21. Notes of a National Security Council Meeting1
Bud McF: review earlier decision—here today to cover 5 remaining agenda items—(1) interim restraints (substantive & public affairs context—to ratify SALT II would legitimize buildup, legitimize gross inequalities, delay getting on w/reductions—review pros & cons—any comments? [no]
Pres: what’s good, if anything, in SALT II?
Bud: counting rules
Haig: preclude breakout they could do—we’re not abiding by SALT II per se—political element
Meese: strategic planning not constrained
Weinberger: densepack/ALCM—I don’t think the Soviets could do more than they’ve done now—if we say we’ll abide by SALT II, I don’t think we’ll get on with START
Meese: I was assuming that what the Pres. said earlier—we’ll not be constrained in planning
Rostow: for the moment, it’s in our interest to abide—no advantage to change policy—SFRC
Weinberger: I’m not advocating public announcement—we need to be clear internally
Meese: but when we advance basing moved for MX, we must be prepared
Haig: problem at moment is a political problem—getting on w/START will resolve issue—if we raise issue now, it will complicate MX
Weinberger: ensure our budget planning
Inman: answer question (1) DELTA III testing—have to take out YANKEES—168? (2) at least 2 new ICBMS underway, can only test 1 (3) BACKFIRE production less than it could be (4) SS–18 MIRVs (5) future verification—encryption of telemetry
Reagan: are they going ahead w/new sub programs
Inman:
[Page 83]Meese: I think we’re agreed (1) no [change] in public formulation (2) resist any attempt to revive SALT II (3) as a matter of policy, no constraints . . . when
Rostow: don’t violate until deploy . . .
McFarlane: we have words that capture this—IG—get back to you
Rowny: whatever we say, distance ourselves from SALT II—help negotiate
McFarlane: 2nd issue
Weinberger: would hope paper not intended for dissemination—“some believe . . .”
Murphy: does this paper assume we’re satisfied w/ telemetry we’re getting now
McFarlane: isn’t intended to—next issue mobiles—propose we reserve judgment in our position although Rowny wishes to build in from start
Rowny: everyone’s agreed we want to keep open options re MX—issue is true mobile—if we don’t want, time to decide is now
McFarlane: you have paper to consider—move on—do we want to ban heavies first, etc.—number of issues—to IG, w/ your approval, for report within two weeks
Weinberger: I thought original paper did include banning of heavies
Pres: MXs?
Weinberger: less than heavy
Pres: Titans—trading chip?
Ikle: Soviets don’t worry about Titans
Pres: heavier than MX?
(chorus): 18s
Pres: 18 heavier than 19?
(chorus): yes
Rostow: comment
Pres.: if we go for heavier 1st, don’t we have negotiation problems
Ikle: it’s like SS-20/zero-option
Hayward: get at 18s indirectly
McFarlane: final issue—phasing—single or two agreements
Weinberger: Phase II as important as Phase I—worried procedurally—would argue for single treaty, one process, because of strong importance we attach to TW as only way to achieve equality at lower levels—if treaty w/ Phase I, doubt get them back
Haig: thought this was issue you decided last time, Mr. Pres—if we can get objectives in I, sign Treaty—I read decision memo that [Page 84] way & briefed on Hill, allies briefed that way—easy matter—have, for instance, 5 year review tied to good faith on Phase II—must keep credibility
Weinberger: no one intends to undercut credibility
Haig: must be clean or clear
Weinberger: I’m worried—5 years/ ALCMs . . .
Haig: if achieve everything in Phase I, then don’t sign, we’d be laughed out of court
Hayward: if you get Phase I, substantial cut TW
Rowny: announcement of whether or not we seek agreement in Phase I should be kept open, from negotiating point of view (discuss Soviet tactics)
Pres: when we talked about it, I didn’t think we meant 2 separate treaties—when we achieve 1st, then see what’s needed in phase II, where we stand (asks question)—am I being Boy Scout
Haig: you said it better than anybody
McFarlane: will you sign
Meese: can’t you reserve question until then
Haig: it’s already been asked: Congress, allies—don’t want to reverse decision already made, via this esoteric discussion
Weinberger: don’t bind us because we’ve briefed w/o clarification of decision
Rostow: explain as in INF, depends on how Soviets play it—don’t create impression we’re out to get one treaty quickly
Haig: great danger is that it looks like you waffling on what you said: Phase I warheads—if bureaucracy’s confused, will emerge
Pres: couldn’t part of negotiations be this
Haig: yes, call it interim, or whatever
Meese: Phase I—reserve decision
McFarlane: precedent—conclude,
Bush: do we then go to Senate, ask ratify I?
Ilke: do like test bans
Weinberger: procedural matter—don’t tie hands by saying that once Phase I done, go to Senate
Pres: until completed on Phase I, don’t know what TW problem is in Phase II
Haig: want to be careful of what has been bureaucratic hassle—don’t undercut Phase I unit of measure
Pres: continuing negotiation
Rostow: don’t fix on 2 agreements
[Page 85]Meese: think we’re agreed
McFarlane: yes
Baker: on last, prepare written guidance
Pres: consensus items
McFarlane:
- Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR—101, NSC 49A. Secret. Drafted by Wheeler. The original text is handwritten. Brackets and ellipses are in the original text. The editor transcribed the portion of the text here specifically for this volume. An image of the notes is Appendix B. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place in the Cabinet Room and ended at approximately 10:45 a.m. No formal minutes of this meeting were found.↩