Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

198. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) and the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State (Timbie) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, June 27, 1987

SUBJECT

• START in Your Meeting with Shevardnadze²

Having made considerable progress in INF, it is worth a serious effort at the Foreign Ministers meeting to revive START, both because this is indeed the “root problem” and because it will be much easier to make the case for INF if there is an agreement or a reasonable prospect for agreement in START. Our leverage is not likely to be greater in the future than it is today.

We had a similar objective for the April meeting, but accomplished very little. At that time, we made the best arguments for our current position. To be more successful now, we will need a different approach.

Our suggestion is to try to engage on some of the issues of interest to the Soviets that we have been saving for the endgame, if the Soviets are prepared to engage on issues of interest to us. Specifically, you could tell Shevardnadze early in the meeting that you are prepared to discuss and resolve issues they have raised—SLCMs and mobile ICBMs—if they are prepared to discuss and resolve issues of interest to us—sublimits and throw weight. If Shevardnadze is interested, discussion of their subjects and our subjects could proceed in parallel.

If we could get such a negotiation going, we would push for an outcome along the following lines:

—4800 ballistic missile warheads

—3600 ICBM warheads³

—1500 heavy ICBM warheads

—Missile throw weight 50% below the current Soviet level

—Mobile ICBMs (and other survivable ICBM basing modes) permitted subject to numerical and verification constraints

—Declarations by both sides of their deployment plans for long-range nuclear-armed SLCMs

—All of this to be implemented over seven years (e.g., by 1995).

If the Soviets have not given up on START or closed their minds to sublimits, an outcome along these lines may be possible. There would appear to be little to lose in trying.

While such an outcome would receive broad support as achieving our primary objectives at little cost, there will be opposition on both substance and timing. We would need authority to permit mobile ICBMs, settle the SLCM question on the basis of declarations, and drop the 1650 sublimit in favor of the Soviet proposal to cut heavy ICBMs by 50%.

We can anticipate that Shevardnadze will probably counter by proposing to expand the discussion to include a sublimit on SLBM warheads and to include linkage to defense and space. The package could be expanded to deal with these issues in ways that serve our interests, and this would also require new authority. Applying a 3600 sublimit to SLBM warheads as well as to ICBM warheads would permit SLBM warheads to comprise ¾ of our ballistic missile force, a slightly larger fraction than in our present force. Such a limit should be acceptable to the United States, but we know from experience that the JCS opposes such a sublimit on grounds that we should keep open the option to deploy most of our warheads in a survivable sea-based mode as a hedge against inability to deploy survivable ICBMs. With regard to linkage to defense and space, Shevardnadze will probably want to add a provision in START permitting a side to terminate the reductions agreement if the other side breaks out of the ABM Treaty.⁴ Since in this situation a party could invoke the supreme interest withdrawal clause in any event, such an explicit provision would actually add little. However, we can anticipate opposition on this point as well.

We and Max and Ron tried to get comparable ideas approved for use with Shevardnadze in April, with very modest success. This implies we should try a different approach now. One idea would be to put our recommendations together as a package, and try to get the President to make an up or down decision on the package. If you concur, we can work with EUR and PM to assemble a package which you could brief to the President and Max and Paul could brief to Howard Baker and Frank Carlucci. The White House needs to appreciate the advantages of a START agreement to accompany or closely follow INF, so they are prepared to make a serious effort to get one.

There is no need for detailed interagency staffing of these ideas; none of them is novel. Ideally, the President could call a meeting on our package with you, Cap, Crowe, Carlucci, and perhaps Webster and then give you guidance. We can exploit our home court advantage, and not try to anticipate every move with contingency guidance. You can report as the talks progress, and get further guidance as necessary.

We would like to meet with you, Max, Roz, and Allen to discuss these ideas further.⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control and Disarmament, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Records of James P. Timbie, Box 1, START/INF 1987. Secret. Drafted by Timbie; cleared by Holmes and Burton. Timbie initialed the memorandum on Nitze’s behalf. A stamped notation indicates that Shultz saw the memorandum.
2. Shevardnadze visited Washington for talks with Reagan, Shultz, and other U.S. officials from September 15–17. See Document 210. The memoranda of conversation are printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Documents 66–72, 74–76.
3. Shultz drew a horizontal line from this point to the right-hand margin and wrote: “could we live w/o this sublimit so we don’t get into the SLBM question?” A typed note on the memorandum dates Shultz’s comment as June 29.
4. Shultz underlined “a provision in START permitting a side to terminate the reductions agreement if the other side breaks out of the ABM Treaty” and wrote in the right-hand margin: “elaborate as in your other memos.” A typed note on the memorandum dates Shultz’s comment as June 29. The reference to Nitze’s and Timbie’s other memoranda is not further identified.
5. In a June 29 note affixed to the memorandum, Shultz wrote: “I favor trying to get ourselves in a position to do this.” (Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control and Disarmament, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Records of James P. Timbie, Box 1, START/INF 1987)