210. Editorial Note
On September 16, 1987, Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze met from 9 to 10:20 a.m. in Shultz’s private office at the Department of State. After a discussion of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces negotiations, Shultz “said he would like to make a few points on START. Reflecting on the reports of the U.S. working group (and he had been told the discussion of START issues was useful), he wanted to take the opportunity to emphasize to Shevardnadze the importance we attached to the concept of an overall limit on ballistic missile warheads, within the overall 6,000 warhead limit which was already agreed.” Shultz’s reasoning, which he described as “straightforward,” was that “weapons carried by airplanes were in a different class from those mounted on ballistic missiles.” “This was obviously true in a descriptive sense,” Shultz went on to say, “and past Soviet proposals had seemed to reflect this. We had taken this into account in suggesting a 4,800 limit on ballistic missile warheads, applying the Soviet figure of 80% to the 6,000 limit agreed to in Reykjavik. The problem we had with the current Soviet 60% [Page 907] proposal was that it would allow all 6,000 warheads to be on ballistic missiles. That would be undesirable, as ballistic missiles were the most threatening and destabilizing element of the triad. So we needed to find means of forcing those numbers down.” (Memorandum of Conversation, September 16; [Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz-Shevardnadze—Wash—9/87.] The full memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 69.
Shevardnadze responded that the Soviet position was based “on the fact that a strategic structure already existed—the triad, which both sides had configured to meet their specific needs. What the U.S. was proposing would shatter that structure, to the detriment of Soviet security interests.” The foreign minister “had already said the day before that, at this stage, the Soviet Union could accept a 3,600 limit on ICBM’s. That was a significant step in the American direction. The experts could play further with the figures, but that was the Soviet number.” Also, Shevardnadze said “he could not accept the Secretary’s contention that ballistic missiles were more destabilizing and dangerous than bombers. Bombers were very dangerous indeed, as U.S. experts would be able to tell the Secretary. Otherwise, why would the U.S. want to keep so many?” (Ibid.)
Following Shultz and Shevardnadze’s meeting, the Nuclear and Space Talks Experts Group, led by Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) Paul Nitze and Soviet Marshall Sergei Akhromeyev, met at the Department of State from 4 to 7 p.m. A memorandum of conversation is in the Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Box 214, Shultz-Shevardnadze—Wash—9/87.
Shultz and Shevardnadze met again in Shultz’s private office the morning of September 17. In a meeting that lasted from 9:35 a.m. to 2:30 p.m., they discussed bilateral issues, INF, START, nuclear testing, and plans for an upcoming summit in Washington. A memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 74. Following this meeting, Shultz and Shevardnadze went to the Monroe Room of the State Department, where from 3:15 to 4:45 p.m. they received reports from working groups on nuclear testing, chemical weapons, and conventional arms negotiations. A memorandum of conversation is in the Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Box 214, Shultz-Shevardnadze—Wash—9/87.
[Page 908]In their joint statement of September 18, Shultz and Shevardnadze announced their “agreement in principle to conclude” an INF Treaty, and “that a similarly intensive effort should be made to achieve a treaty on 50% reductions in strategic offensive arms within the framework of the Geneva nuclear and space talks.” (Department of State Bulletin, November 1987, pp. 39–40).
In a paper he prepared for Shultz’s use in a September 18 meeting with President Reagan, Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State James Timbie included three points on START: “—Big issues still unresolved. 4800 sublimit, mobile ICBMs, link to Defense and Space.—Delegation will do what it can, and we will have two more opportunities this fall to discuss START in detail with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. Top priority.—Gorbachev said publicly on Wednesday that we should aim to complete START early next year. We have seen already this week that once the Soviet leadership makes the decision to try to accomplish something, people down the line become easier to deal with. We can agree with the objective of completing START next spring.” (Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, 1987 Sept. 18 Mtg. w/ the Pres.)