to be first. Any arms negotiations based on such a principle would be sterile. Equity must be a basic criterion. The problem has been that there have been great abuses on the part of the Soviet Union. Over the past 18 months, during the two meetings with Minister Gromyko and in the meetings with Ambassador Dobrynin, the US tried to emphasize that the basis for US-Soviet relations must be actions, not rhetoric. Haig had spoken about Southern Africa, where the US has no desire and no reason to increase its influence. No progress has been made in that area. The Soviet Union has been an obstacle to progress. Haig had spoken about shipments of arms to Cuba, but no precautions have been taken by the Soviets in this regard. The US had spoken about the situation in Poland. It could be greatly improved as a result of American economic assistance, but the Soviets have taken no steps to improve the situation. Nothing has happened to improve matters in Afghanistan. All of this is not equality. In all of this—arms or political, economic or security relations—the imbalance which exists is a direct result of Soviet policy.

Haig would find it sterile to propose to depart from the principle of equal security and equality, either in a broad sense or in arms negotiations. But if equality existed in the 70’s, during the period of detente, and in the agreements on basic principles of relations, then it is the Soviet Union, and not the United States which has flagrantly violated these principles.

Gromyko asked for examples.

Haig mentioned Africa, the Middle East, Afghanistan, Cuba, Kampuchea, as well as the level of resources allocated to military buildup. There had been no change in Soviet policy in this regard.

On the other hand, it has been only in the past two years that the US has begun to increase the level of its arms expenditures, and has not reached the level of Soviets arms expenditures over the past 15 years. The evidence was irrefutable.

Gromyko indicated that in his reply, Haig had departed from the discussion of the basic principles of our relations, that is, equality and equal security, and had turned to the policies of the Soviet Union and the U.S. in different parts of the globe. He would reply on these matters subsequently, but it would be more logical to continue to talk about basic principles and on questions of cessation of the arms race, reduction of arms, and of disarmaments, specifically on the two questions of nuclear arms in Europe and strategic arms.

Gromyko indicated that the question of nuclear arms in Europe had been discussed for a long period of time. Our two nations, as well as many other nations, have spoken out about this question, but as yet there has been no agreement, and no results. Therefore, it would be desirable to compare the positions of the two sides, and to examine future prospects. Of course he and Haig would not go into the details of this question, but would discuss it only in principle, since the details would be left for discussion to the delegations in Geneva. However, the specific data would hover in the background, like phantoms, helping in the discussions.

The principle of equality should apply not only in the global sense to US/USSR military relations, but should apply to Europe as well. So when we speak of approximate equality between the US and the USSR, this applies to Europe, with one reservation of which he would speak. Approximate equality in Europe between the US (NATO) and the USSR (Warsaw Pact), had not been contested by the US until recently. These recent doubts have had no basis. Now, with regard to the reservation of which he had spoken: there is now equality in Europe from the point of view of arms materiel, but there is also a geographical factor which favors the US, as the Soviet side had previously mentioned. In actual fact the US has transferred a launching pad for its strategic weapons from the US to Europe. And the US now wants a significant increase in its potential on this launching pad by adding Pershing II and cruise missiles. These are in actual fact strategic weapons and must be taken into consideration. This is the first thing that he wanted to say.

The second thing involves the question of flight time, which exists whether we like it or not. Both military specialists and political specialists must take into consideration the use of weapons from US territory and Western European territory, and the time parameters involved in both cases. If the Soviet side were religious it would say that the whole world prays to all the gods that this will not happen, but we must take this into consideration.

The nuclear weapons of England and France must be taken into account. It is not acceptable to leave them out. It is not enough to say that these are matters of prestige, and that they involve independent countries. For the Soviet Union this is unimportant, and a loss of time to argue about it.

One other aspect should be taken into account. Although there is approximate equality between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, even in terms of materiel, the US does have an advantage from the point of the number of warheads, i.e., it has 50 percent more than the USSR. In number of delivery vehicles, there is approximate equality, if comparable categories are considered.

Although the Soviet side did not know what proposals the US delegation in Geneva would come up with in the future, the proposals which have been presented not only do not form a basis for an agreement, but do not even form a basis for bringing the positions of the two sides closer together. The Soviet proposals, on the other hand, whether the US agrees with this or not (and the US has been critical of them), are equitable. But the US proposals do not form a basis for agreement. The US should be more objective in regards to the Soviet proposals and in regard to all aspects of the relations of the strategic arms of the two countries in Europe.

He knew that the US side was aware of the proposals made by Leonid Brezhnev concerning a moratorium, Soviet SS–20’s and a freeze. There had been no discussion of these matters, since the US side had not wished to discuss them in context with other matters. This is unfortunate. The Soviet side would like to have the US give these matters due attention.

The Soviet side has the impression that Washington has set its sights on implementing its plan to place Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, and that everything else is not very important. Would the US side agree with such a conclusion?

The Soviet Union wants to have agreement on nuclear arms in Europe and considers it very important. Such an agreement would improve the situation with regard to strategic arms as well.

Haig said he was sure that Gromyko realized he had been “counting beans” for many years, during five years as NATO commander, and long before that, when questions of nuclear and conventional arms were addressed. He could not let pass the statement that there was no contention on the existence of an arms balance between East and West. One should examine this from an historical perspective. For example, the West never sought to match Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional arms capabilities with equivalent Western conventional capabilities. From the early days, the Western approach has been to compensate for this by relying heavily not only on strategic weapons, but also on theater weapons. As the Soviet capabilities in nuclear weapons began to grow, the difference between East and West in this area began to decrease. Before, there had been a period of “accepted” stability. The West accepted its qualitative advantage as a compensation for the increase of nuclear capabilities in the East.

But there has been a shift in the balance. There has been no compensation on the part of the West in the area of conventional weapons. The Western levels have stayed the same, and have tended to decrease after the crisis of the 1950’s, with the one exception of the FRG. When Haig went to Western Europe, the situation had not changed. In the area of conventional weapons, the Soviet Union had about a 2–1 advantage in in-place forward-deployed divisions, a 3–1 advantage in tanks, a 4–1 advantage in artillery, and a 2–1 advantage in aircraft. In the area of aircraft, the Soviet side had increased the number of new dual-capability aircraft made available to the Warsaw Pact. Those imbalances are roughly the same today. This is in reply to Gromyko’s statement that there was never any contention on this issue.

In 1975 the “bean-counting” in Europe became more intense as the Soviets began increasing deployment of SS–20’s and dual-capable Warsaw Pact fighters and fighter-bombers. Alarms began to sound in Western circles, especially military circles. By 1977, NATO calculations showed that in the area of nuclear delivery systems, the pattern of superiority enjoyed by the West to offset Eastern superiority in conventional weapons began to change. Such a situation still exists today. As our experts have strongly indicated in Geneva, by any reasonable calculation, the Soviet side has anywhere from a 3–1 to a 6–1 advantage, and the disparity is being aggravated by the deployment of the extremely destabilizing SS–20’s, which has been continuing since the mid-1970’s. Moreover, the old S–4 and S–5 missiles, which the SS–20’s were designed to replace, have not been removed. All in all, the Warsaw Pact has over 900 warheads in place, which is much greater than the number on the S–4’s and S–5’s had been. Therefore, at the present time there is a very large imbalance both with regard to conventional weapons and with regard to nuclear weapons, where the West has at least a 3–1 disadvantage in nuclear delivery vehicles.

Haig was well aware of the recent Soviet proposal put forth in Geneva, and considered that it showed a measure of good faith and flexibility, especially in the willingness of the Soviet side to accept that SS–20’s east of the Urals are capable of hitting European targets, and that depending on where they are located, they may be considered strategic. It is clear that such weapons are strategic if one looks at them from Paris, London, or Bonn. One of the advantages in beginning the START negotiations lies in the interrelation of theater and strategic forces. As the US assesses Soviet bean-counting, some of the Western systems the USSR has mentioned will be shown as being counted twice in the START talks. These systems might be considered strategic.

At any rate, an important step forward has been made in initiating these talks. The subject of bean-counting has posed difficulties in the past. It has been dealt with in SALT I and SALT II, and a number of subjective differences have been eliminated. This will be an important contribution in the START talks. It will help to bring the two sides closer together, and to avoid double jeopardy in counting.

Haig was not contesting what Gromyko had mentioned in regard to flight time for strategic weapons. The problem is that one cannot deal with theater weapons without appropriate consideration of strategic weapons. This problem will have to be addressed in due course.

Regarding START, Soviet official reaction to US proposals have shown a certain misunderstanding, perhaps based upon a misinterpretation of the President’s public statements. In such public statements, the US has tried to avoid going into the details of the START proposal, but has only given its broad framework. There might be misinterpretations of the motives behind the proposal. In the first place, it is a serious proposal, and not propaganda. There is a serious desire to bring about significant reductions in the arsenals of both sides, an equal reduction by both sides. The US insists on talking about the warheads and launchers in the first phase because it wishes to build on the experience of SALT I and SALT II.

The charge has been made that this is a one-sided approach involving reduction only by the Soviet side. This is not so. The US is also speaking of reductions on its side, which are to be as dramatic as those on the Soviet side. The US wishes to deal with those systems which are the most destabilizing and which raise uncertainties regarding the intentions of the two sides, thus creating a major threat to peace. The US does see reductions by its side not only of the old systems, but new systems as well, similar to those which are asked from the Soviet side. Aircraft are not excluded. The U.S. sees reductions to equal levels of capabilities. It is not excluding cruise missiles. It sees the possibility of reduction of cruise missile levels under phased conditions.

Haig wished to make it very clear for the record that he could not agree with Gromyko’s statement that equality in the theater area had never been contested. He could remember how President Nixon and Brezhnev agonized until 4 o’clock in the morning, and how he, Haig, was on the phone in Washington talking about submarines and various other categories of weapons.

Haig was not pessimistic. Both sides should not be rigid but should have an open mind. Some issues might quickly be resolved. Haig could barely understand the feelings of the Soviet side about the weapons of the US allies, but was even less understanding of statements about the existence of equality. There is no equality. There is a 3–1 inequality at the very least, involving such things as Warsaw Pact aircraft, which the East does not count. But all of this will be better handled in the coming months.

Haig wished to assure Gromyko and the Soviet leadership that President Reagan is very serious about arms control, and is not engaged in propaganda. The US feels that the Soviet Union is engaged in propaganda. The US does not favor the idea of a moratorium, since it considers that the West is in an inferior position and would not want to solidify such a position. The US has rejected such a moratorium and has publicly said so. Obviously the Soviet side can challenge this, but the US is unconvinced.

Haig understood that the Soviet leadership was disturbed over the non-ratification of the SALT II Treaty. There was a great deal of controversy in the US over that treaty, and that controversy is what caused its collapse. The collapse was not a reaction to Afghanistan, but was caused by the view that there were inadequacies in the treaty itself.

Other areas where progress is possible also exist. One of these is the area of verification, in which the US had noted the encouraging remarks of the Soviet side.

A great challenge lies before us in our negotiations, but Haig was not pessimistic that solutions could be found which would reduce the likelihood of nuclear conflict and would relieve the tremendous economic burden posed by an arms buildup. Of course, equality and equal security must form a basis for the negotiations. At the same time, the US has not abandoned the concept of linkage, because linkage is not a policy which can be simply adopted or rejected. Linkage is a fact of life. If progress is not made in other areas, this necessarily impacts on progress in the arms area. This is as clear as night follows day. If the USSR had doubts about US actions in the Soviet sphere of concern, the USSR would also begin to apply pressure. This was not something that was optional. Linkage has always existed and remains a fact.

Gromyko indicated that one example of linkage was the table before them at that moment which had water, coffee, and other things on it. The two sides are engaged in conversation next to this table. Let’s say that the table is taken away. Should this mean that the conversation must also stop as long as the table is not present?

Haig replied that this was a mechanistic view of linkage.

Gromyko said that that was exactly what it was.

Haig replied that linkage was not mechanistic.

Gromyko said that such an approach was equivalent to asking what the sum of the Eiffel Tower and good health was.

Haig said that he would not presume to recall history better than Gromyko, but he was sure that Gromyko was aware of the stands of previous Presidents on this issue.

Gromyko countered that linkage was an invention of the present Administration.

Haig said it was not, that in actual fact, Henry Kissinger had coined the word.

Gromyko replied that Kissinger had coined the word, but had kept it in his pocket. Kissinger had always had great praise for Metternich, but Gromyko had always wondered whether Metternich’s efforts had not led in the end to the fall of the Austrian Empire.

Haig said he thought that for whatever reason, the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate had whetted Moscow’s appetite. The USSR undertook actions which proved costly to the US and which had brought about a great deal of tension. US-Soviet relations cannot be examined without looking at the experience of the past decade. From the American point of view, it had been a bitter experience. But all of this is behind us, and it is important to look to the future.

Gromyko indicated that he had listened carefully to what Haig had said, and that he wished to refer some questions to future discussion. For the moment, he wished to direct Haig’s attention to the question of nuclear arms in Europe.

First of all, Haig had mentioned conventional arms. The two of them should leave this question aside, since Haig had only touched upon it in passing, and they were not discussing this matter at present. There are negotiations which deal with this. The USSR is not afraid of any reproaches from the West. The Soviet position is very clear. The Soviet side would like to reach agreement with the West, but the West has other views. Nevertheless, the USSR will be patient and will continue its work. He noted that the US did not even say “thank you” for the Soviet withdrawal of 1000 tanks and 20,000 troops from the GDR to the USSR.

Secondly, it cannot be contested that in the area of nuclear forces in Europe, NATO (the US) and the Warsaw Pact (USSR) have approximate equality in the area of delivery vehicles, and that NATO had 50 percent more nuclear warheads.

Thirdly, the US side is trying to change the dividing line defining medium-range systems: it takes into consideration aircraft with a range of less than 1,000, 900, 800, 700, 600 miles, sometimes calling these systems intermediate, and then begins to compare. Why is this done? The US has included some of the Soviet aircraft which do not carry nuclear weapons. The US has been capricious in its estimates.

Fourthly, if this is the approach the US takes, not recognizing the dividing line of medium-range aircraft—we should go further. We should include all nuclear weapons, including tactical ones. The Soviet side would agree with such an approach. Brezhnev has indicated his approval for such an approach. But Washington has not reacted positively to this. So the two sides should get away from various combinations and artificial constraints of this kind. They should take a scientific and mathematical approach, and take all factors into consideration.

Fifthly, Gromyko was glad to hear that, although Haig had been careful in his remarks, he had nevertheless indicated that the US saw a certain flexibility in the Soviet proposal made in Geneva and that it could be helpful. The US side should look more closely at the proposal, and perhaps it might see not only a sign of flexibility, but a basis for progress in the negotiations.

Sixthly, Gromyko repeated that the USSR would like to see an agreement on nuclear arms in Europe.

Seventh, US stationing of the Pershing II and cruise missiles would elicit a very strong response and would sound a negative note for the situation in Europe, the world, and US–USSR relations. The USSR would be forced to react accordingly. Then Soviet proposals concerning a moratorium, our missiles east of the Urals and a freeze would no longer be valid. The situation would then be different and the USSR would have to think about how best to improve its security and that of its allies in the Warsaw Pact. The USSR would not permit itself to be in an unfavorable position. It would protect its interests.

The US did not think that the Soviet Union had forgotten about other US plans and possibilities in other regions of the world—not in strategic arms, but in other areas of the world. He was thinking of medium or intermediate range weapons, and how they could be dangerous to the USSR. He was referring to what might be called the “beyond the Ural” range. These weapons had not been included in the negotiations but the Soviets might be forced into including them given certain situations. It remains to be seen how such a “Ural” version develops, i.e., involving areas like the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and the ocean areas in the east of the Soviet Union.

The USSR would like to hope that the US Administration could be more flexible in all this, realizing that the Soviet Union would not like the US to be in a better position than it is. The Soviet Union does not strive to have the upper hand with regard to nuclear arms in Europe.

The Soviet Union does not want to make the US the underdog as a result of negotiations or agreement. This was Gromyko’s reply to Haig’s comments and if Haig had no other comments perhaps they could talk about strategic arms and the principles which apply to them. Of course the two delegations in Geneva will continue these talks, but if the basic principles have been worked out, their work will be easier.

Haig indicated that he wanted to make a brief comment since he was disturbed by Gromyko’s last statement. The Minister knows that it was the Soviet Union, and not the US, that deployed the SS–20’s. The US has no comparable means to deal with this. There are more than 900 warheads aimed at the West. A decision was made by the previous administration to place Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe. This was not only a moderate reply but if recalculations are made due to the continuing deployment of SS–20’s, the West will still be at a disadvantage unless it can compensate for the measures taken by the Soviet side. Threats about what the USSR will do if the West does what it has decided to do as a result of Soviet actions are counter-productive. If the Soviet Union were to compensate for these measures, the West could do likewise. It would not want to, but it would be ready to. If the West is forced to have a jousting match, it is ready to do so. Haig was hopeful that before long the negotiations in Geneva would resolve these matters. The US intends to reduce, not increase nuclear arms, but it is ready to deal with such a contingency if it arises.

Haig indicated puzzlement regarding Gromyko’s second reference concerning other geographical areas for location of nuclear arms. Perhaps Gromyko could enlighten him about this. It was hard for Haig to say whether he was looking at the same thing that Gromyko was.

Gromyko said that he was not proposing to add other questions to the European agenda. He simply wished to say that the USSR has not lost sight of US plans to use nuclear weapons of various types which would generally be considered medium-range weapons (such as cruise missiles) against the USSR in certain areas. The US has not said it will not use such weapons. He did not want to formally broaden the agenda for this meeting, but simply to direct Haig’s attention to this question. Lack of progress on nuclear weapons would be bad for everyone—the Soviet Union, the United Nations, Europe and the world.

Haig indicated that he was confused about what Gromyko had said regarding cruise missiles. He thought that he had made it clear that cruise missiles would be considered in the START talks, in the context of establishing equal ceilings.

Gromyko replied that if this would not be a problem, that would be good. Then there will be no confusion.

Haig replied that that was the reason why it was so important to begin START talks. He emphasized that the US was thinking about a two-phase approach. The first phase would involve the types of systems to be limited, i.e., warheads and launchers. The US is thinking about a thirty percent reduction in these systems by both sides. The world is waiting for such a step.

Gromyko noted that there is a lot of good will shown in the world concerning this cause.

The relation of the US Administration to strategic arms and nuclear arms in Europe is clear. But perhaps the US has plans for nuclear arms which are not strategic and which are not concentrated on Europe—i.e. they involve the Indian Ocean, the Pacific, the Persian Gulf, etc. The systems involved might be cruise missiles and submarines. In Soviet terminology their range would be described as medium range, i.e., less than strategic. Would these then be considered “wild” weapons? Should that be a comfort to the USSR? Gromyko indicated that he was looking ahead in regard to these matters.

Gromyko added that it would be good if the US were to make a statement about excluding these types of systems. He was a little concerned about this. In Europe, the two sides are looking for agreement. But the US wants to be able to have systems which cover the eastern part of the USSR, the central part of that country, Central Asia, etc. He thought he had made his point clearly.

Haig indicated that he understood. The two sides would have to deal with that question. As technology changed, previous definitions would have to be given careful thought. These are questions which involve bookkeeping. When should weapons be considered theater weapons? By US standards, certain types of weapons have traditionally been considered strategic, i.e., submarine-based weapons. Other questions involving ranges of weapons, i.e., those on mobile platforms, should be included.

For the above reasons, as Haig had said, the relation between INF and START is very important. Some questions of definition which pose problems with regard to theater weapons may be dealt with more readily if examined from the point of view of different categories. President Reagan had also indicated in West Berlin that the US looks forward to a greater exchange of information with the USSR in the future, aimed at confidence building measures, such as notification of military exercises and missile launchings, whether or not the missiles leave the territory of the launching state. The US would soon present its concrete proposals about such exchanges of data for confidence building measures and arms control in general. At the moment, the US has still not decided on the best venue for dealing with these matters, but it urges the Soviet side to be receptive.

Gromyko suggested that he and Haig might now turn to strategic arms.

Haig agreed.

Gromyko indicated that the Soviet side thought we would be remiss if we simply forgot about the treaty concluded by the former US Administration. A great deal of work was put into that treaty. It had been signed by Brezhnev and Carter in Vienna. The treaty was balanced. It was in the interests of both sides, and these interests had been very carefully weighed. The present US Administration has indicated that the usefulness of SALT II has been exhausted. It has been buried. But the US has not said how deeply it has been buried. The Soviet side feels that this matter should not be dealt with so lightly. All the positive results of those negotiations should be preserved.

First of all, it would be good if SALT II were ratified by both the US and the USSR. Questions of prestige (i.e. who proposed and signed the treaty) should take second place.

Some questions concerning time would exist, of course, since the treaty has not been ratified, and the Protocol has not been put into effect. Certain rules concerning missiles, strategic bombers and cruise missiles would not take effect. For example, the Soviet side had been bound to remove 200 land-based missile sites. Such an obligation was based on implementation of all the provisions of the treaty and Protocol, and since these provisions had not been confirmed, the Soviet side would not carry out these obligations. Otherwise the treaty is a good one. If the question of strategic arms were to be solved, this would help improve the atmosphere for solving the questions of nuclear arms in Europe as well.

Secondly, with regard to the recent proposals announced by Washington in the area of what should be discussed first in regard to strategic arms, the US has the right, of course, to publicly announce its position on this. But such a proposal has no future. It is not acceptable for the Soviet Union. Why? Because it would change the nuclear balance in favor of the United States.

Attention in the proposals has been concentrated primarily on Soviet heavy SS–18 missiles, which the US side has not taken a liking to for some reason. This is a very one sided and arbritary approach which is intended to undercut Soviet security in the area of nuclear arms.

Gromyko could not believe that Haig was not aware of the situation concerning SALT II, but perhaps he was not, although this did not seem probable. Perhaps Haig knew, but was closing his eyes to it. In this regard Gromyko wanted to make some clarifications. There had been intensive discussions, especially in Vladivostok between President Ford and Brezhnev (Kissinger and Gromyko has also been present), in which the US voiced very strong concerns about the Soviet heavy missiles.⁴ The Soviet side, on its part insisted by [that] US forward-based systems should be included in SALT II. There had been a long argument about this, and finally, agreement was reached that the Soviet Union would be permitted to have its SS–18s and US forward-based systems would not be included in SALT II. Obviously, no such statement was made, but there was agreement that forward-based systems should be handled in SALT III. So how can the US side accuse the Soviet Union of having these missiles and thereby creating an imbalance? It is hard to find the proper words to describe such an approach.

The fact that such an agreement was reached should be made known. But it is not known, and Gromyko is convinced that US Congressmen are not aware of it because the Administration is not telling them. They are saying that there is not equality between the sides, and that SALT II is a bad treaty, and that the heavy missiles are the main destabilizing factor. But these missiles are a result of the agreement. They are not destabilizing, and they are not the main factor of concern.

If the Soviet Union wished to look at destabilizing factors in order to throw a shadow on the treaty, it could say that the main destabilizing factor is the existence of twice as many warheads on US submarines as on Soviet submarines. The Soviet side would say that we should begin with this subject. But the Soviet side is not saying this. Haig should try to see the situation through Soviet eyes. The Soviet Union is ready for the negotiations on strategic weapons, and it will present its position when the time comes. But it asks the US to take a closer look at its proposals, and to take a more serious position.

Haig wished to comment on the observations presented by Gromyko. He wished to reassure Gromyko in certain respects and to bother him in others. The US side has said that SALT II is dead, not buried. This is so for several reasons. First of all, any attempt to revive the treaty would reopen the controversy which raged in 1979 in the Senate and in the House. Since the President campaigned against SALT II, it would be politically impossible for the President to support the treaty, which he does not believe (and which Haig also does not believe) constitutes a constructive and fair approach. Having said this, however, Haig would not deny that there were positive things which had been negotiated in SALT II.

Haig wished to reassure Gromyko that the head of the US negotiating team, General Rowny, was perhaps the most active arms control representative in the US government. Perhaps the Soviet side did not share his views. But he had worked on SALT I, SALT II, the Vladivostok accords and the Test Ban Treaty. Gromyko would recall that Rowny had worked out the threshold agreements.

The US side does not reject everything that was accomplished in SALT II. As President Reagan recently stated publicly, the US will abide by the restraints of that treaty. It is aware of the problems of the Protocol, which was one of the difficult problems in the way of the treaty ratification.

Haig did not want to dwell on Mr. Warnke’s⁵ and Carter’s lack of judgment, since this was not relevant at the moment, but there is no way of resurrecting SALT II.

All of the balanced approaches of the two sides can be included in the new treaty. The sides would also need to examine American plans for force modernization, as well as, undoubtedly, Soviet plans for force modernization. The Soviets side had spoken of the US advantage in MIRVed SLBMs. These matters must be dealt with in START as destabilizing systems. But the most important destabilizing systems are the heavy land-based missiles. The US is ready to compensate for a reduction in these systems. Hopefully, the Soviet side is not against sharp reductions on both sides. This is the essence of the President’s program, where the focus is on destabilizing systems.

Gromyko should be aware that everything achieved in the past will not be thrown out the window. The positive aspects of SALT II can be used, although the treaty itself is dead, if not buried.

The President is ready for give-and-take in Geneva, but he would never agree to a treaty which would not provide for substantive reductions, or which would permit avenues for increasing destabilizing systems while restraining others which are less destabilizing. Substantial reductions below current levels are very important, not only with regard to systems presently deployed, but future systems as well. A very important question is the question of instantaneous hard-target kill, which the Soviet have with their ICBMs and the US has (and will have much more of) on SLBMs. Another important question was the breakout potential of heavy missiles. Value judgments will be made by experts on both sides. But neither side should fear that the other side will not take its interests into account.

(At this point, there was a short break.)

Gromyko indicated that the main difference between the Soviet approach and the US approach to the discussion of strategic arms was not that the US wanted substantial reductions and the USSR did not. The ideal of substantial reductions is not foreign to the USSR. The Soviet side considers that such reductions must take place. The differences arise over the way in which we see the path of negotiations aimed at such reductions. If the two sides are to discuss only one type of weapon and leave everything else aside, then there is a very large gap between the two positions. Such a position is not realistic. Moreover, the Soviet side had serious doubts when it saw the US position. It wondered whether the US side really wants an agreement.

Haig wished to reassure Gromyko that the US is very serious about reaching agreement, and very serious about substantial reductions. The US does not believe that the American people or the people of the world would be satisfied with less. But the sides should not prejudge the outcome of the talks until experts look at the US side’s Phase I proposals, and listen to the Soviet side’s counter proposals. Apparently, public presentation of the US proposals has raised doubts about the way these questions would be resolved at the table. It is very important to take an approach which would not leave the possibility of destabilizing kinds of weapons—first strike, instantaneous hard-target kill systems on both sides. It is difficult to understand why a proposal of reduction by both sides in this category is called one-sided. But perhaps when the experts get together, the two sides could deal with the matter. However, the Soviet side should not prejudge the outcome solely on the basis of the President’s remarks, without the additional considerations just indicated.

Gromyko said that the US side is the master of its position. He had raised the subject because the US had openly spoken about it. The US should take a different approach. This is the official Soviet position.

Gromyko said it would be good to discuss one independent but related matter. He had presented Brezhnev’s statement at the UNGA concerning the unilateral promise about no first-strike use of nuclear weapons. It would not be immodest to say that this is an historic decision. If other countries did the same, there would be no nuclear war, no first-strike, no second-strike, and so on. The Soviet side was surprised at the initial reaction of Washington to this. It considers that the US should take a more serious approach. It makes no sense to say that if one takes an obligation of no first strike use of nuclear weapons, this opens the door for use of conventional weapons. This is a contrived stance. It is hard to explain. Perhaps it is political inertia, namely, that since the Soviets have made an important decision, it is better for Washington to oppose it. The USSR asks that the US take a more objective approach.

Gromyko indicated that the US is aware that the Soviet side made a proposal to have an agreement on no use of force (and this was approved by the UNGA). But no such agreement exists, since the US reacted negatively. So we have an impenetrable wall. Should we simply knock our heads against it? The US also has no desire to fall into the abyss. Even if there are people in Washington who say that they are not bothered by this, no one really believes them.

The US and the USSR, as well as the other countries of the world, are in one big trench. Both sides should look at the most serious problems before them. And the most serious problem is that of nuclear war. The USSR is not seeking tricks or subterfuge in order to hurt US interests. The only desire of the USSR is to ensure peace in the world. The actions of the USSR will not harm one hair on the head of any nation in the world.

The Soviet Union is disappointed at the reaction of the US to its no first strike proposal, and hopes that this is just an initial reaction, and that US leaders, including the President and Haig, would think this matter over. If all the world’s nuclear powers would do this, questions of strategic arms, European arms and regional questions would appear in a new light.

Haig replied that he was aware of Gromyko’s experience in witnessing history, so Haig was not surprised at such a proposal, since the Soviet Union had made such a proposal before, along with other proposals, such as nuclear free zones. But in the first place, Western military doctrine had long been structured on the principle of force compensation. Western strategy is defensive, not offensive. Nothing in Western actions since the Second World War suggests the use of force, except with regard to Article 51 of the UN Charter. Unfortunately, this has not been the case with the Soviet Union. But the US is looking toward the future and not the past. The West has a defensive strategy. It is against first use of any kind of force. But the topic of use of force is very broad, and involves not only nuclear weapons, which are, indeed, very devastating. There have been more than one hundred conventional military conflicts since the last war and hundreds of thousands of people have been killed in them. These consequences are equally heinous. In addition to conventional warfare, there has been terrorism, insurgency, and violence involving extra-legal means. The West has recoiled from this. This has been the pattern of Soviet actions after World War II, and these actions have caused a large percentage of the conflicts Haig had spoken of. Analyses would confirm this. So it is difficult to isolate one particular area (although an especially heinous one) unless some comparable principle is applied globally by the superpowers to outlaw any kind of conflict. Specifically, revolutionary movements have been sustained, led and instigated from outside on the territories of peaceful nations. There has been illegal use of force in subtle ways. Everything should be viewed in totality. There is a fine line between political struggle and application of force. The two sides should get together to discuss the consequences of conflict in general before such one sided proposals as the no first-use of nuclear weapons can make sense. If a person dies from an axe, a stone, a spear or nuclear weapon, it is still unacceptable. This should be discussed in detail, case-by-case.

It is difficult for the US to seriously accept the pledge not to use nuclear weapons first in light of the agreements of principle of 1972. The sides had taken a pledge not to take advantage of each other. There have been wholesale violations of that pledge, and this is the basis for American suspiciousness.

The West has never used force directly. It has not done so in Western Europe, where the philosophy of structured response has been developed. If the Soviet Union is so magnanimous in its no first strike proposal, it should add credence to it by dismantling some of its systems or at least stopping their build-up.

Substantial reductions of nuclear weapons is fair for both sides. President Reagan is truly dedicated to this. His letters to Brezhnev have not been cynical. The US is very serious about significant reductions, as the coming weeks and months will confirm. Hopefully, the USSR is as interested as it says. If it is, the talks will succeed. But such one sided proclamations or even two sided ones are meaningless when every day, in various regions of the world, the Soviet Union either directly or indirectly violates the spirit, if not the letter, of such a proposal.

Gromyko replied that he categorically disagreed with such views. They were not convincing. They went against the real desires of those who cherished life and who are opposed to nuclear conflict.

He thought that Haig had talked strangely, and wondered if everyone in Washington talks the same way and compares the use of stones and swords to nuclear weapons. If we take one individual, then it does not matter whether he dies from a stone or a nuclear weapon. Death is death. But surely it makes a difference whether one person or a thousand people or one million people or three hundred million or five hundred million people die. Haig’s answer seems to have been a stereotyped response. How can there be no distinction between the death of one person and the death of one thousand, one million, three hundred million and five hundred million, people? The Soviet side cannot agree with such an approach, if it reflects the position of the US Administration. Armed conflicts are not all of an equal nature. But, returning to the talks on nuclear arms in Europe and strategic arms, Gromyko wished to emphasize that they should proceed as planned.

Gromyko suggested that discussion of regional issues, especially the Middle East, could be postponed to the following day.

Haig agreed. He specifically mentioned the Middle East, Poland, southern Africa and Afghanistan.

Gromyko agreed on Africa and Afghanistan, but regarding Poland, said that he would say the same thing he had said in Geneva, i.e., that the Poles had not authorized them to intervene in internal Polish matters.

Haig replied that the Poles had been contacting the US, and that he felt that he and Gromyko were free to discuss any issue.

Haig indicated that Gromyko had selectively rebuffed his views on the no first-strike proposal. In order that the Soviet record and the US record of the meeting not be distorted, he wished to point out that no one in the world can be insensitive to the problem of nuclear weapons. But there must also be sensitivity to the order of international conduct which could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. The history of the world has seen many efforts directed at applying the rule of law to relations between states and the avoidance of conflict. But when the Soviet Union constantly sends arms to assist insurgents, Haig would not accept a lecture on the lack of American understanding of humane principles. The US side considers that there should be a change in this record if we are to achieve progress in arms control, reduction of the nuclear threat and improvement of the relations between our countries which the people of the world demand and which is in their interest.

Gromyko replied that he would answer Haig’s statement the next day, and would also talk about regional issues.

Haig and Gromyko agreed to meet at 9:30 a.m. the following day at the Soviet UN Mission.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Clark Files, Haig/Gromyko Meetings 06/18/1982—06/19/1982. Secret; Nodis; Super Sensitive. The meeting took place at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. Bremer sent the memorandum of conversation to Clark under cover of an undated memorandum. (Ibid.)
2. See Documents 90, 91, 137, and 138.
3. Reference is to Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, who addressed the United Nations on June 16. (“Cuba Reports Getting ‛Huge’ Supply of Arms,” New York Times, June 17, 1982, p. A11)
4. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Documents 91 and 92.
5. Paul Warnke, head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and chief negotiator for SALT II from 1977 to 1978.