Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

199. Memorandum From Ambassador-at-Large Nitze and the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State (Timbie) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, July 7, 1987

SUBJECT

• START

This memorandum addresses further the issues you flagged in our memorandum of last week.²

ICBM Sublimit

You asked if we could live without the 3300/3600 sublimit on ICBM warheads to avoid getting into the SLBM warhead question. Our answer is that in the end, the US could forego the 3600 ICBM warhead sublimit provided we get the 4800 ballistic missile warhead and 1500 heavy ICBM warhead sublimits. The Soviets would almost certainly want to keep some SLBMs, so under the 4800 and 1500 sublimits they would likely have 3500–3600 ICBM warheads in any event, about the same fraction of their total force as today.

There are, however, a number of caveats. First, it is important that the START agreement not merely reduce forces but contribute to stability. One way a START agreement can do this is to provide for a survivable US ICBM force. This implies both constraints on the number of accurate Soviet warheads (ICBM warheads and in the long run perhaps SLBM warheads as well), and flexibility for the US to deploy ICBMs in sufficient quantity and in sufficiently survivable basing modes to survive a determined attack. We have commissioned an analysis of the ability of the United States to deploy a survivable ICBM force under constraints of 3600 ICBM warheads and 1600 total launchers, plus an exploration of the effect raising the upper limit on Soviet ICBM warheads above 3600 would have. Our tentative conclusion is that under a 4800 sublimit the Soviets would be unlikely to have substantially more than 3600 ICBM warheads, and we could deploy an ICBM force of our own such that a significant number would survive even if they should do so.

Without an ICBM warhead sublimit the START agreement will be more difficult to sell to the Senate. Opponents would argue that the Soviets could have 4800 ICBM warheads to use against some 800 US ICBMs, a 6-to-1 ratio no better than today’s situation. While there are counterarguments, this would be a negative aspect to the agreement.

Finally, without the 3600 sublimit the 4800 sublimit becomes absolutely essential. So we should not concede on this point without definitive Soviet acceptance of the 4800 (and the 1500).

All of this leads us to recommend that we initially show flexibility on the 1650 but not the 3300 sublimit. If Shevardnadze objects, as we expect, we can try raising the number to 3600 in the context of Soviet movement on issues of interest to us. In the end, we could agree to drop the ICBM sublimit rather than consider applying it to SLBMs, but only in the context of pinning down the 4800 and 1500. We should not now assume that a 3600 ICBM warhead sublimit is unattainable.

Linking START to the ABM Treaty

The Soviets have recently suggested that their START proposal will permit a side to terminate the START reductions if the other side takes steps to undermine the ABM Treaty. They say this concept will be part of their new START Treaty.

Without an agreement on what testing is permitted and not permitted under the ABM Treaty, such a linkage of START to the ABM Treaty would be imprudent; it would encourage the Congress to enact unilateral constraints on the use of appropriated funds on tests remotely justifying Soviet withdrawal from scheduled START reductions. Such restraints would not be binding on the Soviets.

However, reaching agreement on a START Treaty and getting it ratified by the Senate will probably require addressing ABM Treaty issues. If this is true, it would be better to link START to the ABM Treaty, which already exists, than to hold it hostage to a Defense and Space Treaty whose prospects are uncertain at best and would require the same agreement on what testing is and is not permitted. Max, as you know, believes that it may not be necessary to go beyond non-deployment.

Another point is that the START agreement will permit withdrawal on six months notice if a party judges its supreme interests to be jeopardized, and either party could invoke this clause in any event should the other party break out of the ABM Treaty.

Finally, there is a close relationship between offense and defense, and this is recognized in our Defense and Space position.

Our suggestion is that you let Shevardnadze raise this issue, and at an appropriate time in response say that we recognize that there is a close relationship between offense and defense, and that we believe we can find ways to record this relationship in a START agreement. This would leave our negotiators quite a bit of leeway on how to implement this concept, and if it should permit Shevardnadze to discuss the substance of START we would be way ahead of the game.

With or without this explicit linkage between START and the ABM Treaty, we will need to clarify what the ABM Treaty permits and prohibits, and resolve the Krasnoyarsk violation.

Other Points

We have discussed these issues with Ron Lehman. He fully supports the linkage approach discussed here. On the 3600, he agrees it could be dropped in the end, but would be very cautious now for fear that if we decide what our bottom line is it will leak, and fear that if we move too quickly, we could find ourselves in a position where the Soviets have what they want (6000 warheads, mobile ICBMs allowed, SLCMs constrained) and we don’t have what we need (sublimits and throw weight constraints). This leads him to be inclined to hang tough for now on the 3300/3600, until the Soviets agree to the 4800, 1500, and a limit on the number of mobile ICBMs.

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control and Disarmament, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Records of James P. Timbie, Box 1, START/INF 1987. Secret. Drafted by Timbie; cleared by Kampelman, Holmes, and Burton. A stamped notation indicates Whitehead saw the memorandum.
2. See Document 198.