197. Telegram From the Consulate in Frankfurt to the Department of State1
7793. Subject: Dobrynin on arms control issues.
1. Secret—Entire text.
2. The Dobrynins accepted an invitation from Rebecca and me for a private dinner Friday2 evening, and when we rose from the table Dobrynin suggested a tete-a-tete which continued for well over an hour. He was mainly interested in assessing the prospects for arms control agreements, and spent more time talking than listening. We spoke only Russian, since—despite his fluency in English—I sensed that he was more relaxed in his own language and, indeed, his words—delivered in the same clipped stacatto characteristic of his English—gushed forth in such profusion that at times I had difficulty finding openings to insert my own comments. In general, his substantive message was consistent with the one you received from Bessmertnykh,3 but the underlying question, to which he returned repeatedly, was: does the administration really want to conclude an INF agreement— [Page 866] and if it does, does it have the political will and political clout to bring an agreement to a successful conclusion?
3. On this point I assured him that the administration is totally serious about concluding real arms reduction agreements, but of course could not accept some of the current Soviet positions. Therefore, if they are serious, the Soviets must take a constructive attitude toward the remaining issues and be prepared to work them out without unnecessary delay.
4. Other comments which Dobrynin offered were the following:
—A claim that the START proposal you brought last month made a “bad impression” on Gorbachev, since it seemed a “retreat” from the Reykjavik formula;
—A statement that he was “astounded” by the allied resistance to their SRINF proposal, since they considered their proposal a major concession to the Western position;
—A preference for working on an agreement on “basic elements” of a START agreement, on the practical grounds that time probably will not permit negotiation of a complete treaty text.
—Repeated assertions that no START agreement could be concluded unless there was a satisfactory resolution of the issue connected with SDI and the ABM treaty.
5. I replied to these comments along the following lines:
—The President is eager to move ahead with sound agreements for fair and balanced arms reduction, but will not sacrifice a viable SDI research and testing program to attain this goal. (To this, Dobrynin commented that Gorbachev understood this fact—and was willing to “let the President have his program.” However, Gorbachev—he said—could not concede an American right to deploy SDI at some time in the future, and had to have some understanding of just where to draw the line between testing and deployment—particularly in space.)
—Regarding our proposal for a 50 percent reduction of strategic arms over a seven-year period, I pointed out that it was an honest attempt on our part to find a compromise solution to the Reykjavik impasse. Dobrynin said he could understand the logic of our move, but repeated that “psychologically” the effect was bad, since it involved a longer-period for the 50 percent reduction than was discussed at Reykjavik, and a shorter period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.
—Regarding the position of the allies on SRINF, I reminded him of the very legitimate concerns of the West Europeans regarding the conventional inbalance and potential decoupling. Dobrynin retorted by saying that the decision to offer zero in Europe was a difficult one for them and was made by Gorbachev personally “to avoid unbecoming [Page 867] and petty haggling over number”—in the full expectation that it would be greeted by the U.S. and West Europeans as a forward move. “However—if you don’t want it,” Dobrynin added—“we can do an INF agreement without it.”
—As for working on a “basic elements” agreement for START, I pointed out that a treaty would be a much better goal, and expressed the hope that Soviet negotiations would deal with it promptly and constructively. Dobrynin said that they have nothing against negotiating a treaty per se: it is simply their judgment that we may have time only for something more limited, such as an agreement on basic elements, similar to Vladivostak. I commented that we would hardly consider Vladivostak an encouraging precedent—and indeed it illustrates some of the real pitfalls inherent in an agreement which does not include the details.
6. Picking up on his comment about the “bad impression” left by our proposal for 50 percent START reductions over a seven year period, I asked him if it would be correct to infer that the most important element for the Soviets is the length of time the parties agree not to withdraw from the ABM treaty. He avoided confirming this, but commented that they had interpreted our proposal as meaning (A) that we cannot deploy SDI for seven years in any event; and (B) that the U.S. wants to set in motion a process to break the ABM treaty at that time. He then added that it is the latter situation which they cannot accept. I told him that their analysis was not correct—that we are offering commitments which in fact will show the development of SDI, and that it would be quite unrealistic if the Soviets were to demand an ultimate veto over SDI deployment.
7. Comment: There was nothing surprising or new about the points Dobrynin made. However, I was struck by his persistent effort to portray Gorbachev as a man in a hurry to wrap up some agreements. He repeatedly said that Gorbachev dislikes “petty trading” and prefers the grand gesture to nitpicking the details. He also asked repeatedly about the President’s commitment to concluding agreements and (implicitly) his political strength to carry them through, particularly with former President Nixon now critical of our INF position. (He observed wryly, by the way, that we had extracted from them a much better deal for the U.S. than Nixon and Kissinger ever had, and though he could understand Kissinger’s criticism on “egotistical grounds”—(i.e., it was not his idea—he was surprised by Nixon’s criticism.) I assured him that the President’s authority to negotiate such matters has in no way been affected by unrelated matters such as “Irangate,” and that if they were willing to negotiate constructively and fairly they would certainly find the President responsive. I cautioned him, however, that the President does not “need” an agreement for agreement’s sake and would not make one-sided concessions to achieve one.
[Page 868]8. My overall conclusion—based on much more than this one conversation—is that Gorbachev does see it in his interest to wrap up an agreement—at least on INF—this year. They know we are more interested in START, and want to use this interest to bring pressure to bear on SDI. But the bottom line seems to be that Gorbachev has an increasing stake in concluding an agreement he can point to as a concrete achievement of his leadership. The domestic Soviet arena does not offer promising material for quick results, and if he is to claim success in the near term, he has far alternatives to seeking it in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N870004-0417. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.↩
- May 15.↩
- See Document 196.↩